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ABSTRACT 
In 2009, the IASB issued its International Financial Reporting Standard for Small and 
Medium‐sized Entities. Little is known about what influenced countries’ decisions on 
whether to adopt this important standard. 
This study aims to develop a deeper understanding of the decision-making process of national 
accounting standards boards (NASBs) by examining the influence of both visible 
environmental factors, including the European Community (EC), national governments and 
stakeholders, and unseen environmental factors such as authority, history and culture on their 
behaviour towards IFRS for SMEs. Scholars have criticised NASBs’ decision-making 
processes for being conducted inside a black box and have called for further investigation of 
this topic. This study uses IFRS for SMEs as a vehicle to fulfil its main objectives by 
focusing on different European Union (EU) jurisdictions because their reactions toward IFRS 
for SMEs varied significantly. This is despite the fact that all EU jurisdictions must conform 
to EC directives, and hence have common rules which they must incorporate. 
The main contribution of this study is to show that EU governments’ and NASBs’ decision-
making processes are not isomorphic but differ significantly. Moreover the various 
behaviours toward IFRS for SMEs resulted not from cost benefit analyses or domination of a 
single entity or factor but from the influence of interrelated environmental factors that differ 
from one jurisdiction to another. The findings are explained through a theoretical framework 
which incorporates theories of power and legitimacy into institutional theory and suggest that 
whilst the EC had the capacity to mandate adoption of the standard, it chose not to exercise 
this power. This in turn led other visible environmental factors, including governments and 
stakeholders, and unseen environmental factors, such as authority, history and culture, to 
influence the final outcomes and behaviour of governments and NASBs toward IFRS for 
SMEs. 
Word count: 295 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Research 
1.1 Introduction 
This study explores and investigates European Union (EU) National Accounting 
Standards Boards’ (NASBs) decision-making processes with regard to International 
Financial Reporting Standard for Small and Medium-sized Entities (IFRS for SMEs). 
It uses the standard as a vehicle to investigate their processes and the motivations 
behind their various behaviours toward it. The reasons for using IFRS for SMEs for 
this investigation are twofold. First, Small and Medium‐sized Entities (SMEs) are very 
important to any economy because at least 95 per cent of companies are considered to 
be SMEs (IASB 2018a). Second, since the issuance of this standard, many 
jurisdictions have either adopted it or used it as a blueprint for their national 
accounting regulations. An issue of Accounting in Europe (Vol. 14, Issue 1-2, 2017) 
was dedicated mainly to investigating the role and current state of the International 
Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB) standards, including IFRS for SMEs in the EU, 
indicating the academic importance of the adoption decision. 
Some previous studies (Kaya and Koch 2015; Saucke 2015) have argued that 
jurisdictions’ decisions relating to their behaviour toward IFRS for SMEs were based 
mainly on cost–benefit analyses. They have also argued that EU countries were 
unlikely to adopt the standard, or at most would adopt but modify it, owing to its 
inconsistencies with EC directives, indicating that the directives were a roadblock to 
adopting the standard. If this were the case, NASBs’ decision-making processes would 
be simple and easy to understand. However, studies have criticised NASB’s decision-
making processes for being conducted inside a “black box” (e.g. Hodges and Mellett 
2002, 2012; Howieson 2017; Baudot 2018; Klein and Fülbier 2018), indicating that 
classifying NASBs’ decision-making processes as mere cost-benefit analyses fails to 
explain this complex issue. With regard to the EC’s Fourth and Seventh Directives, 
Kaufhold (2015, p.1950) argues that the updated version of the Fourth Directive 
2013/34/EU removed the vast majority of incompatibilities between IFRS for SMEs 
and the directive, and that the only issue remaining was “the treatment of unpaid 
subscribed capital”, which the author deemed unrelated to SMEs because they rarely 
use it. In other words, the revised directive removed many existing differences, which 
would allow adoption of IFRS for SMEs. Thus, Kaya and Koch’s (2015) and Saucke’s 
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(2015) findings should be treated with caution because their results at most partly 
explain NASBs’ decision-making processes. 
In the remainder of this chapter, Section 1.2 presents the motivation for this research 
and the research questions, Section 1.3 introduces the research methods, Section 1.4 
discusses the contribution, and Section 1.5 provides an overview of the study. 
1.2 Research motivation and questions 
The IASB started working on its IFRS for SMEs project in July 2003 and completed 
and published it in July 2009 (IASB 2009; Ram 2012; Ram and Newberry 2013, 
2017). The IASB stated that IFRS for SMEs is a standalone standard with fewer than 
250 pages and claimed that it had been designed around SMEs’ capabilities and needs, 
arguing that the standard is applicable to all SMEs worldwide, which constitute more 
than 95 per cent of companies around the globe (IASB 2018a). In developing IFRS 
for SMEs, the IASB did not want to create a new framework based on SMEs’ needs 
and uses; rather, it used the conceptual framework of International Financial Reporting 
Standards for publicly accountable entities (IFRS) but reduced its accounting options 
and disclosure requirements (IASB 2003). Thus, it appears to have not intended to 
create a different set of accounting standards, but a simpler version of IFRS. The 
IASB’s method suggests that it viewed SMEs’ uses of financial statements as similar 
to those of public companies, and adopted a top-down rather than bottom-up approach 
based on their needs for and uses of financial statements. In justifying its top-down 
approach, the IASB (2007a, p.27) claimed that a “fresh start” approach to issuing IFRS 
for SMEs “would be costly and time-consuming and ultimately futile”. 
Although the IASB’s top-down approach indicated that IFRS for SMEs might at most 
partly satisfy SMEs’ requirements, many jurisdictions either adopted or permitted use 
of the standard (IASB 2018c). According to Kaya and Koch (2015, p.93), “despite the 
economic importance of non-publicly accountable entities, little is known about what 
factors influence countries’ decisions to adopt IFRS for SMEs”. The IASB’s top-down 
approach and increasing acceptance of the standard have motivated scholars (e.g. 
Aboagye‐Otchere and Agbeibor 2012; Bartůňková 2013; Hoxha 2014; Chand et al. 
2015; Nisansala 2018) to investigate its usefulness for SMEs in many jurisdictions. In 
general, they find that IFRS for SMEs is not suitable for SMEs in developing countries 
because it is deemed too costly and time-consuming and requires detailed disclosures, 
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and the use of fair-value measurement would pose significant challenges. They argue 
that the costly and cumbersome standard would not create significant benefits because 
SMEs’ financial statements are prepared primarily for the purposes of management 
(e.g. Collis and Jarvis 2000) and taxation (e.g. Sian and Roberts 2009), whereas 
publicly accountable entities prepare financial statements to inform investors (Saucke 
2015). Hopwood (1994) suggests that the benefits of international accounting 
standards (IASs) have been taken for granted rather than being systematically 
explored, which suggests a limited understanding of these standards. This assumption 
may be applicable to IFRS for SMEs, since many jurisdictions have adopted or 
permitted it regardless of the IASB’s top-down approach and empirical results that 
challenge its usefulness for SMEs worldwide. These issues raise the question of why 
many jurisdictions have adopted or permitted its use, which in turn motivated this 
study’s exploration of EU NASBs’ decision-making processes with regard to IFRS for 
SMEs. 
The EU provides an interesting setting in which to investigate NASBs’ decision-
making processes because all EU jurisdictions must comply with EC directives (EC 
2016b), and hence have common rules to which they must adhere and must incorporate 
into their own regulations when issuing national laws and regulations. However, the 
EC’s rejection of IFRS for SMEs did not cause all EU jurisdictions to reject the 
standard but resulted in differing behaviours. For instance, the United Kingdom (UK) 
and Ireland adopted the standard with major modifications, whereas Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands rejected it (IFRS Foundation 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016f, 
2016h). This raises questions about the reasons for these differing decisions. 
Previous studies of NASBs’ decision-making processes with regard to IFRS (e.g. Mir 
and Rahaman 2005; Hail et al. 2010; Ramanna 2013; Howieson 2017) suggest that 
various environmental factors may have influenced final outcomes. They show that 
NASBs’ processes do not take place in a vacuum. Scholars (e.g. Hoffmann and Zülch 
2014; Kosi and Reither 2014; Fülbier et al. 2017) have identified national stakeholders 
as a relevant element of NASBs’ environment. For instance, the German parliament’s 
modernisation of the accounting regulations of the Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB, German 
Commercial Code) between 2007 and 2009 was significantly influenced by 
widespread use of the IASB’s IASs, meaning that many proposed accounting 
treatments were aligned with the IASs (Hoffmann and Zülch 2014; Fülbier et al. 2017). 
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German national stakeholders were not pleased with such a move and actively lobbied 
the parliament, both privately and publicly, in order to prevent the IASB’s accounting 
standards from infiltrating German Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP). Hoffmann and Zülch (2014) and Fülbier et al. (2017) suggest that lobbyists 
successfully influenced the parliament since the initial regulatory proposal was very 
close to IFRS, whereas the final law did not explicitly refer to it. 
German stakeholders’ strong opposition to the IASB’s accounting standards can be 
explained by their negative experience of similar standards during crises in the 1870s 
and 1920s. According to Heidhues and Patel (2011) and Hoffmann and Detzen (2013), 
Germany’s incorporation of fair value measurement during the 1870s and 1920s 
contributed significantly to these crises.1 Prior to incorporation of fair value, entities 
were only permitted to use historical cost treatments. However, fair value 
measurements were later permitted, allowing entities to revalue their assets based on 
market price at the time of recognition. This feature led them to overestimate their 
assets, which caused many to go bankrupt, and in turn led to two national crises. Since 
fair value measurement had allowed entities to abuse the accounting system and record 
overestimated transactions, in the 1920s the German government removed this option, 
reintroduced historical cost accounting and allowed hidden reserves in financial 
statements. Germany’s unfavourable experience with fair value accounting led 
German SMEs to react negatively to any regulation or accounting standard that might 
reintroduce fair value measurement. Detailed disclosure and fair value measurement 
are essential characteristics of the IASB’s accounting standards (IASB 2009; EC 2010; 
Ernst & Young 2010), posing significant challenges for Germany’s historically and 
culturally embedded accounting regulations. This conflict offers an explanation to 
German SMEs’ conservative behaviour toward modernisation of German GAAP. 
Previous studies (e.g. Annisette 2004; Ashraf and Ghani 2005; Mir and Rahaman 
2005; Albu et al. 2011; Krishnan 2016, 2018) also identify another component of 
NASBs’ environment: the influence of supranational entities. For instance, Mir and 
Rahaman (2005) argue that Bangladesh adopted IFRS as issued by the IASB and 
without consultation with national stakeholders because its accounting standards 
                                                 
1According to Hoffmann and Detzen (2013, p.384), “Fair value, market value and current value are 
used interchangeably and signify valuation concepts other than historical cost. For a discussion of the 
concepts and their recent history, see Alexander (2007)”. 
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setter, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB), accepted a World 
Bank grant of US$200,000 to improve its capability to adopt these standards. In 
contrast, Albu et al. (2011) argue that although the World Bank mandated adoption of 
IFRS as a condition for granting a loan to Romania, it did not adopt these standards as 
issued by the IASB because of its desire to join the EU. It incorporated IFRS to the 
extent that all adopted standards complied with the EC’s Fourth and Seventh 
Directives, indicating that although two supranational entities influenced its adoption 
decision, the EC was more powerful in this case, which led to changes to the adopted 
standards. 
These studies reveal influential environmental factors, including supranational entities 
such as the EC and national stakeholders, culture and history. Such factors led NASBs 
to behave differently toward IFRS. These inconsistencies suggest that each 
jurisdiction or NASB has different features and is influenced by different entities. 
Since accounting is a social practice, other phenomena also require investigation. 
Thus, the objective of this study is to explore and deepen understanding of EU NASBs’ 
decision-making processes with regard to their various behaviours toward IFRS for 
SMEs. The findings of previous studies helped in the development of the following 
research questions: 
1- What were NASBs’ decision-making processes with regard to adopting IFRS for 
SMEs? 
2- What were NASBs’ perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of IFRS for 
SMEs, and how did these influence their adoption decisions? 
3- Which entities and factors influenced NASBs’ decision-making processes in the 
case of IFRS for SMEs, and to what extent? 
The first research question was developed from studies including Broadbent and 
Laughlin (2002), Eierle and Haller (2009), Ram (2012), Ram and Newberry (2013, 
2017), Uyar and Güngörmüş (2013), Kiliç et al. (2014) and Krishnan (2016). The 
second was drawn from studies by Bartůňková (2013), Hoxha (2014), Chand et al. 
(2015), Kaya and Koch (2015), Saucke (2015) and Gassen (2017). The final question 
was developed from Broadbent and Laughlin (2002), Mir and Rahaman (2005), 
Howieson (2009, 2017), Albu et al. (2011), Burlaud and Colasse (2011), Danjou and 
Walton (2012), Ramanna (2013), Ram and Newberry (2013), Collis et al. (2017), Di 
Pietra (2017) and Fülbier et al. (2017). It was then necessary to determine an 
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appropriate research method to achieve the research objective, as discussed in the next 
section. 
1.3 Research methods 
This study embraces Laughlin’s (1995) middle-range thinking (MRT). He describes 
this approach as a middle ground between positivism and interpretivism, taking into 
account the strengths and weaknesses of both. For instance, Laughlin (1995) argues 
that positivism’s predetermined or fixed perceptions do not allow scholars to explore 
accidently overlooked issues (Broadbent and Laughlin 2013). In contrast, 
interpretivists lack rules and engage in minimal preparation for fear that rules may 
constrain their investigations, so it is almost impossible to replicate such studies since 
they are based on the researchers’ own perceptual powers (Laughlin 1995). In order 
to minimise the disadvantages and maximise the advantages of positivism and 
interpretivism, Laughlin’s (1995, 2004, 2007) Middle Range Thinking (MRT) 
approach suggests that it is essential to gain general preliminary understandings of the 
phenomena under investigation. Such understandings can be gained from previous 
literature, to help identify general patterns that may guide and be guided by empirical 
results. Scholars’ involvement with the phenomena under investigation should neither 
be fixed nor entirely without rules, but semi-structured. Having some rules allows 
replication and provides scholars with flexibility to adjust the research design. Since 
accounting is defined as a social practice (Chua 1986), it is desirable to collect and use 
qualitative data, including interviews and publicly available documents (Laughlin 
1995). 
Based on the MRT approach, in this study, a general preliminary understanding of 
NASBs’ decision-making processes was gained from a review of previous literature. 
This review indicated the existence of general theoretical and empirical patterns, 
including environmental factors influencing NASBs’ decision-making processes, 
which helped create the skeletal theoretical framework, research questions and 
interview protocols for this study. The framework also provided some structure for 
field involvement and investigation of the chosen phenomenon. Qualitative data and 
research methods were used in this study, involving interviews and the gathering of 
publicly available documents. The data gathering was based on semi-structured rules, 
so the investigation process was guided by the study’s research design and theoretical 
framework. NVivo software and latent content analysis were used to analyse the 
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interviews and archival and secondary data respectively. All gathered data were 
reflexively interpreted and considered in tandem, which allowed exploration of 
reasons for EU NASBs’ various behaviours toward IFRS for SMEs. Lastly, critical 
reflexive thinking facilitated the theoretical and empirical contributions of this study, 
as discussed in more detail in the next section. 
1.4 Contributions 
The contributions of this study are twofold. First, it makes several practical 
contributions. Previous scholars (Kaya and Koch 2015; Saucke 2015) have argued that 
cost–benefit analysis and the EC’s directives were the principal causes of rejection of 
IFRS for SMEs in the EU and the UK’s major modifications. However, although the 
EC had a notable influence on EU jurisdictions, its directives were not the most 
influential factors with regard to governments’ and NASBs’ differing behaviours 
toward IFRS for SMEs. In other words, since the EC did not mandate adoption of the 
standard, its latent power allowed both visible and unseen environmental factors 
relating to EU NASBs to influence their behaviours and final outcomes. However, 
although NASBs were influenced by similar environmental factors, these factors 
varied in nature and were interrelated, revealing the complexity of their adoption and 
non-adoption decisions. 
This challenges the assumption that NASBs’ decisions were based mainly on cost–
benefit analyses; rather, interrelated factors, including visible environmental factors 
such as the EC, national governments and stakeholders, and unseen environmental 
factors such as authority, national history and culture, influenced adoption or non-
adoption of IFRS for SMEs to differing extents. The findings also suggest many 
reasons for the major modifications introduced by the UK and Ireland prior to adopting 
IFRS for SMEs. Although some of the ASB’s early modifications were due partly to 
the EC directives and issues of incomparability between the standard and the EC’s 
Fourth and Seventh Directives, the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC) major 
modifications were driven not by the EC regulations but by its environment. 
In addition to its practical contributions, this study also makes a theoretical 
contribution. Dillard et al. (2004) suggest that incorporating structuration theory into 
institutional theory enabled them to mitigate institutional theory’s limitations and led 
to a better articulation of the phenomenon they investigated. In a similar approach, this 
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study incorporates theories of power and legitimacy into institutional theory to enable 
a deeper understanding of NASBs’ decision making processes. Institutional theory has 
been criticised for its weak consideration of power (e.g. Cloutier and Langley 2013) 
and oversimplified recognition of legitimacy (e.g. Dart 2004; Phillips and Malhotra 
2008; Scott 2008). For instance, institutional theory does not acknowledge that power 
has multiple dimensions and that legitimacy has various types. This is important for 
this study as each dimension of power and type of legitimacy may differently influence 
an entity’s behaviour and tolerance of or compliance with various environmental 
factors. Scholars (e.g. Hail et al. 2010; Zeff and Nobes 2010; Albu et al. 2011; 
Ramanna 2013) also highlight that authority and national accounting history and 
culture are important and relevant factors for understanding NASBs’ decision-making 
processes, yet institutional theory at most only briefly and implicitly discusses these 
factors. 
In order to mitigate these criticisms, this study creates a skeletal theoretical framework 
presented in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1, which incorporates a theory of power, more 
specifically Lukes’s (1974, 1977, 2005) work on power including his three dimensions 
of power, and legitimacy theory, more specifically Suchman’s (1995) different types 
of legitimacy. It also explicitly acknowledges relevant factors defined by prior 
literature discussed in Chapter 2, including influence of authority, and history and 
culture. In other words, the theoretical framework of this study proposes a social-
theory-based framework for expanding institutional theory to better articulate 
institutionalisation processes by suggesting that coercive pressure has multiple 
dimensions and that normative and memetic pressures each have various types. This, 
in turn, allows institutional theory to better articulate political and socio-economic 
contexts and further addresses the dynamics of enacting, embedding and changing 
organisational processes. For instance, the findings of this study suggest that, in the 
case of IFRS for SMEs, the EC’s latent power, since it did not mandate adoption of 
the standard, allowed various environmental factors to influence governments’ and 
NASBs’ decision-making processes. However, in the case of IFRS, despite the 
existence of various cultural, historical and accounting traditions in the EU, the EC’s 
exercise of power caused EU countries’ to adopt these standards for publicly listed 
companies’ consolidated financial statements. In effect the EC’s exercise of power 
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prevented other environmental factors influencing NASBs decision-making 
processes. 
Laughlin (1995, 2004, 2007) defines the MRT approach as a technique to “flesh out” 
a theoretical “skeleton”. The “skeletal” theory may indicate the existence of general 
patterns; however, empirical results and evidence are required to validate and make 
such theory meaningful. In other words, the theoretical skeleton only provides a 
language that allows the empirical findings to be understood, and the empirical 
findings authenticate and aid the development of the skeletal theory. Thus, the skeletal 
theoretical framework of this study revealed general patterns that helped explore why 
jurisdictions’ behaviours toward IFRS for SMEs diverged, while the empirical 
findings validate the framework and indicate its appropriateness for future studies with 
regard to NASBs’ decision-making processes. The MRT approach guided the research 
process but did not prevent the discovery of overlooked findings. It also allowed many 
obstacles to be overcome which were deemed to be roadblocks to completion of the 
research. Thus, this approach was useful for investigating NASBs’ decision-making 
processes. 
1.5 Outline of the study 
This study is presented in nine chapters as follows. The current chapter has presented 
a brief overview of the study, the motivation for the research, and the research 
questions, methods and contributions. 
Chapter 2 reviews the previous literature to gain preliminary understanding of 
NASBs’ decision-making processes and the usefulness of IFRS and IFRS for SMEs. 
These studies helped create the skeletal theoretical framework that guided the research 
process by revealing general empirical and theoretical patterns that might explain why 
EU jurisdictions’ behaviour toward IFRS for SMEs varied. 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of Laughlin’s (1995) MRT approach, its 
limitations and the motivation for embracing it in this study. The MRT approach 
guided the choices made in this study, including choosing appropriate data, and 
analysing and interpreting the data based on the research objectives and the nature of 
the phenomenon under investigation. This chapter also discusses the steps taken in this 
study to collect and analyse data. 
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Chapter 4 discusses institutional theory, its criticisms, and the incorporation of power 
and legitimacy theories to overcome some of these limitations, which led to the 
creation of the skeletal theoretical framework of this study. This framework was based 
on empirical and theoretical issues discussed in previous literature; hence, an 
abductive approach was adopted to deepen understanding of NASBs’ decision-making 
processes. 
Chapter 5 presents the first set of empirical findings relating to the UK’s adoption of 
IFRS for SMEs and the influence of the UK NASB’s visible and unseen environmental 
factors on its adoption decision, providing a deeper understanding of its process and 
reasons for modifications prior to adopting IFRS for SMEs. 
Chapter 6 presents the second set of empirical findings relating to the rejection of IFRS 
for SMEs by Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, and the influence of visible and 
unseen factors in the environments of EFRAG, ASCG, OIC and DASB on EFRAG’s 
advice and comparability study, as well as on other NASBs’ decisions to reject the 
standard. This provides a deeper understanding of their processes and the reasons for 
their behaviours toward IFRS for SMEs. 
Chapter 7 develops the skeletal theoretical framework by using the findings of this 
study to identify relevant elements, adding needed meat to the bones of the framework 
and creating a version of the developed framework for each jurisdiction based on their 
own characteristics and unique reasons for this behaviour. Relevant visible and unseen 
environmental factors are colour coded depending on the extent to which they were 
consistent with, supported or entities’ own characteristics were influenced by their 
decisions to adopt IFRS for SMEs. 
Finally, Chapter 8 presents the contributions, limitations and implications of this 
study, and makes recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
For decades, scholars have investigated accounting standards boards’ decision-making 
processes with regard to issuing, modifying, adopting or rejecting accounting 
standards (Cobb et al. 1976; Lowe et al. 1983; Sutton 1984; Laughlin 1987; Booth and 
Cocks 1990; Wallace 1990; Nobes 1991, 1992; Fogarty 1992; Klumpes 1994; Rahman 
et al. 1994; Walker and Robinson 1994; Gordon and Morris 1996; Broadbent and 
Laughlin 2002; Ashraf and Ghani 2005; Mir and Rahaman 2005; Cortese 2006; 
Howieson 2009; Stevenson 2010; Albu et al. 2011; Hodges and Mellett 2012; 
Hoffmann and Zülch 2014; Kim 2015; Warren 2017; Krishnan 2018). They suggest 
that, depending on the nature of and potential changes introduced by an accounting 
standard, various visible environmental factors, including stakeholders, and unseen 
environmental factors, such as politics and national accounting history and culture, 
may influence the final outcomes. The influence of such diverse factors on NASBs 
suggests that understanding their processes is complex. For instance, scholars (e.g. 
Larson 2007) criticise the IASB’s accounting standard-setting process for being 
difficult to understand, despite its recognition as the world’s standard setter for 
financial markets (Whittington 2005; Danjou and Walton 2012). This raises questions 
about NASBs’ decision-making processes in general, and more specifically about their 
behaviour toward the IASB’s accounting standards, including IFRS and IFRS for 
SMEs. 
The reason for this is that, since the issuance of the IASB’s accounting standards, 
many jurisdictions have either adopted, rejected or permitted these standards, or have 
used them as a blueprint for their own national accounting standards (IASB 2017). 
Chris Cox (2014), former Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chair, 
observes that even if the IASB’s accounting standards were to lead to global 
convergence in the short term, it is not sustainable in the long term. This is because a 
country adopting IFRS must allow a foreign entity to dictate its financial reporting 
laws, full-scale adoption of IFRS may be unlikely in the US (Hail et al. 2010), and 
other jurisdictions may behave similarly or create their own versions of the IASB’s 
standards, thereby undermining harmonisation of accounting standards worldwide. 
Critics of international accounting harmonisation (e.g. Hopwood 1994) argue that 
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many people have less comprehension of the main aspects of international accounting 
than they realise. Hopwood also states that: 
“The emergence of interests in international accounting has not been 
explored. Little is known to outsiders of the complex and shifting politics that 
pervade the area. What is known is an official discourse of standardization 
and its benefits, the status of which is usually taken for granted rather than 
systematically explored” (Hopwood 1994, p.251). 
In other words, Hopwood (1994) questions NASBs’ decision-making processes and 
behaviours toward the IASB’s accounting standards. Therefore, this chapter discusses 
previous literature on NASBs’ decision-making processes with regard to the IASB’s 
accounting standards, including IFRS and IFRS for SMEs, and their usefulness to 
preparers and users of financial statements. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses contextual 
factors that influence NASBs’ decision-making processes. Section 2.3 provides an 
overview of literature relating to IFRS standards’ usefulness to preparers and users of 
financial statements. Section 2.4 discusses SMEs’ issues arising from accounting 
regulations. Section 2.5 discusses the development of IFRS for SMEs, and Section 2.6 
discusses relevant studies that investigate its appropriateness to SMEs in various 
jurisdictions. Lastly, Section 2.7 summaries and draws conclusions on the topics 
covered in this chapter. 
2.2 Influence of contextual factors on NASBs 
Although publicly available documents discuss NASBs’ decision-making processes, 
they seldom provide a comprehensive picture of their final decisions because the 
influence of environmental factors is often undocumented (e.g. Hodges and Mellett 
2002; Howieson 2009). This, in turn, has caused scholars to criticise their processes 
for being conducted within a “black box” (e.g. Hodges and Mellett 2002, 2012). 
This section provides an overview of NASBs and the influence of contextual factors 
on their decision-making processes. 
2.2.1 Overview of accounting standard setting and role of national governments 
Many NASBs describe the process of accounting standard setting as profound, 
comprehensive and successive, suggesting a conscious, logical and legitimate due 
process (Hodges and Mellett 2012; Ram 2012; Ram and Newberry 2013, 2017). For 
instance, the IASB claims to adopt a rational approach to issuing accounting standards, 
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and highlights the importance of comprehensive and systematic analysis in this 
process (IASCF 2006). However, little is known about whether NASBs actually 
follow the expected rational approach in developing their accounting standards (e.g. 
Hopwood 1994; Ram 2012). Gerboth (1972, p.47) contends that NASBs do not follow 
“commonly accepted virtues of orderliness and completeness, but common-sense 
norms are not necessarily criteria for policy-making”; he describes the process of 
issuing accounting standards as “muddling through”. 
NASBs seek to convince their external environments that their accounting standard-
setting processes are fair and legitimate. Young (2003) contends that staff and board 
members of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) often interact with 
external parties to persuade them that its work is valid, adequate, valuable and 
beneficial. It uses many techniques, including speeches by staff and board members, 
publication of articles and exposure drafts (EDs), minutes of meetings, final standards 
and other documents (Young 2003). 
Scholars’ description of the accounting standards setting process as being conducted 
inside a “black box” (e.g. Hodges and Mellett 2002, 2012; Howieson 2009, 2017; Ram 
2012; Ram and Newberry 2013, 2017; Baudot 2018; Klein and Fülbier 2018) suggests 
that undocumented environmental forces influence NASBs’ decision-making 
processes. Publicly available documents do not provide a comprehensive picture of 
their decision-making processes because environmental factors are intentionally or 
unintentionally omitted. Hodges and Mellett (2002, 2012) propose that, in order to 
better understand the extent of environmental factors influences, including national 
stakeholders, governments, and political and supranational entities, it is valuable to 
seek the perceptions of participants in NASBs’ decision-making processes, such as 
technical staff, project managers, research directors and board members, owing to their 
direct inside knowledge of their institutions. 
The IASB’s approach to preparing jurisdictional profiles validates scholars’ call to 
interview NASBs. For instance, when the IASB prepares a jurisdiction’s profile, 
which discusses the level of adoption of its accounting standards including IFRS and 
IFRS for SMEs, it contacts NASBs and relevant bodies such as governmental 
institutes and central banks (IASB 2017). In the case of the EU, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Italy, Ireland and the UK, it lists as “relevant jurisdictional authorities” 
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the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), the Accounting 
Standards Committee of Germany (ASCG), the Dutch Accounting Standard Board 
(DASB), the Italian accounting standards board (OIC) and the FRC respectively, 
indicating their relevance and importance to understanding the status and process of 
IFRS for SMEs in these jurisdictions (IFRS Foundation 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 
2016f, 2016h). 
However, NASBs’ responsibilities and authority differ. For instance, EFRAG and 
ASCG are not responsible for issuing accounting regulations; rather, their role is only 
to advise the European Commission (EC) and German Federal Ministry of Justice on 
SMEs’ accounting regulations (Federal Ministry of Justice 2011; EC 2016a; Fülbier 
et al. 2017). On the other hand, the DASB, OIC and FRC are responsible for issuing 
national accounting standards for use by SMEs within their jurisdictions (FRC 2016; 
DASB no date; OIC no date-b; Brouwer and Hoogendoorn 2017; Collis et al. 2017; 
Di Pietra 2017). 
One explanation for NASBs’ differing levels of authority is that it is driven mainly by 
their respective governments’ delegation of authoritative power, as they may have to 
comply with their jurisdiction’s governmental rules and regulations. For instance, the 
FRC, OIC, DASB and ASCG must issue accounting standards that comply, 
respectively, with the UK’s companies acts, the Italian civil code, the Dutch civil code 
and the German commercial code, because such compliance is embedded in their roles 
as NASBs (Federal Ministry of Justice 2011; DASB no date; FRC no date; OIC no 
date-b; Brouwer and Hoogendoorn 2017; Collis et al. 2017; Di Pietra 2017). Although 
the FRC’s relationship with the UK government may seem clearer than for other 
NASBs, the extent of governmental influence with regard to the ASCG, DASB and 
OIC is unclear. For example, Germany’s Federal Ministry of Justice (2011) states that 
the ASCG must provide all drafts and interpretations of adopted standards to the 
Federal Minister of Justice. Once proposed standards are approved by Germany’s 
Federal Ministry of Justice, the government publishes these standards in the Federal 
Gazette, and entities are advised to comply with them. However, it is unclear what 
would happen if the Federal Ministry of Justice were to refuse to publish the standards. 
In the case of the DASB, although it issues accounting standards, it does not claim that 
“the authoritative statements in either the draft or the final standards are compulsory 
in the same way as the legal requirements” (DASB no date). 
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On the other hand, in the UK and the Republic of Ireland, the government has authority 
to establish and disestablish the organisation responsible for issuing accounting 
standards (ICAEW 2018b). The UK government established the FRC and its 
predecessor, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB), to promote good financial 
reporting. In 2012 the FRC took over the ASB and became the entity responsible for 
issuing national accounting standards, among other responsibilities (Collis et al. 2017; 
ICAEW 2018a, 2018b). Much of the FRC’s authority, responsibility and functions are 
recognised in statute, including the Companies Acts 2004 and 2006 (FRC no date). In 
March 2013, the FRC adopted IFRS for SMEs with major modification and issued it 
as FRS 102 (IFRS Foundation 2016f, 2016h; Collis et al. 2017). Thus, the 
government’s role and involvement vary by jurisdiction, and it is unclear how 
governments influence NASBs’ decision-making processes. Operating in different 
external environments may influence their behaviour towards IFRS for SMEs in 
different ways. 
NASBs not only interact with their governments, but also with other entities. Like 
other organisations, they do not adopt and issue accounting standards in a political and 
social void (e.g. Fogarty et al. 1994; Young 1995; Mir and Rahaman 2005; Hail et al. 
2010; Krishnan 2018). The next sub-section discusses lobbyists’ involvement in 
accounting standard setting. 
2.2.2 Active stakeholders’ influence on NASBs 
NASBs normally provide stakeholders with opportunities to participate at various 
stages of their decision-making processes including agenda entry (e.g. Cobb et al. 
1976; Sutton 1984; Nobes 1992; Rahman et al. 1994; Walker and Robinson 1994; 
Kwok and Sharp 2005; Cortese 2006; Huang 2013; Bewley et al. 2018). In accounting 
standard setting, stakeholders’ efforts to influence NASBs’ decision-making processes 
are referred to as “lobbying” (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Zeff 2002, 2010; 
Königsgruber 2010; Krishnan 2018), which Sutton (1984) defines as individuals’ or 
organisations’ attempts to promote, change or obstruct the amendment or issuance of 
new regulations. Studies have investigated the effect of lobbyists’ activities on 
NASBs’ decision-making processes (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Schalow 1995; 
Georgiou 2002, 2004, 2010; Königsgruber 2010; Zeff 2010; Giner and Arce 2012; 
Hoffmann and Zülch 2014; Fülbier et al. 2017; Bewley et al. 2018; Krishnan 2018). 
16 
These identify many issues relating to lobbying activities, including what motivates 
lobbyists to participate and when they do so. 
Like any other entity, lobbyists incur expenses when they lobby NASBs. Scholars (e.g. 
Jorissen et al. 2013; Hoffmann and Zülch 2014; Bewley et al. 2018) argue that 
lobbyists’ behaviour is influenced by whether the expected benefits of proposed new 
or amended regulations and the probability of influencing NASBs’ decision-making 
outcomes outweigh the costs of lobbying. Thus, not all stakeholders participate in such 
action. Lobbyists’ participation depends mainly on the impact of proposed changes on 
their financial statements, and more specifically on their cash flows. Lobbying 
activities are likely to occur if proposed changes impose additional burdens, impact 
on borrowing agreements, increase book-keeping costs, impose higher taxes or 
influence information collection and disclosure (e.g. Georgiou 2002; Jorissen et al. 
2012; Fülbier et al. 2017; Bewley et al. 2018). For instance, Kosi and Reither (2014) 
investigate how changes proposed to IFRS 4 (Insurance Contracts) influenced 
lobbyists’ activities. They find that insurance companies and financially constrained 
firms were more likely to lobby NASBs because the proposed changes specifically 
influenced their income volatility. Hence, lobbyists’ activities may generally be 
associated with the influence of proposed changes on their economic position. 
Previous studies have also investigated types of lobbyists, focusing mainly on 
preparers of financial statements (e.g. Schalow 1995; Georgiou 2004, 2010). Unlike 
users of financial statements, preparers tend to actively lobby NASBs and are often 
involved in the accounting standard-setting process because their potential benefits are 
higher (e.g. Sutton 1984; Georgiou 2004, 2010; Larson 2007; Durocher and Fortin 
2010; Giner and Arce 2012; Jorissen et al. 2012). However, although NASBs often 
issue accounting standards to satisfy users’ needs, the users themselves seldom 
participate in standard setting, which implies that their perspectives may be ignored 
(Georgiou 2010; Durocher and Fortin 2010). As a result, scholars criticise and are 
sceptical of NASBs’ decision-making processes, as well as how they cite users’ needs 
in promoting their accounting standards (Young 2003, 2006). Durocher and Fortin 
(2010, p.497) highlight that “a user perspective in standard setting is not an overriding 
pragmatic concern for standard setters, but more of a symbolic rhetorical strategy that 
helps to ensure their cultural legitimacy”. They also question whether NASBs develop 
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accounting standards with “true knowledge of users’ needs and decision processes” 
(Durocher and Fortin 2010, p.497). 
The case of the German parliament’s modernisation of accounting regulations between 
2007 and 2009 illustrates lobbyists’ influence on the decision-making process for 
accounting standards. Hoffmann and Zülch (2014) and Fülbier et al. (2017) argue that 
moderation of the HGB was inspired by widespread use of IFRS. At that time, the 
ASCG had no power over standard setting and played only an advisory role to the 
parliament. Interest groups lobbied parliament in both written and oral, public and 
private communications. Hoffmann and Zülch (2014) compare lobbyists’ statements 
with the final outcome, concluding that they strongly influenced moderation of the 
HGB through the use of three “myths”: “Germany’s legal authority is undermined by 
the reform, German SMEs are weak and in need of protection and German accounting 
principles are highly endangered by the reform” (Hoffmann and Zülch 2014, p.719). 
They argue that lobbyists were able to transfer their own knowledge and beliefs 
relatively easily because those in parliament lacked accounting expertise. As a result, 
parliament accepted and supported these myths. The ministry’s initial regulatory 
proposal was very close to IFRS, whereas the final law was independent and did not 
explicitly refer to it. Accordingly, the main goals underlying the myths were achieved: 
German SMEs were protected, and national accounting regulations were preserved. 
These studies provide partial insights into NASBs’ environments by identifying active 
lobbyists including national stakeholders and governments, as entities relevant to their 
decision-making processes. Although stakeholders’ behaviours and lobbying 
activities may be driven by economic benefits, their perceptions of their level of 
influence and their understanding of the technical issues, these are not the only reasons 
for their participation in NASBs’ decision-making process. Embedded cultural 
accounting traditions may also encourage such lobbying activities, or cause non-
compliance if forced to adopt accounting regulations (e.g. Mir and Rahaman 2005; 
Ramanna 2013; Degos et al. 2018). The next sub-section discusses the influence of 
national accounting history and culture on NASBs’ decision-making processes. 
2.2.3 Influence of history and culture on NASBs’ decision-making processes 
Previous research on moves toward harmonisation of accounting standards has 
considered culture as an influential factor (Heidhues and Patel 2011). According to 
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Heidhues and Patel (2011), Gray’s (1988) framework and subsequent adaptations have 
significantly influenced cross-cultural accounting studies. This framework was based 
on Hofstede’s (1980) four-dimensional model, which in turn was based on an 
international survey of IBM employees in over 50 countries between 1967 and 1973 
(Holden et al. 2015). Hofstede (1984b, p.21) describes national culture as “a collective 
programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from 
another”. 
Perera (1989) uses Gray’s (1988) framework in hypothesising the relationship 
between society and accounting values. For example, he argues that in countries such 
as France and (West) Germany, governments’ direct involvement in setting national 
accounting standards is traditionally accepted; whereas in countries such as the UK 
and the US, governments rarely play such an active role, and the accounting profession 
tends to determine accounting standards. Perera (1989) attributes established 
associations between societal and accounting values to preparers’ value orientations, 
which are formed by cultural values. 
Ding et al. (2005) utilises Hofstede’s (1984b) dimensions and Schwartz’s (1994) new 
cultural dimensions of values as proxies to investigate and explain the influence of 
culture on accounting harmonisation and the adoption of IASs. They state that, 
although technical and political dimensions are essential to the harmonisation debate, 
rejection of IASs is driven not only by the legal context (common law/code law) or 
technical superiority, but also by diverse cultural factors. They measure differences 
between national Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and IASs using 
divergence and absence measures. They find that cultural values matter more than 
legal context and correlate with their divergence index in explaining divergences from 
IASs. 
Gernon and Wallace (1995, p.85) describe the research framework in international 
accounting as “trapped by a paradigm myopia by its reliance on the framework 
suggested by Hofstede”. They argue that Hofstede’s work on culture is 
unrepresentative because it relies on an assumption that IBM employees, on whom the 
research was based, accurately represent the values of each country. Scholars such as 
Baskerville (2003) and Heidhues and Patel (2011) further criticise the use of 
Hofstede’s and Gray’s work on culture suggesting that lack of recognition of the 
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former framework’s critical flaws limits the validity of the latter. Baskerville (2003, 
pp.1-2) proposes that “Hofstede established the dimensions of culture, and the 
subsequent reification of ‘culture’ as a variable in cross-national studies in accounting 
research led to a misleading dependence on cultural indices as an explanatory variable 
of differences in accounting practices and behaviour.” Although studies that have used 
Hofstede’s (1980, 1984a, 1984b) and Gray’s (1988) work on accounting culture 
suggest its relevance to accounting regulations, the framework omits countries’ unique 
characteristics and features, causing improper and vague clustering of countries 
(Heidhues and Patel 2011; Nobes 1998, 2018). According to Nobes (2018), Hofstede’s 
(1984a) consideration of culture as an independent measurable variable is vague 
because, for instance, Hofstede considers Asian and Middle-Eastern countries to have 
a different range of management cultures, yet he clusters East African and Arab 
countries as blocs, even though the former includes jurisdictions colonised and 
influenced by the UK. Nobes (1998) suggests that scholars might better focus on the 
influence of countries’ cultural features on particular fields, such as corporate finance, 
because such a focus might provide plausible explanations of the former’s influence 
on the latter. 
Differently from quantitative studies that utilise Hofstede’s and Gray’s indices, a 
significant body of qualitative research investigates the influence of national 
accounting history and culture on accounting regulations, and jurisdictions’ moves 
toward harmonisation or substituting their own accounting standards with those of the 
IASB (e.g. Fogarty 1992; Walker and Robinson 1994; Mir and Rahaman 2005; 
Heidhues and Patel 2011; Ramanna 2013; Degos et al. 2018). One of the main issues 
identified with regard to adoption of IFRS is that these standards are strongly tailored 
toward countries with Anglo-Saxon accounting models, such as the US (e.g. Mir and 
Rahaman 2005; Tyrrall et al. 2007; Vellam 2012; Aletkin 2014; Mohammadrezaei et 
al. 2015). This raises many obstacles for developing countries seeking to adopt the 
IASB’s accounting standards, because the latter have significantly different historical 
and cultural accounting traditions compared with developing countries’ national 
accounting regulations. Nobes and Parker (2012) and Degos et al. (2018) define the 
Anglo-Saxon accounting model as weakly connected with tax regulations and with an 
emphasis on informing investors, whereas the Continental European accounting model 
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is strongly associated with taxable income and focuses principally on informing 
creditors. 
The UK’s adoption of IFRS vividly illustrates the influence of national accounting 
history on accounting regulations. For instance, in the UK, an essential accounting 
feature, the “true and fair view”, was introduced in the 1948 Companies Act, which 
determined that financial reporting should provide a “true and fair view” of 
companies’ performance and financial position (HMSO 1965; Parker 1989; Nobes 
1993; FRC 2014b). Since the introduction of this phrase in 1948, it has played a 
significant role and been widely used in accounting standards published in the UK, 
and has been exported to British Commonwealth countries, the EC and many EU 
countries (Parker 1989; Nobes 1993; Nobes and Parker 2012; FRC 2014b). For 
instance, the FRC has used the phrase in all six of its collective financial reporting 
standards (FRC 2014b, 2018), thus preserving this historically accepted accounting 
tradition. When the EC mandated adoption of IFRS in 2002 (EC 2000, 2002), there 
was fear for the demise of this feature, but the IASB’s Anglo-Saxon model suggested 
that this issue would be overcome. According to the FRC (2014b, p.3), implementation 
of IFRS in the UK did not encumber the essential concept of the “true and fair view” 
because “fair presentation under IFRS is equivalent to a true and fair view”.2 Thus, 
the existence of this feature in the IASB’s accounting standards eased their adoption 
in the UK. 
Canada provides another example of how environmental factors, including history and 
culture, influence adoption decisions. Ramanna (2013) examines IFRS adoption in 
Canada. Since a significant proportion of Canada’s exporting activities and the 
majority of its foreign portfolio investments are associated with the US, it would seem 
economically beneficial for it to adopt US GAAP, yet it has adopted IFRS. Ramanna 
(2013) argues that two factors may have influenced this decision. First, Canada has a 
desire to differentiate itself from the US, despite the two countries’ strong economic 
connections. Second, since the 1970s, Canada has been involved in the development 
of the IAS standards, and is also a more recent former UK colony, representing high 
proximity to the UK’s accounting history and culture. Ramanna (2013) defines 
                                                 
2This study cannot confirm such compliance. In order to do so, it would be necessary to evaluate the 
true and fair view before and after the introduction of IFRS, which is beyond the scope of this study 
and might be investigated in future research. 
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proximity in terms of historical and cultural distance, “where “culture” is defined as a 
set of shared beliefs and preferences across entities” (Fernández 2008 cited in 
Ramanna 2013, p.6). The author identifies two reasons for Canada’s adoption of IFRS 
as a result of its British roots. First, the early development of Canada’s accounting 
profession closely followed the British tradition, having used the British Companies 
Act, 1900 as a framework. Second, Canada’s principles of corporate disclosure were 
created in accordance with “the 1844 British law on joint stock companies” (Gray and 
Kitching 2005 cited in Ramanna 2013, p.15). Therefore, Canada’s proximity to the 
UK caused it also to be proximate to the IASB’s accounting standards, which led to 
its adoption of IFRS. 
In other countries, differences between national accounting history and the IASB’s 
accounting standards may negatively influence behaviours toward the latter (e.g. 
Brouwer and Hoogendoorn 2017; Collis et al. 2017; Di Pietra 2017; Fülbier et al. 
2017; Degos et al. 2018). For instance, Heidhues and Patel (2011) and Fülbier et al. 
(2017) critically examine German GAAP and its closeness to the IASB’s accounting 
standards. Their analysis shows that, although the German accounting model is getting 
closer to the IASB’s accounting standards, Germany still retains many of its historical 
accounting features, including confidentiality, limited financial disclosure, 
preservation of “merchants’” privacy and the development of accounting regulations 
tailored to creditors. They argue that there are various reasons for preserving these 
features, including the economic environment and national stakeholders’ active 
participation in accounting standard setting. However, another explanation is 
Germany’s accounting history. 
According to Heidhues and Patel (2011) and Hoffmann and Detzen (2013), one of the 
main reasons for Germany’s crises between the 1870s and the 1920s was the use of 
fair value measurement. Prior to the introduction of fair value, Germany only allowed 
use of historical costs, meaning that companies could only record the prices they 
actually paid for their assets or products. Introduction of fair value allowed them to 
record their assets according to their market price at the time of recognition. As a 
result, many entities speculated on price increases and recorded them based on 
estimations, which caused the recording of unrealised gains and led to the bankruptcy 
of many entities, and hence two national crises. In the 1920s, the German government 
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removed fair value accounting and reintroduced historical cost accounting and thus 
allowed hidden reserves in financial statements. 
Germany’s negative experience of fair value accounting causes national stakeholders 
to react negatively to any accounting regulations that incorporate this approach. Since 
fundamental features of the IASB’s accounting standards are detailed disclosure and 
fair value measurement (IASB 2009; Ernst & Young 2010; EC 2010), these contradict 
Germany’s historically embedded accounting regulations. Thus, Germany’s history 
and negative experience of fair value measurement may also explain the results of 
Heidhues and Patel (2011) and Fülbier et al. (2017). 
In general, previous studies provide evidence to support the influence of national 
accounting history and culture on the adoption or non-adoption of accounting 
standards. In doing so, they shed some light on NASBs’ environments. However, 
national stakeholders, governments and historical and cultural accounting traditions 
are not the only issues that influence NASBs’ decision-making processes. Authority 
has been identified as another influential factor (e.g. Mir and Rahaman 2005; Hail et 
al. 2010; Albu et al. 2011; Ramanna 2013), as discussed in the next sub-section. 
2.2.4 Influence of authority on NASBs’ adoption decisions 
Since the IFRS standards were issued, many jurisdictions have either adopted, 
rejected, permitted or used these standards as a blueprint for their own national 
accounting standards (IASB 2017). As a result, scholars (e.g. Hail et al. 2010; Zeff 
2010; Cox 2014; Krishnan 2016; Van Mourik and Walton 2018) have begun to 
investigate various aspects that may influence adoption of IASB’s accounting 
standards, including authority. Although the US accounting professional bodies were, 
among others, responsible for forming the IASB’s predecessor, the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC; Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu no date), it has 
not adopted the IASB’s accounting standards, even though these standards are based 
on the Anglo-Saxon accounting model (e.g. Mir and Rahaman 2005; Tyrrall et al. 
2007; Aletkin 2014; Mohammadrezaei et al. 2015; Bamber and McMeeking 2016). 
Previous studies have argued that the IASB’s accounting regulations are based on and 
influenced by those of Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions such as the UK and US (Zeff 2002; 
Mir and Rahaman 2005; Hail et al. 2010; Bamber and McMeeking 2016), raising the 
question of why the US has not adopted them. 
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The US provides one of the most prominent examples of environmental factors 
influencing IFRS adoption. Hail et al. (2010) argue that the US is unwilling to adopt 
IFRS because this decision would have a significant impact on its legislative power, 
since it would certainly affect the US Congress, the FASB and the SEC. IFRS is set 
by the IASB, meaning adoption requires authority for accounting standards to be 
relinquished to a supranational entity, placing NASBs in the position of agents or 
consultants of the IASB. Hail et al. (2010, p.573) suggest that: 
“Such a delegation of standard-setting power to the IASB, by its very nature, 
poses numerous political challenges beyond the economic aspects that we 
have discussed, so far. Legislative bodies like the U.S. Congress have an 
innate resistance to give up power to a foreign authority or standard-setting 
body”. 
Taking a different approach, in 2002 the EC mandated implementation of IFRS, which 
caused every jurisdiction in the EU to adopt these standards (EC 2000, 2002; Burlaud 
and Colasse 2011; IASB 2018b) because all EU members must comply with 
regulations issued by the EC, including the Fourth and Seventh EC Directives (EC 
2016b). The EC has established mechanisms granting it the right to veto any future 
changes: subsequent amendments to IFRS must be endorsed by the EC, the European 
Parliament, the Standards Advice Review Group, EFRAG and the Accounting 
Regulatory Committee (Zeff and Nobes 2010; Van Mourik and Walton 2018). Also, 
EFRAG supports and participates in the IASB’s standard-setting process (Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu 2014), thus promoting the EU’s influence in deliberations regarding 
future changes to IFRS (Chand and Cummings 2008). As a result, IFRS is moving 
closer to developed countries and further from many developing jurisdictions. The EU 
example supports Cox’s (2014) argument that jurisdictions adopting IFRS may protect 
themselves from loss of legislative power by requiring their NASBs to evaluate and, 
if necessary, modify IFRS before enacting the standards. Therefore, harmonisation of 
accounting regulations worldwide is difficult to achieve owing to the nature of 
decisions to adopt the IASB’s accounting standards. 
The examples of the US and the EC reveal that adoption or rejection of IFRS may not 
be due purely to economic factors, but may seek to protect national authority for 
accounting regulations. However, the EC’s mandatory adoption of IFRS and the EU’s 
100 per cent adoption of these standards indicate that supranational entities may 
mandate such a move. Thus, influential entities other than national stakeholders and 
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governments may influence NASBs’ decision-making processes, as discussed in the 
next sub-section. 
2.2.5 Influence of supranational entities on NASBs’ adoption decisions 
Previous studies have investigated IFRS adoption in a small number of developing 
countries, including Pakistan, Romania, Bangladesh and India (e.g. Ashraf and Ghani 
2005; Mir and Rahaman 2005; Annisette 2004; Albu et al. 2011; Krishnan 2016, 
2018). The World Bank may be seen as the main supranational lobbying entity 
promoting the use of IFRS, since it is a key supporter of the IASB’s accounting 
standards (e.g. Mir and Rahaman 2005; Ashraf and Ghani 2005; Annisette 2004; Albu 
et al. 2011). Jurisdictions with high proximity, meaning they share similar historical 
and cultural preferences, may influence NASBs’ decisions to adopt specific standards. 
Albu et al. (2011) examine the development of accounting standards in Romania up 
to the adoption of IFRS. The first phase of Romania’s accounting development was 
the adoption of accounting standards based on the French accounting framework. 
According to Albu et al. (2011), this was motivated by close economic and cultural 
relationships between France and Romania, and the fact that France’s accounting 
system has been devised in accordance with the EC’s Fourth Directive. Thereafter, in 
order for Romania to secure a World Bank loan, it was required to meet certain 
conditions imposed by the World Bank relating to the adoption of IFRS.3 This 
requirement initiated the second phase of accounting standards development. 
Furthermore, since Romania was planning to join the EU, its NASB adopted only 
IAS/IFRS standards that complied with the Fourth and Seventh European Directives. 
Albu et al. (2011) interviewed two regulators, one of whom suggested that: 
“Therefore, along with Romania’s adhesion to EU, we have secured the 
conformity with the Fourth European Directive: everything which is 
compulsory in the directive is taken in the Romanian regulations, and also 
some optional provisions were taken. Where the directive had basic 
provisions or such provisions were completely missing, we took the provision 
in the IASs, but only to the extent that these provisions would not be against 
the provisions of the directive. Now we have many definitions, concepts, 
                                                 
3 According to Albu et al. (2011, p.85), “the World Bank imposed four conditions for granting financial 
assistance to Romania: (1) use of IAS by some (generally large) companies; (2) auditing of these 
companies by auditors applying International Standards on Auditing; (3) issuance of a guide for IAS 
implementation by the Ministry of Public Finances; and (4) establishment of an institution for financial 
auditing (leading to the establishment of the Chamber of Financial Auditors of Romania) that would 
endorse the International Standards on Auditing”. 
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recognition criteria, measurement rules from the IFRSs” (Albu et al. 2011, 
p.89). 
The authors argue that, although the World Bank influenced the NASB’s decision-
making process during the second phase, the implementation of IFRS in Romania has 
been limited. This indicates that Romania’s desire to join the EU strongly influenced 
how it adopted IFRS, because all the adopted standards comply with the EC’s Fourth 
and Seventh Directives. Thus, in the case of Romania’s adoption of IFRS, many 
supranational entities, including the World Bank and the EC, influenced its NASB’s 
decision-making process, but the latter was more influential owing to Romania’s 
desire to join the EU. However, although the authors interviewed various interested 
entities, they only interviewed two regulators, indicating a need for further studies to 
gain a deeper understanding of this issue. National stakeholders may not have 
experience or prior knowledge of influential environmental factors imposed on 
NASBs, since this type of influence is rarely documented in publicly available data 
(e.g. Hodges and Mellett 2002, 2012; Howieson 2009; Ram 2012; Ram and Newberry 
2013, 2017). 
Bangladesh is another example of a country where the World Bank has promoted use 
of the IASB’s standards. Mir and Rahaman (2005) examine the motivation for 
wholesale adoption of IFRS in Bangladesh. In October 1999, the ICAB issued a plan 
to adopt IFRS after the World Bank granted it US$200,000 to enhance its capabilities 
for their adoption. Surprisingly, by the end of 1999, ICAB had already adopted 21 IAS 
standards, and 16 others were under consideration. This rapid adoption raises 
questions about whether each standard has been considered in the context of national 
historical, cultural and economic circumstances. Mir and Rahaman (2005) suggest that 
ICAB’s adoption of 21 standards within a short time frame and with no modification 
indicates that it did not consult any other entity. One of their respondents argued that 
adoption of the IASB standards was political rather than beneficial: 
“Although it appears like the adoption is initiated by SEC in actual fact it is 
initiated by the international agencies. The government tells us which 
standards to consider for adoption. It is a process that is really political ... 
You don’t know the bases for the choice of standard for adoption. ... Money 
talks. It’s all political” (Mir and Rahaman 2005, p.826). 
Critics of wholesale adoption observe that India, a neighbouring country with similar 
historical, cultural and economic conditions, has established its own accounting 
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standards rather than endorsing wholesale adoption of the IASB’s accounting 
standards. Therefore, Mir and Rahaman (2005) suggest that ICAB would have been 
unlikely to adopt accounting standards that do not meet the needs of Bangladesh’s 
economic sector if it had not been pressurised or influenced by environmental factors. 
They also conclude that, as a result of this undemocratic approach and the absence of 
representation of entities other than ICAB, Bangladesh suffers from a lack of 
compliance with IAS standards. However, similarly to previous studies, the authors’ 
limited consultation of regulators may indicate either that the regulators supported 
adoption, or that discussions with regulators disclosed no further information. 
Krishnan (2016, 2018) investigates India’s long convergence process with IFRS. She 
finds that India’s convergence plan was first introduced in 2000 “through indirect and 
‘soft’ influences” on the national state (2018, p.316) by international entities such as 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The EU’s adoption of 
IFRS and the European Securities and Market Authority’s (ESMA) communication 
with regard to Indian companies listed on EU markets, accompanied by external 
pressure from IOSCO and UNCTAD, led to India’s announcement of an official 
deadline of 2011 for its convergence with IFRS. However, the nature of the 
convergence decision and controversial debates about these standards caused the 
deadline to be missed, with no public notification regarding the process or the causes 
of this delay. In 2012, India announced another deadline of 1 April 2013 for its 
convergence plan. Like the previous deadline, this was missed with no announcement 
or explanation, and 1 April 2016 was announced as another date for convergence. 
According to the IFRS Foundation (2017), although India has not adopted IFRS, many 
of its national accounting standards have been converged with these standards, 
indicating its progress toward convergence. According to Krishnan (2018), India’s 
long implementation period and cautious attitude toward convergence with IFRS was 
due to the attitudes of its trading partners, the US and Japan, toward these standards. 
The US’s rejection and Japan’s slow convergence plan indirectly caused significant 
delays to India’s convergence plan. This suggests that national governments may 
influence the behaviour of other jurisdictions’ NASBs toward the IASB’s accounting 
standards. 
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Previous studies have investigated various factors that may influence jurisdictions’ 
behaviours toward the IASB’s accounting standards, including IFRS, revealing that 
many environmental factors may influence NASBs’ decision-making processes. They 
define general patterns and entities, including national stakeholders, governmental 
history and culture, as influential factors. However, the behaviours of supranational 
entities, including the World Bank and the EC, and other governments toward the 
IASB’s accounting standards are also influential. For instance, the first phase of 
Romania’s accounting development and Canada’s adoption of IFRS provide examples 
of how national accounting history and culture influence adoption decisions. The US’s 
reluctance to lose its authority and surrender its legislative power to a supranational 
entity such as the IASB shows the nature and complexity of such decisions. The 
influence of supranational entities, such as the World Bank in Bangladesh and the EC 
in the EU and Romania, provide examples of the influence of supranational entities 
on accounting regulations. 
Thus, although general patterns may exist, explaining these phenomena requires in-
depth investigation. This is because previous studies show that no theory or 
explanation can capture every feature of every phenomenon, nor perfectly explain all 
reasons behind all phenomena. Since the IASB drew on the conceptual framework and 
standards of IFRS but reduced their disclosure requirements and accounting options 
when it developed IFRS for SMEs, and because this study utilises the latter as a vehicle 
to understand NASBs’ decision-making processes, it is necessary to review studies 
that investigate whether adopting IFRS standards led to or brought any advantages or 
disadvantages to preparers and users of financial statements. This is because if IFRS 
for SMEs is adopted, this may cause advantages and disadvantages similar to those of 
IFRS due to the fact that the IASB’s accounting standards share a similar, although 
not identical, conceptual framework. These perceived expectations may drive or 
influence NASBs’ decision-making processes and behaviours toward adoption of 
IFRS for SMEs, suggesting the relevance of reviewing studies that investigate IFRS 
standards, as discussed in the next section. 
2.3 Usefulness of IFRS adoption and its influence on quality of financial 
statements 
A considerable body of research has examined different jurisdictions’ adoption of 
IFRS. A causal analysis of IFRS profiles by the IASB indicates that some jurisdictions 
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that have adopted IFRS standards require all domestic, publicly-accountable entities 
to use these standards, while others permit some but not all such entities to do so, and 
a few neither require nor permit the use of IASB standards (IASB 2018b). Thus, not 
every country has adopted IFRS, and its implementation may differ according to each 
jurisdiction’s view of the likely outcomes of adoption. Adopting IFRS may seem 
beneficial because it helps reduce cross-country differences; however, financial 
reporting quality is measured not only by the adoption of financial reporting standards, 
but also in terms of the usefulness, relevance and quality of information provided (De 
George et al. 2016). This section discusses the usefulness of IFRS adoption for 
financial statements. 
2.3.1 Usefulness of IFRS adoption for reporting comparability 
According to De George et al. (2016), empirical studies of the effect of IFRS adoption 
on comparability employ two alternative methods: examination of the observable 
outcomes of comparability (e.g. Brochet et al. 2013; Wang 2014) or direct 
measurement of comparability (e.g. Barth et al. 2012). In 2007, the SEC was 
considering allowing US public firms to file their financial statements according to 
IFRS, as a result of debate following approval for cross-listed non-US firms to do so 
(Barth et al. 2012). 
Barth et al. (2012) and Liao et al. (2012) examine value relevance and accounting 
system comparability, and find that adoption of IFRS is associated with high 
comparability of financial statements. However, Barth et al. (2012) and Balsmeier and 
Vanhaverbeke (2018) indicate that higher comparability is associated with a country’s 
enforcement system because, for companies located in a country with strong 
enforcement or where IFRS is mandatory, comparability is generally higher. Liao et 
al. (2012) conclude that in France and Germany, accounting numbers were 
comparable immediately after implementation of the standards, but this comparability 
later diminished. These results suggest that adopting these standards without 
supporting measures will not enhance comparability of financial statements, indicating 
a need to take other factors into consideration. Also, Liao et al.’s (2012) conclusion 
supports the view that adopting IFRS may help improve comparability in the short 
term, but that its effect in the long term is questionable. Barth et al. (2012) and Liao et 
al. (2012) are unable to draw conclusions regarding overall comparability since they 
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only evaluate the usefulness of summary accounting values, meaning their use of a 
single measure of financial reporting comparability. 
Unlike studies that directly examine the influence of IFRS adoption on comparability, 
Wang (2014) compares stock market reactions to firms that have yet to announce their 
earnings with similar foreign firms that have announced their earnings, where both 
report under the same standards. She concludes that abnormal price reactions to the 
two types of firm are strongly correlated if both firms use the same financial reporting 
standards (IFRS), whereas abnormality decreases if the firms use different reporting 
standards. However, Wang’s (2014) findings are only significant for companies 
located in jurisdictions with strong enforcement systems, indicating that mere 
adoption of IFRS will not improve comparability (De George et al. 2016). According 
to Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1998), enforcement systems are measured according to the 
effectiveness of the legal system, the level of corruption and the rule of law. Improving 
comparability of financial reporting requires a strong enforcement system 
accompanied by strong accounting standards. 
In general, studies investigating capital-market effects report strong increases in 
comparability following the adoption of IFRS, while studies directly measuring 
comparability provide weak evidence (De George et al. 2016). Furthermore, previous 
empirical studies show that comparability does matter to investors, and particularly to 
foreign investors. However, simply adopting the same accounting standards globally 
will not enhance comparability, leading scholars to investigate whether adoption of 
IFRS influences cross country activities.4 
2.3.2 Usefulness of IFRS adoption for cross-country investment 
Since previous studies have highlighted the importance of financial comparability, 
especially for foreign investors, supporters of IFRS adoption argue that high-quality 
and comparable financial reporting under IFRS will increase cross-country investment 
(e.g. EC 2002; IASB 2009; Amiram 2012; Yu and Wahid 2014; AICPA 2018; Al‐
                                                 
4 Scholars have examined the definition of IFRS adoption and overuse of the term “adoption”. In 
defining a jurisdiction as an “adopter”, many concepts must be evaluated, including whether a 
jurisdiction has partially converged, fully converged, partially adopted, adopted but modified, or 
adopted IFRS standards as issued by the IASB. Other issues, such as implementation mechanisms for 
future amendments, translation issues, and which entities are permitted or required to use the standards, 
must also be considered. These are less relevant to this study because it focuses mainly on the decision-
making process leading to the outcome, rather than the outcome itself. For further information see, for 
example, Evans (2004); Nobes (2006, 2013); Zeff and Nobes (2010); Saucke (2015). 
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Htaybat 2018). Those who support this assumption argue that it takes time and 
resources for foreign investors to understand and comprehend various versions of 
GAAP. Previous scholars (e.g. Revsine et al. 2011; Al‐Htaybat 2018) describe 
accounting rules as a network of conventions, guidelines, procedures and rules 
developed by accounting practitioners and NASBs that may ease communications 
between various entities if unified. Revsine et al. (2011) highlight that the main 
purpose of GAAP is to ensure that companies’ financial statements clearly illustrate 
their economic preferences and conditions. Unlike local investors, differences 
between local GAAPs mean that foreign investors must overcome substantial 
information barriers (De George et al. 2016; Al‐Htaybat 2018). 
Scholars have therefore examined whether enhanced comparability as a result of 
adopting IFRS will, in turn, improve cross-country investment. DeFond et al. (2011) 
and Covrig et al. (2007) examine whether adoption of IASs improves foreign mutual 
fund investment. Both studies conclude that adoption of IFRS results in an increase in 
foreign mutual fund investment. However, DeFond et al. (2011) argue that the increase 
is higher in jurisdictions that have credible implementation, and especially for 
companies with increased accounting uniformity. DeFond et al. (2011) define 
implementation credibility as management’s faithful application of IFRS, but do not 
elaborate on what types of enforcement system lead to greater uniformity. 
Taking a slightly different approach, Yu and Wahid (2014) examine how accounting 
distance, in terms of differences in accounting standards, affects investment decisions 
by global mutual funds. They note that, once accounting distance decreases as a result 
of the implementation of IFRS by investees and investors, the willingness of investors 
to invest in foreign mutual funds increases. For example, their empirical test suggests 
that an accounting distance increase of a single standard deviation between South 
Africa and the US led the latter’s investors to underestimate the former’s companies 
by 19 per cent. Also, when the adoption of IFRS occurs only in the investor’s 
jurisdiction and decreases accounting difference, investors tend to invest in foreign 
mutual funds. This suggests that investors’ familiarity with investees’ financial 
reporting standards increases foreign investment. 
Other research has examined the influence of IFRS adoption on US investors’ 
decisions to invest in foreign equities. Khurana and Michas (2011) and Shima and 
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Gordon (2011) find weak or no correlation between the adoption of IFRS and the 
tendency of US investors to invest in foreign markets, unless this adoption is 
accompanied by a strong enforcement system. Khurana and Michas (2011) also argue 
that countries that have adopted IFRS where there is little similarity between local 
accounting standards and IFRS and jurisdictions with strong incentives to report high-
quality financial information, also influence US investors’ tendency to invest in 
foreign markets. 
Since one goal of adopting IFRS is to establish an internationally understandable set 
of accounting standards, Florou and Pope (2012) examine whether mandatory 
adoption influences the institutional holdings of investors worldwide. They observe a 
1.4 per cent incremental increase in ownership, on average, immediately after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS, and claim that, since most firms have active investors 
who rely on financial reporting numbers, their observation relates directly to 
mandatory adoption. However, the authors’ results do not distinguish whether this 
increase is due to investors’ familiarity with IFRS or its high quality. Amiram (2012), 
on the other hand, examines these potential factors in the context of cross-border 
investment. He finds that investors from jurisdictions using IFRS would rather invest 
in other jurisdictions that have adopted these standards than in jurisdictions that have 
not yet done so. Also, countries that have adopted IFRS and have strong investor 
protection and low levels of corruption experience higher levels of foreign investment. 
These results support the finding of previous studies that investors’ familiarity with 
investees’ financial reporting standards increases the likelihood of foreign investment. 
Previous empirical studies that have examined the correlation between adoption of 
IFRS and cross-border investment provide evidence that the former does, in fact, 
increase the latter (De George et al. 2016). However, although early studies attribute 
increases in cross-border investment to comparability under IFRS, later studies 
attribute such increases to investors’ familiarity with IFRS. The results of recent 
studies suggest that adoption of these standards is not necessarily the main cause of 
increases in cross-border investment, because investors’ familiarity with other 
standards will also increase such investment. Harmonisation of accounting regulations 
may reduce entities’ cost of capital, as discussed in the next sub-section. 
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2.3.3 Usefulness of IFRS adoption for the cost of capital 
Previous studies of the influence of IFRS standards adoption on the cost of capital 
have relied on a few, mostly EU, countries because these allowed voluntary adoption 
of IAS/IFRSs prior to their mandatory implementation in 2002 with an effective date 
of 2005 (De George et al. 2016; Bassemir 2018).5 Comparison of entities that have 
voluntarily adopted, mandatorily adopted or rejected adoption provides additional 
information on the influence of adoption on the cost of capital. Daske (2006) and 
Daske et al. (2013) investigate how the cost of capital is influenced by mandatory and 
voluntary adoption of IAS/IFRS. Unlike Daske’s (2006) and Bassemir’s (2018) 
studies, which focus only on German firms, Daske et al.’s (2013) sample includes 
firms from 30 countries. These studies argue that adopting internationally-recognised 
accounting standards reduces the cost of capital. 
However, Daske et al. (2013) further argue that mere adoption will not drive such 
benefits; rather, they categorise firms as “serious” adopters or “label” adopters. A firm 
is classified as a “label” adopter if its level of observable incentives is weak or non-
existent around the adoption of IAS/IFRS and it has made no significant changes to 
its reporting policies. “Serious” adopters are firms with strong observable incentives 
that have made substantial modifications to their reporting guidelines. The authors 
argue that firms classified as “serious” adopters experience a greater increase in 
liquidity and a decrease in the cost of capital compared with “label” adopters. These 
results support the argument that simply adopting IFRS will not lower the cost of 
capital unless other factors, such as firms’ reporting incentives, are also aligned. 
Scholars have also examined the influence of IFRS on loan structure. Kim et al. (2011) 
examine the effects of voluntary adoption of IFRS on structured loan contracts and 
loan ownership in the international loan market. They argue that voluntary adoption 
of IFRS reduces information ambiguity between lenders and borrowers, which in turn 
enables lenders to assess borrowers’ credit quality more effectively. They claim that 
loans issued to firms that have voluntarily adopted IFRS incur lower interest rates, are 
larger and have longer maturity periods. In addition, such firms attract more foreign 
investors than firms using local GAAP.  
                                                 
5 Studies discussed in this section use different samples from different countries and dates, ranging from 
the 1990s to the 2010s. Studies investigating voluntary adoption of IFRS standards often exclude 
companies that were mandated to adopt them. 
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In contrast to studies examining the effects of voluntary adoption of IFRS on the cost 
of capital, Chen et al. (2015) examine the consequences of compulsory 
implementation for the contract terms of bank loans globally. The authors maintain 
that mandatory adoption of these standards may result in either less or more 
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Adoption encourages 
recognition of losses and gains in a timely manner and fair value accounting. Timely 
recognition of losses and gains decreases information risk and the costs of monitoring, 
which decreases information asymmetry. On the other hand, shifting from rules-based 
to principles-based accounting standards leads to greater management flexibility, 
which in turn increases information risk and the costs of monitoring. Chen et al. (2015) 
find that borrowers that have mandatorily adopted IFRS experience higher interest 
rates and shorter maturity periods, and that the likelihood of loans based on 
collateralisation increases. 
Florou and Kosi’s (2015) study extends previous research by comparing the terms of 
private loans and public bonds. They note that compulsory adoption of IFRS enhances 
access to public bonds and decreases interest rates. However, they find no relationship 
between mandatory adoption and private loans. They attribute these results to public 
reliance on publicly available financial reporting, while private borrowers rely on 
private communications. Previous studies of the effects of IFRS adoption on the cost 
of debt reveal mixed results. De George et al. (2016) provide possible explanations for 
these contradictions, arguing that studies focusing on voluntary adoption may suffer 
from endogeneity concerns, while studies focusing on mandatory adoption may suffer 
from contaminating events. Furthermore, previous studies have used different 
samples, and the presence of specific countries in the sample may have affected their 
results. 
Accordingly, scholars investigating the usefulness of IFRS adoption reach conflicting 
views on whether the observed benefits generally relate to features and characteristics 
of these standards, or are driven by other external factors, including a strong national 
enforcement system, companies’ own incentives and investors’ familiarity with 
investees’ financial reporting. In other words, jurisdictions’ adoption of other 
accounting standards may lead to similar benefits, including harmonisation of 
accounting regulations and reductions in the cost of capital, because these benefits are 
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not driven primarily by the IASB’s accounting standards, but rather by other external 
factors (De George et al. 2016). 
The contradictory evidence of IFRS studies raises many questions with regard to the 
adoption of IFRS for SMEs. For instance, given the lack of robust empirical results to 
confirm the usefulness of IFRS adoption, this issue may be more severe in the case of 
IFRS for SMEs. The IASB’s main goal is to set accounting regulations that satisfy 
public interests, yet empirical results only partly or weakly support its claims with 
regard to the benefits of IFRS adoption. The IASB used the IFRS framework in issuing 
IFRS for SMEs (IASB 2003) and did not consult with SMEs worldwide, indicating 
that it has a less clear understanding of their needs compared with those of public 
companies. Its claim that adopting IFRS for SMEs will benefit SMEs worldwide 
(IASB 2018a) should therefore be taken with caution. 
Since this study uses IFRS for SMEs as a vehicle to investigate and deepen 
understanding of EU NASBs’ decision-making processes, it is essential to discuss 
SMEs’ history with regard to issues relating to accounting regulations and 
jurisdictions’ adoption or incorporation of accounting standards issued by the IASB 
and its predecessors. This is relevant because issues relating to SMEs’ accounting 
regulations that had been deemed resolved resurfaced owing to jurisdictions’ adoption 
of IFRS standards. Therefore, the IASB developed IFRS for SMEs in an attempt to 
solve SMEs’ financial reporting issues. This suggests the latter’s relevance to 
understanding whether NASBs’ perceptions of these issues and the extent to which 
they would be overcome by the standard’s adoption may influence their behaviour 
toward it. This, in turn, may explain NASBs’ behaviour toward IFRS for SMEs. The 
next section briefly discusses SMEs’ issues with regard to accounting regulations. 
2.4 History of issues relating to SMEs’ accounting regulations 
SMEs’ main concern was outdated legislation that required them to comply with 
standards used by public companies, regardless of differences in size, making SMEs’ 
financial reporting increasingly extensive and complex (Keasey and Short 1990; 
World Bank 2004a; Evans et al. 2005; Rennie and Senkow 2009; Sian and Roberts 
2009). Increased complexity and lack of distinction between public companies and 
SMEs burdened the latter (AICPA 1981; Keasey and Short 1990; Son et al. 2006; 
Evans et al. 2005; Rennie and Senkow 2009; Sian and Roberts 2009). According to 
AICPA (1981), NASBs had over-detailed accounting standards, which required in-
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depth disclosures, contained too many separate standards, used complicated 
accounting measurements, and did not satisfy SME users’ and preparers’ needs. Thus, 
SMEs’ preparation of their financial reports in accordance with national GAAP was 
deemed too burdensome and costly. Scholars (e.g. Lippitt and Oliver 1983; Keasey 
and Short 1990; Jarvis et al. 1996; Collis and Jarvis 2000; Rennie and Senkow 2009) 
highlight that SMEs’ compliance with GAAP and complicated accounting regulations 
was onerous because their users’ needs were different from those of public companies, 
and they had to seek external help to produce their accounting statements in 
accordance with GAAP. Many SMEs suffered considerable increases in their costs of 
reporting because they lacked internal trained accountants, which led to outsourcing 
(Campbell 1978; Lippitt and Oliver 1983; Collis and Jarvis 2000). Thus, the increased 
costs of complying with irrelevant accounting standards included outsourcing book-
keeping and higher audit fees, which were deemed unnecessary (Chazen and Benson 
1978; Hepp and McRae 1982; Keasey and Short 1990; Jarvis et al. 1996; Collis and 
Jarvis 2000; Fearnley and Hines 2007). 
Previous studies (e.g. Campbell 1978; Epaves 1978; Mosso 1981; Keasey and Short 
1990; Son et al. 2006; Rennie and Senkow 2009) have investigated the usefulness of 
SMEs’ compliance with complex accounting standards such as GAAP. Campbell 
(1978) argues that such compliance did not improve the informational content of 
SMEs’ financial statements. GAAP requirements mandated information disclosures 
that did not cater to satisfying SMEs’ preparers and users (Epaves 1978; Mosso 1981; 
Keasey and Short 1990; Evans et al. 2005). Hence, Hepp and McRae (1982) question 
the usefulness of SMEs’ compliance with certain complicated accounting standards, 
as well as whether statements produced in accordance with GAAP are needed at all 
by SMEs and their users. 
Users of SMEs’ financial statements can be classified as internal or external (Nair and 
Rittenberg 1983; Lowe 1987; Jarvis et al. 1996; Evans et al. 2005; Son et al. 2006). 
Internal users focus primarily on running the enterprise and can request necessary 
information owing to their direct involvement (Berry et al. 1993; Jarvis et al. 1996; 
Collis and Jarvis 2000; Evans et al. 2005; Sian and Roberts 2009); thus, financial 
statements prepared in accordance with accounting standards are not required. 
External users, on the other hand, including major suppliers, banks and credit agencies, 
are able to request special-purpose reports that focus mainly on SMEs’ capability to 
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repay their debts (Nair and Rittenberg 1983; Lowe 1987; Berry et al. 1993; Collis and 
Jarvis 2000; Marriott and Marriott 2000; Evans et al. 2005; Son et al. 2006; EC 2010). 
Scholars (e.g. Berry et al. 1993; Jarvis et al. 1996; Collis and Jarvis 2000; Marriott and 
Marriott 2000; Son et al. 2006) highlight that little is known about how SMEs and 
their users utilise financial statements, which is an issue for NASBs. They argue that 
it is not known whether major lenders use SMEs reports similarly to those of large 
companies. 
In response to increased concerns regarding the complexity of SMEs’ accounting 
standards, NASBs issued different reporting requirements to ease their burden (Hepp 
and McRae 1982; Evans et al. 2005; Fearnley and Hines 2007). For instance, the EC’s 
Fourth and Seventh Directives and the UK accounting standards were issued based on 
quantitative measures for compliance, meaning that as companies grow, they must 
comply with more complicated regulations and standards (Devi and Samujh 2015). 
The notion of different reporting requirements originated from the concept that 
different types of company should be subject to different accounting standards (World 
Bank 2004b, 2004a; Jarvis et al. 1996; Collis and Jarvis 2000; Evans et al. 2005). Devi 
and Samujh (2015) further argue that some companies should be exempt from certain 
accounting standards, while others should be completely exempt from preparing 
accounting statements. The notion of two-tier reporting was considered a challenge to 
the concept of unified accounting standards for all companies, regardless of size 
(Cheney 2003). Although different reporting requirements for SMEs were seen as a 
necessary solution to ease their burden, others were concerned that this solution might 
cause SMEs to be regarded as second-class citizens (Cheney 2003). 
However, the temporary relief in SMEs’ accounting burden was interrupted by the 
issuance of IFRS, as a result of which the problem of SMEs’ accounting standards 
resurfaced and intensified (Devi and Samujh 2015; Ram 2012; Saucke 2015). Since 
the issuance of IFRS in 2001, many jurisdictions have adopted it (IASB 2017). 
Jurisdictions’ adoption or conversion of IFRS superceded their SMEs’ accounting 
requirements, leading them to question how this move would impact on their SMEs’ 
financial reporting (Devi and Samujh 2015; Ram 2012; Saucke 2015). In 2009, the 
IASB issued IFRS for SMEs as a solution to SMEs’ financial reporting problems, and 
since then, many jurisdictions have adopted or used the standard as a blueprint for 
their national accounting standards (IASB 2018c). However, little is known about the 
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decision-making process and the motivation for the IASB’s issuance of IFRS for 
SMEs (e.g. Burlaud and Colasse 2011; Danjou and Walton 2012; Ram 2012; Ram and 
Newberry 2013), nor about the usefulness of the standard to SMEs (e.g. Kaya and 
Koch 2015). Therefore, the rest of this chapter focuses on IFRS for SMEs, since this 
study utilises it as a vehicle to understand NASBs’ decision-making processes. 
2.5 The IASB development of IFRS for SMEs 
Issuing accounting standards is described as a complicated process that does not take 
place in void (e.g. Fogarty et al. 1994; Young 1995; Hodges and Mellett 2002, 2012; 
Mir and Rahaman 2005; Hail et al. 2010). In the case of the IASB, accounting 
standards setting is even more complicated, and is influenced by many different 
cultures, events and supranational entities, because it must manage the influence of 
multiple jurisdictions with various levels of economic growth (Howieson 2009; 
Camfferman and Zeff 2015). Many scholars question the legitimacy of the IASB’s 
process for issuing IFRS for SMEs (e.g. Danjou and Walton 2012; Burlaud and 
Colasse 2011; Ram and Newberry 2013, 2017).6 Burlaud and Colasse’s (2011) 
criticism is that politics has regained a role in issuing financial reporting standards, 
whereas other scholars, such as Danjou and Walton (2012), state that politics has never 
been absent from this field. The IASB is generally regarded as the worldwide standard 
setter for financial markets, and its mass support indicates that it does not lack 
legitimacy (Danjou and Walton 2012). Nonetheless, its process for issuing financial 
accounting standards is not entirely understood. Its lack of proper documentation of 
the influential external environmental factors it faces raises questions about the case 
of other NASBs. 
Motivated by academic debate over the legitimacy of the IASB’s actions, Ram and 
Newberry (2013, 2017) examine the IASB’s due process for the issuance of IFRS for 
SMEs. They find that the IASB was divided over the IFRS for SMEs project, which 
was titled the “SME project”. Interviews with key players also show that the IASB 
was influenced by its environment, including supranational entities such as the World 
Bank, to adopt the SME project. In addition, the IASB was concerned that if it did not 
make a move to issue financial reporting standards aimed at SMEs, other legislators, 
                                                 
6 Since this study does not examine the IASB’s decision-making process, detailed discussion of 
ostensible reasons for the IASB’s issuance of IFRS for SMEs is not presented. For further reading on 
this issue, see, for example, Ram (2012); Larson and Herz (2013); Ram and Newberry (2013, 2017). 
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such as the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on 
International Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR), might do so, which 
might affect its authority and ability to control the SME financial reporting arena. 
Furthermore, Ram and Newberry (2013, 2017) argue that since the IASB’s focus was 
mainly on issuing financial reporting standards applicable to publicly accountable 
entities, reductions in disclosure requirements to meet the capabilities of specific 
groups of entities might threaten the IASB brand. 
However, the IASB incorporated the SME project into its agenda in 2003. Ram and 
Newberry (2017) attribute the IASB’s change of focus from publicly accountable 
entities to SMEs to that fact that such a move might significantly influence its brand, 
because board members held significantly different influential power. According to 
Ram and Newberry (2017), former IASB chair, Sir David Tweedie was unhappy when 
he learned that the IASB’s technical team members wanted to bar the SME project 
from its agenda. In other words, they were trying to stop the IASB’s active 
involvement with SMEs. However, Tweedie intercepted this move and ensured that 
the SME project was granted agenda entry, which led to the IASB’s involvement with 
it. At that time, the chair also had authority to appoint staff, indicating authoritative 
power not only to set the tone of the IASB’s project, but also to structure its 
membership. In order to prevent board members who were against introducing the 
SME project from being directly involved or causing delays, Tweedie appointed Paul 
Pacter as technical director, granting him special powers that allowed him to report 
directly to Tweedie without going through the usual reporting channels, which 
included reporting to senior technical members. Having introduced the SME project 
to the agenda, it was necessary to determine its framework. 
Since the IASB’s aim was not to issue a different set of financial reporting standards, 
but a simpler version of them to be used by SMEs, so it used the IFRS standards and 
framework to issue IFRS for SMEs (IASB 2003, 2009). Thus, it appeared to assume 
that SMEs’ uses and needs with regard to financial statements were identical to those 
of public entities. However, the IFRS conceptual framework deals mainly with 
companies that are publicly accountable (Evans et al. 2005), focusing on decision 
usefulness and investor protection (Chua and Taylor 2008) rather than on stewardship. 
The IASB in 2010 substituted the concept of “reliability” with that of “representational 
faithfulness” (Zeff 2013; IASB 2015). The former is concerned with monitoring 
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principles, while “the latter is concerned with capturing the substance of an economic 
phenomenon” (Whittington 2008, p.500). The IASB eliminated reliability and 
stewardship from its conceptual framework because these principles did not support 
the current direction of its standard setting (O’Brien 2009). Thus, using IFRS as a 
conceptual framework for IFRS for SMEs seemed problematic, and would at most 
only partially satisfy SMEs’ needs. 
Members of the IASB were uncertain whether it would be appropriate to use the IFRS 
framework as a conceptual framework for IFRS for SMEs, since the needs and uses 
of SMEs’ financial reports are different from those of publicly-accountable entities 
(IASB 2003; Ram 2012, 2017). In 2008, an ED of IFRS for SMEs was field tested by 
116 entities from 20 jurisdictions. Analysis of the field test comments reveals that 
implementation of fair value was difficult, disclosure requirements were too 
burdensome, and additional simplification was needed (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
2008). Nevertheless, the IASB’s (2007a) development of IFRS for SMEs was based 
on the conceptual framework of IFRS, because developing a completely new 
accounting standard based on SMEs’ needs would have required a fresh conceptual 
framework, and new financial reporting objectives, financial information, and 
measurement and recognition principles. The IASB also claimed that “a ‘fresh start’ 
approach would be costly and time-consuming and ultimately futile” (IASB 2007a, 
p.27). The IASB employed a top-down approach to issuing IFRS for SMEs mainly 
because issuing accounting standards through a bottom-up approach would have been 
costly and allegedly unjustifiable (IASB 2007a). 
As a result, the IASB’s motivation for and approach to issuing IFRS for SMEs explain 
why many scholars (Burlaud and Colasse 2011; Ram 2012; Ram and Newberry 2017; 
Gassen 2017) have questioned the IASB’s legitimacy regarding the issuance of IFRS 
for SMEs, challenging whether use of the standard is appropriate worldwide and 
providing a possible explanation for NASBs’ behaviour toward it. Jurisdictions must 
therefore carefully consider whether to adopt IFRS for SMEs. Also, lack of demand 
from SMEs for the standard’s adoption may be due to the way in which it was 
developed. Previous studies (e.g. Gassen 2017; Sellami and Gafsi 2018) indicate that 
the IFRS framework does not seem to be attractive to SMEs because most do not have 
significant international activities, nor are they interested in becoming publicly-listed, 
seeking foreign investors, or being part of an international group (e.g. Eierle and Haller 
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2009; Aboagye‐Otchere and Agbeibor 2012; Bartůňková 2013; Hoxha 2014; Brouwer 
and Hoogendoorn 2017; Di Pietra 2017; Fülbier et al. 2017; Gallo et al. 2018; Ghio 
and Verona 2018; Buculescu and Dutescu 2018; Sellami and Gafsi 2018). The 
perceived usefulness of IFRS for SMEs to SMEs and their users is discussed in the 
next section. 
2.6 Perceived usefulness of IFRS for SMEs 
Following increased adoption of IFRS for SMEs, scholars have started to question its 
usefulness. Supporters of a single set of financial reporting standards argue that 
accounting harmonisation may help improve cross-country activities (e.g. EC 2002; 
IASB 2009; Amiram 2012; Yu and Wahid 2014; Baetge et al. 2016; AICPA 2018; Al‐
Htaybat 2018). However, as previously mentioned, Hopwood (1994) suggests that the 
benefits of the IASB’s accounting standards have been taken for granted rather than 
being systematically explored, indicating a limited understanding of these standards. 
This assumption may also apply to IFRS for SMEs, because many jurisdictions have 
adopted or permitted it, despite the IASB’s top-down approach in developing the 
standard. This section discusses the appropriateness of IFRS for SMEs to various SME 
groups in different jurisdictions. 
2.6.1 Costs relating to adoption of IFRS for SMEs 
Scholars have investigated whether the benefits of adopting IFRS for SMEs outweigh 
the costs, since adoption decisions seem not to be costless (e.g.Chand et al. 2015; 
Gassen 2017). Chand et al. (2015) investigate Fijian accounting professionals’ 
perceptions of the benefits of adoption. The vast majority of their respondents agreed 
that it is costly, complicated and unjustifiable, and the authors conclude that, although 
adoption may be justifiable for SMEs operating in developed countries, compliance 
with IFRS for SMEs is unjustifiable in Fiji. 
Studies by Hoxha (2014) and Bartůňková (2013) examine whether the adoption of 
IFRS for SMEs may provide future benefits in Albania and the Czech Republic 
respectively. They find that small companies do not believe that adoption will improve 
SMEs’ decision-making processes; rather, they believe that adoption will be 
burdensome. Hoxha (2014) finds that SMEs are unwilling to invest in new accounting 
standards such as IFRS for SMEs, because this increases the cost to small entities by 
approximately 400 to 600 euros per year, a cost regarded as unjustifiable and 
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unbeneficial. In addition, medium-sized entities estimate the initial cost of 
implementing IFRS for SMEs to be approximately 3,000 euros, with an additional 
annual cost of approximately 2,000 euros. Like small entities, most medium-sized 
companies are unwilling to adopt the standard because they believe it is irrelevant to 
their decision-making and stewardship. However, Hoxha (2014) and Bartůňková 
(2013) agree that, unlike SMEs, large entities tend to support its adoption. They 
suggest that this is because large entities may plan to become publicly traded 
companies, and implementing IFRS for SMEs may ease this transition. Another 
possible explanation is that, unlike small and medium-sized entities, large entities can 
afford to train and hire experienced employees. The results of these studies depend on 
the distinction between small, medium-sized and large entities. However, the authors 
do not clarify the criteria used for their data analyses since definitions of SMEs vary 
(Pacter 2008). This may lead to misinterpretation of these findings, since small entities 
in the UK may not resemble those in jurisdictions elsewhere. 
Scholars have investigated motivations for adopting IFRS for SMEs across multiple 
jurisdictions (e.g. Kaya and Koch 2015; Saucke 2015). They find that, if a jurisdiction 
has previously adopted IFRS for listed companies, the likelihood of adopting IFRS for 
SMEs is higher because this may reduce their financial reporting burden. The authors 
also argue that NASBs’ behaviour toward IFRS for SMEs is driven mainly by cost–
benefit considerations. The usefulness of these findings is limited because they are 
influenced primarily by perceived costs and benefits, potentially disregarding the 
influence of countries’ specific environmental factors, including authority and national 
accounting history and culture, on NASBs’ decision-making processes. Thus, in-depth 
investigation of EU NASBs’ decision-making processes with regard to IFRS for SMEs 
is needed. Another benefit that the IASB claimed would derive from adoption of its 
SMEs standard is ease of access to foreign investors. This issue is discussed in the 
next sub-section. 
2.6.2 Usefulness of the adoption of IFRS for SMEs for cross-country activities 
Since adopting a single set of financial reporting standards may help improve cross-
country activities (e.g. EC 2002; IASB 2009; Amiram 2012; Yu and Wahid 2014; 
AICPA 2018; Al‐Htaybat 2018), Eierle and Haller (2009) investigate whether 
adoption of IFRS for SMEs might ease the international transactions of German SMEs 
participating in international activities. They find that a large percentage of the import 
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and export activities of their sample was with non-EU countries, indicating a high 
level of international activities. However, German SMEs do not believe that using 
comparable accounting standards benefits their international activities. Eierle and 
Haller (2009) find that German SMEs are reluctant to support implementation of IFRS 
for SMEs owing to the perceived costs of adoption and because they do not believe 
that international suppliers and customers care about their financial reports. 
Similarly, Ghanaian SMEs and micro-entities rarely engage in international activities 
or have international structures, so internationally comparable financial reporting is 
unnecessary for them (Aboagye‐Otchere and Agbeibor 2012). Aboagye‐Otchere and 
Agbeibor (2012) also find that, although IFRS for SMEs discusses 27 topics, only 
eight are relevant to Ghana’s SMEs. They conclude that SMEs in other African 
countries will have similar needs to those of Ghana. Similarly, Bartůňková (2013) 
finds that most SMEs in the Czech Republic do not support the use of a single set of 
financial reporting standards and believe that implementing IFRS for SMEs will not 
enhance international trade or foreign investment. However, since these studies focus 
on single jurisdictions, their conclusions may be affected by cultural and 
environmental biases. 
2.6.3 Stakeholders’ perceptions of the adoption of IFRS for SMEs 
Scholars such as Kiliç et al. (2014) and Uyar and Güngörmüş (2013) investigate 
Turkish accounting professionals’ perceptions of IFRS for SMEs. They find more 
supporters than opponents of adopting IFRS for SMEs because their participants 
argued that IFRS for SMEs is better than Turkish accounting standards. However, 
more than a third of their participants had no knowledge of IFRS for SMEs. Similarly 
to previous studies, Buculescu and Stoica (2016) investigate perceptions of IFRS for 
SMEs by Romanian accounting professionals, finding that 40 per cent of participants 
believed that adoption of IFRS for SMEs is beneficial, 43 per cent believed that 
adoption is costly and unjustifiable, and 16 per cent had insufficient knowledge to 
assess whether the implementation of IFRS for SMEs would be an improvement on 
current accounting standards. Hoxha’s (2014) investigation of the perceptions of 
Albanian SME preparers regarding the adoption of IFRS for SMEs also reveals that 
most SME preparers have insufficient knowledge of IFRS for SMEs. However, unlike 
previous studies, he finds that SME preparers do not desire any changes to current 
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accounting standards because they do not feel confident or capable of switching to 
new standards. 
Although Uyar and Güngörmüş’s (2013) study shows that supporters of adoption 
outnumber opponents, 51 per cent of their respondents had no opinion on whether 
IFRS for SMEs should be adopted. Taken together with participants’ lack of 
knowledge of IFRS for SMEs, their conclusion that adopting IFRS for SMEs may 
drive economic benefits should be taken with caution. To make a proper assessment 
of the expected benefits and whether they outweigh the costs, participants must have 
a reasonable knowledge of IFRS for SMEs, yet the vast majority of respondents had 
insufficient information to assess the potential impact of adoption. Furthermore, Kiliç 
et al. (2014) claim that Turkey adopted IFRS for SMEs in 2010 for application in 
2014; however, it has not announced the adoption in its IFRS profile, but makes a clear 
statement that IFRS for SMEs has not yet been adopted (IFRS Foundation 2016g). If 
it has not adopted the standard, this casts doubt on Kiliç et al.’s (2014) findings, 
because adoption of IFRS for SMEs may raise participants’ awareness of the standard 
when forced to incorporate it into their financial reports. It is unclear why Turkey may 
have misrepresented its adoption status in its IFRS profile. In addition, large numbers 
of participants in previous studies, regardless of their location, believed that adopting 
IFRS for SMEs would be costly, complicated and require too much disclosure. This 
raises the question of why jurisdictions are rapidly adopting IFRS for SMEs. Scholars 
recommend that the IASB should simplify IFRS for SMEs to meet the varying 
capabilities of SMEs in developing countries. 
2.7 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed previous studies of NASBs’ environmental factors, 
including national stakeholders, governments, history and culture, and supranational 
entities including the World Bank and the EC. NASBs’ environments differ 
significantly, leading to diverse behaviours with regard to IFRS. Jurisdictions have 
either adopted, rejected or used these standards as a blueprint for their national 
accounting regulations. This indicates that, although general environmental patterns 
may exist among NASBs, these patterns cannot capture every aspect of each 
phenomenon under investigation. However, such patterns may provide a preliminary 
understanding of NASBs’ decision-making processes and guide future investigations 
of phenomena relating to standard setting. 
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Previous studies of the usefulness of IFRS have produced contradictory results. Early 
studies attribute the observed benefits to features and characteristics of the standards, 
while later studies suggest that other factors, such as national enforcement systems 
and entities’ own reporting incentives, may give rise to the observed benefits. 
Discussion of these studies is relevant for two reasons. First, since IFRS and IFRS for 
SMEs share a similar, although not identical, conceptual framework, the perceived 
advantages and disadvantages of the former may influence NASBs’ perceptions of and 
behaviours toward the latter. Second, studies of IFRS have produced contradictory 
results with regard to the economic benefits of adoption, despite the IASB’s main 
focus on publicly accountable entities and scholars’ recognition of the IASB as the 
world standard setter for these entities, which raises many concerns with regard to the 
adoption of IFRS for SMEs. This is because, unlike IFRS, the IASB’s approach to 
developing IFRS for SMEs was top-down and focused weakly on SMEs and their 
users, suggesting that adopting this standard may not bring significant economic 
benefits, or may at best reveal inconsistent results similar to those of IFRS. 
Furthermore, previous studies suggest that adopting any standards other than IFRS, 
accompanied by environmental factors including strong national enforcement 
systems, will produce economic benefits, because although the IASB’s accounting 
standards are of a high quality, simply adopting these standards will not cause 
significant or observable positive changes. This suggests that simply adopting IFRS 
for SMEs without supportive measures or environmental factors, including national 
enforcement systems, will not bring economic benefits, because such benefits are 
derived not only from the standards themselves, but from a combination of factors. 
This indicates that adopting any standards other than IFRS for SMEs accompanied by 
the same environmental factors would lead to observable benefits, raising questions 
about NASBs’ choice and motivation for adopting IFRS for SMEs. 
Since this study uses IFRS for SMEs as a vehicle to investigate and deepen 
understanding of NASBs’ decision-making processes, it is also necessary to review 
studies that have investigated the standard’s usefulness. The vast majority of IFRS for 
SMEs studies highlight its inappropriateness for use by all SMEs worldwide. The fact 
that IFRS was used as a model for IFRS for SMEs may explain why the benefits of 
the latter have been questioned. This move by the IASB seems to have assumed that 
SMEs’ needs for and uses of financial statements are similar to listed companies, but 
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previous studies challenge this assumption. They show that SMEs’ financial 
statements are prepared mainly for the purposes of management (e.g. Collis and Jarvis 
2000) and taxation (e.g. Sian and Roberts 2009), whereas listed companies prepare 
financial statements in order to provide external investors with otherwise inaccessible 
financial information (Saucke 2015). Nevertheless, shortly after the issuance of IFRS 
for SMEs, many jurisdictions such as South Africa, which was the first country to 
adopt it within a month (Mackenzie et al. 2011, p.viii), not only adopted IFRS for 
SMEs, but did so with no modification. This raises the question of whether these 
jurisdictions did, in fact, evaluate the standard during the adoption decision-making 
process. 
Although many publicly-available documents discuss the accounting standards-setting 
process, these documents rarely provide a comprehensive picture of the decision-
making process, since influential environmental factors are often undocumented (e.g. 
Hodges and Mellett 2002; Howieson 2009; Perera 1989; Ram 2012; Ram and 
Newberry 2013, 2017). Ram and Newberry (2013) show that the IASB was under 
significant pressure from national and supranational entities during the issuance of 
IFRS for SMEs, yet these environmental factors were not obvious to the public since 
they were undocumented. This indicates a need for more research to deepen 
understanding of NASBs’ decision-making processes (e.g. Hodges and Mellett 2002, 
2012; Howieson 2017; Ram and Newberry 2013, 2017; Saucke 2015; Pawsey 2017; 
Baudot 2018; Klein and Fülbier 2018), especially in relation to SMEs. 
In any study, it is important to decide on an appropriate approach based on the research 
questions under investigation and the data available (Broadbent and Laughlin 2013). 
The next chapter discusses the research methods used in this study to investigate and 
gain a deeper understanding of NASBs’ decision-making processes. 
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Chapter 3: Research approach and methods 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviewed previous literature on the influence of environmental factors on 
NASBs’ decision-making processes regarding IFRS and IFRS for SMEs. This chapter 
explains the research approach used in this study to investigate NASBs’ decision-
making processes with regard to IFRS for SMEs, while Chapter 4 will discuss 
institutional theory, power theory and legitimacy theory and the process of creating 
the skeletal theoretical framework of this study. 
According to Patton (2002b), researchers’ philosophical assumptions determine their 
perceptions of how organisations and various actors comprehend their social worlds. 
Myers (2013) defines philosophical assumptions as a fundamental component of the 
research design. A rigorous philosophical understanding allows researchers to map out 
each step necessary to identify suitable methods of data collection, analysis and 
interpretation (Creswell 2013). According to Ahrens and Chapman (2006), rigorous 
philosophical assumptions ensure that researchers’ ontological and epistemological 
positions align with the research methods used to investigate the chosen research 
questions. 
Laughlin (1995) discusses various theoretical and methodological options with regard 
to epistemology, ontology, methodology, human nature and society. Based on Burrell 
and Morgan’s (1979) study, he argues that, although their two-by-two matrix of social 
science approaches is too simplistic,: 
“It is quite probable that they have indeed isolated many, if not most, of the 
key domains for choice. Indeed a position on being (ontology), on the role of 
the investigator (human nature), on perceptions of society (society), on 
perceptions on understanding (epistemology) and ways to investigate the 
world (methodology) are implicit in the various approaches to empirical 
research” (Laughlin 1995, p.66). 
He reclassifies these elements and suggests that researchers take a low, medium or 
high position with regard to theory, methodology and change. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses Laughlin’s (1995) middle-
range thinking (MRT) approach. Section 3.3 describes the research methods utilised 
in this study, and the various steps taken to gather primary data. Section 3.4 explains 
the collection of archival and secondary data. Section 3.5 details the process of data 
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analysis. Finally, Section 3.6 summarises and provides conclusions on the topics 
covered in this chapter. 
The next section discusses Laughlin’s methodological choices. 
3.2 Laughlin’s methodological choices 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2013) and Laughlin (1995) define methodology as scholars’ 
prior assumptions regarding their roles and subjectivity in the process of investigating 
a phenomenon and the impact of theory on the choice of research methods. Laughlin 
(1995) uses the term “choice” to illustrate that scholars must choose theories, 
methodologies and make changes in accordance with the nature, aims and goals of 
their research questions, as shown in Figure 3.1. The next sub-section discusses these 
choices in more detail. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Laughlin’s methodological choices 
Source: Laughlin, 1995, p.68 
3.2.1 MRT approach 
According to Laughlin’s (1995) three dimensions of choice, scholars using a high level 
of theory, such as positivists, perceive that the reality of the accounting field can be 
examined objectively and the findings generalised to other phenomena. Previous 
literature is significant for them because hypotheses are based on previous findings 
and existing theories. The results are used to examine hypotheses to falsify a theory. 
Positivists also argue that scholars should be detached while investigating, following 
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predetermined sets of research methods with a theoretical framework (Laughlin 1995; 
Broadbent and Laughlin 2013). However, Laughlin (1995, p.83) argues that positivist 
accounting scholars’ quest for generalisations with regard to accounting theory is a 
“considerable leap of faith”, and scholars with alternative assumptions question the 
validity of positivists’ findings because, unlike the theory of gravity which disregards 
any tangible differences, accounting is a social practice that takes place with various 
social actors, so ability to generalise the research results is limited. 
On the other hand, scholars with a low position on theory, such as interpretivists, argue 
that reality is subjective, made by human communications and interactions with one 
another. According to Chua (1986), the accounting field is considered a social practice 
in which actors generate empirical phenomena. Interpretivists argue that actors’ 
understanding of specific phenomena is subjective because individuals are unique, 
hindering the usefulness of existing theories to investigate or examine current 
phenomena, and leading to limited generalisability (Neuman 2013). Since 
interpretivists do not seek generalisability, they often investigate a phenomenon to 
gain a deeper understanding of its empirics by seeking the perspectives of actors who 
have directly experienced, interacted or engaged with it (Hopper and Powell 1985). 
Interpretivists also argue that scholars should be free from any theoretical framework; 
their choice of research methods is subjective in investigating an empirical 
phenomenon. However, Broadbent and Laughlin (2013) criticise interpretivists’ 
assumption that every phenomenon is unique, because this entirely rejects any 
potentially shared attributes between phenomena. In doing so, they disregard general 
patterns that may exist with regard to social science that might guide scholars in their 
investigations of new phenomena (Laughlin 1995). 
Both positivist and interpretivist methodologies have weaknesses. According to 
Laughlin (1995), accounting theory is occasionally described as complex and vague. 
Using a narrow definition of methodology may cause inadequate comprehension of 
the phenomenon under investigation. In the case of positivists, their predetermined or 
fixed perceptions may mean that their surveys or methods of documentary analysis do 
not accommodate issues that have inadvertently not been considered (Broadbent and 
Laughlin 2013). In contrast, interpretivists’ perceptions with regard to methodology 
and their weak preference for predetermined rules, owing to a fear that rules will 
inevitably be restrictive, may shift their emphasis to a rational or theocratical stance, 
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indicating that their analysis of empirical phenomena may be based on their perceptual 
powers (Laughlin 1995). Thus, duplication of others’ research is almost impossible 
because individuals’ perceptual powers differ (Broadbent and Laughlin 2013). 
Laughlin’s (1995) dimension of change is associated with scholars’ understanding of 
the status quo. According to Laughlin (1995, p.68), this dimension “relates to high to 
low levels of critique with regard to the status quo and the need for change in the 
phenomena being investigated”. Scholars in a high position would argue that there is 
no perfect situation, so everything is in need of change, whereas scholars in a low 
position would argue otherwise, because they consider all situations to be flawless, so 
nothing needs to change (Laughlin 1995). However, both argue that organisations and 
societies prefer consistency so do not favour change (Chua 1986), although they 
provide different explanations for this view. Positivists insist that scholars should not 
interfere by making “moral judgments” of organisations’ structure because this may 
hinder their objectivity (Chua 1986). Interpretivists, on the other hand, argue that 
scholars should accept empirical phenomena as taken for granted, indicating a lack of 
need for any change to the investigated phenomena. Some scholars (e.g. Laughlin 
1987; Broadbent and Laughlin 1997) question and critique positivists’ and 
interpretivists’ assumptions of change and argue that research should uncover 
inequality in society, in order to improve and transform it for the better. 
In order to minimise the limitations of positivism and interpretivism, Laughlin (1995, 
2004, 2007) and Broadbent and Laughlin (2014) suggest that accounting scholars 
should take a middle ground with regard to theory, methodology and change. 
According to Laughlin (1995), MRT lies between positivist and interpretivist 
approaches, aiming to gain advantages from both perspectives while minimising their 
disadvantages. 
MRT inspires scholars to use available theories to help guide their investigations of 
current accounting phenomena, which is deemed to be an advantage of positivism, 
while simultaneously also considering that accounting phenomena are not identical, 
which is a strength of interpretivism with regard to theory (Laughlin 1995). The 
middle ground adopted in MRT takes a realist approach to social science, but also 
recognises that social reality differs from natural reality (Laughlin 1995; Broadbent 
and Laughlin 2017). Broadbent and Unerman (2011, p.9) define reality in social 
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science as “inter-subjective consensus” among various actors, using subjective 
judgments of an objective reality to understand accounting phenomena. For instance, 
there is a consensus among accountants with regard to how a specific transaction 
should be recorded and reported, so most accountants would be able to comprehend 
financial statements, despite the fact that many assumptions and judgments are 
involved in their creation (Deegan and Unerman 2011). Since accounting is a social 
practice, a single theory cannot explain every aspect of every phenomenon in the 
accounting field (Laughlin 1995; Broadbent and Laughlin 2017). However, the MRT 
approach allows scholars to identify or develop “skeletal theories” which may 
illuminate general patterns in the empirical results of an accounting phenomenon 
(Laughlin 2004). 
With regard to methodology, the MRT approach allows scholars to modify the 
“skeletal theory” and continually redefine the study’s design while investigating a 
phenomenon (Laughlin 1995, 2004, 2007; Broadbent and Laughlin 2014). Thus, 
scholars’ engagement with and investigation of a phenomenon should establish some 
rules and structure so that duplication of research by subsequent scholars is possible 
(Broadbent and Laughlin 2013). According to Broadbent and Laughlin (2013, p.51), 
the MRT approach uses “critical discursive analysis” as a methodological choice, 
involving researchers in an expansive process in order to reach deeper understandings 
of the phenomena under examination and develop responses or plans to change if 
necessary. MRT accepts descriptive data such as documents, and qualitative data such 
as interviews, depending on the phenomenon under investigation and the purpose of 
the study (Laughlin 2004). 
With regard to the change dimension of MRT, Laughlin (1995, 2004, 2007) and 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2014) argue that the middle position enables scholars to 
propose changes, but in order to do so, they must very carefully consider the 
phenomenon under investigation prior to making such changes. They also suggest that 
scholars must take multiple steps prior to their proposed changes, including 
understanding the investigated phenomenon based on available theoretical 
frameworks and previous literature. It is important for researchers to acquire mutual 
understandings of investigated phenomena based on their engagement with them, and 
to propose changes in accordance with this acquired mutual knowledge. Therefore, 
unlike positivists and interpretivists, the MRT approach takes a middle position 
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regarding theory, methodology and change, maximising their advantages and 
minimising their disadvantages. However, this approach has been criticised (e.g. Dey 
2002; Lowe 2004; Roslender 2013), as discussed in more detail in the next sub-section. 
3.2.2 Limitations of MRT 
Many weaknesses have been identified in Laughlin’s (1995) MRT approach. 
According to Lowe (2004) and Roslender (2013), Laughlin’s (1995) study focuses on 
organising dominant schools of thought in the accounting field. They argue that his 
findings are questionable because many accounting scholars use sophisticated 
methodologies to examine accounting phenomena, whether they are positivists or 
interpretivists. However, their criticism should be considered with caution, because 
the aim of Laughlin’s (1995) study was not to classify dominant schools of thought in 
the accounting field, but to highlight the existence of many different research 
approaches. Researchers must therefore carefully evaluate their choices prior to 
engaging with the phenomena they intend to investigate, because their choices will 
influence how they interpret and understand them. 
Lowe (2004) also criticises Laughlin’s (1995) MRT approach and claims that his use 
of rhetorical language to propagate MRT and undermine other approaches has led to 
its dominance and encouraged many scholars to embrace and use it. Dey (2002, p.113) 
claims that Laughlin’s (1995) study should be considered with caution because it does 
not elaborate exactly “where, when and to what extent skeletal theories might apply”. 
He argues that embracing a skeletal theory completely may damage research results 
by ignoring other existing theories. 
Laughlin (2004) responds to these issues by arguing that researchers have indeed taken 
many approaches other than his, and that they have complete freedom to choose any 
approach if they believe it fits their study and the phenomenon under investigation. 
However, choosing a particular approach inevitably requires the rejection of other 
positions, so choices must inevitably be made, leading to the fact that “all empirical 
research is partial and incomplete” (Laughlin 2004, p.264). Laughlin (2004) stresses 
that use of a skeletal theory should not determine the empirical findings of a 
phenomenon, but should rather guide scholars during their investigations, because a 
skeletal theory is meaningless without the “flesh” of empirical data. The MRT 
approach permits researchers to modify their “skeletal theory” and continually 
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redefine the study’s design, and encourages critical discursive analysis. Thus, the 
flexibility of the “skeletal theory” allows for its modification and further development 
while investigating a phenomenon, suggesting that it does not lead to empirical 
findings, but rather helps guide and provide deeper understandings while permitting 
explorations of issues that researchers have not considered or have accidently omitted 
(Laughlin 1995, 2004, 2007; Broadbent and Laughlin 2014). Since the MRT approach 
was developed, it has been used in many studies, indicating its usefulness for 
examining accounting phenomena. This issue is discussed in more detail in the next 
sub-section. 
3.2.3 Justification for using the MRT approach 
Three factors motivated the utilisation of the MRT approach in this study. First, 
NASBs’ decision-making processes have been described by many scholars (e.g. 
Hodges and Mellett 2002, 2012; Howieson 2017; Baudot 2018; Klein and Fülbier 
2018) as a “black box”, and their calls for further investigation indicate limited 
understanding of these processes. Unlike studies that seek to predict these processes, 
this study aims to gain a deeper understanding of them in relation to EU NASBs. 
According to Laughlin (2004), previous studies show that “skeletal” patterns may exist 
in various phenomena. These can be used to develop conceptual frameworks, but they 
will never fully capture every aspect or feature, nor the diversity between them. In this 
study, the MRT approach permitted the use of previous literature to create a conceptual 
framework, and preliminary understanding of NASBs’ decision-making processes led 
to deeper understanding following engagement with the field. Previous literature may 
inform scholars of various possible theories to guide the process of analysis and 
investigation. Although empirical generalisations are impossible, investigation of new 
phenomena and empirical data may enhance current theories (Laughlin 2004). This 
study seeks to do so by investigating EU NASBs’ decision-making processes with 
regard to their diverse behaviours toward IFRS for SMEs. 
Second, the MRT approach classifies accounting as a socially constructed practice 
(Laughlin 1995, 2004, 2007; Broadbent and Laughlin 2014), which is fundamentally 
significant for this study. NASBs’ decision-making processes are influenced by their 
environment (e.g. Fogarty et al. 1994; Young 1995; Hodges and Mellett 2002, 2012; 
Mir and Rahaman 2005; Hail et al. 2010; Krishnan 2018). Thus, NASBs must interact 
with various entities, showing the social nature of their processes. MRT allows 
53 
investigation of various environmental factors, including history and culture, which 
may influence NASBs’ decision-making processes. 
Third, since Laughlin’s (1995) development of the MRT approach, scholars have 
utilised it to investigate various phenomena on the accounting spectrum (e.g. Laughlin 
1995; Broadbent and Laughlin 1997; Broadbent et al. 2010; Bracci and Llewellyn 
2012; Kraus 2012; Abramik 2016), including accounting standard setting (e.g. 
Broadbent and Laughlin 2002; Khadaroo 2005a; Johansen and Plenborg 2018), 
indicating its suitability for and relevance to this study. Broadbent and Laughlin 
(2002) employ an MRT approach to investigate the ASB’s accounting standard setting 
with regard to private finance initiatives (PFI). They did not use the MRT approach to 
build and test hypotheses with empirical details; “rather the theoretical framework is 
a type of language that guides, yet is also guided and amplified by, the empirical 
descriptions” (p.624). Hence, it is possible to reshape the theoretical framework based 
on empirical results. They based their theoretical framework on previous literature, 
fleshed out with empirical results mainly from written submissions to the ASB with 
regard to its ED of the PFI standard. They find that investigating changes to PFI only 
at a technical level would have excluded many social issues that were deemed crucial 
for understanding the influence of society on the ASB’s accounting standard-setting 
process. The ASB’s position on proposed PFI changes contradicted those of the UK 
government and accounting profession, which endangered its legislative power. 
Although the government may at times have seemed to be disinterested because it had 
relinquished its legislative power to the ASB, this was not the case with regard to PFI. 
It issued an interpretation of the ASB’s accounting standard, not only to prevent debate 
over which body was responsible for UK legislation, but also to permit exclusion of 
investment through PFI off the balance sheet. The government’s interpretation 
provided a “face-saving” device that protected the status quo of the UK government 
and the accounting profession. 
Similarly to Broadbent and Laughlin (2002), Bracci and Llewellyn (2012) used the 
MRT approach to examine the influence of accounting reforms on social care 
providers in two Italian entities. They find that individuals’ interpretations of the 
concept of accountability influenced their performance of their duties. They also find 
that different interpretations of the concept of accountability gave rise to two different 
groups of service providers, “Territoriali” and “Residenziali”. The “Territoriali” 
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followed a traditional approach to social care, engaging with, supporting and seeking 
to modify the behaviours and characteristics of their clients; whereas the 
“Residenziali” often outsourced and had standardised care packages in the form of 
daily, residential and home-based services. The authors argue that the reason for their 
differences was that, unlike the “Residenziali”, who largely accepted and embraced 
the new accounting reform, the “Territoriali” refused to embrace the imposed changes 
and preferred to follow a traditional care approach. These studies recognise the 
importance and usefulness of MRT for investigating and understanding empirical 
phenomena in light of existing “skeletal theory”. Accordingly, this study embraces the 
MRT approach to examine EU NASBs’ decision-making processes with regard to 
their diverse behaviours toward IFRS for SMEs, as shown in Figure 3.2. 
Therefore, this study follows Laughlin’s (1995, 2004, 2007) MRT approach 
paradigms, including the acquisition of a general preliminary understanding of 
NASBs’ decision-making processes through the review of previous literature 
discussed in Chapter 2, as well as field engagement which facilitated the development 
of a theoretical framework to investigate the phenomenon, to collect and use 
qualitative data, including interviews and publicly available documents, and to 
conduct discursive analysis of empirical data based on structured rules. The empirical 
phenomenon under investigation shaped and reshaped the study’s design and the 
theoretical framework throughout the process. 
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Figure 3.2: Nature of the research approach 
Source: Laughlin, 2004, p.272 
The remainder of this chapter discusses the use of qualitative research methods, data 
collection, ethical considerations and the process of data analysis in this study. 
3.3 Research method 
According to Laughlin (1995, 2004, 2007), researchers must make choices, including 
choosing a suitable methodology capable of examining the phenomenon and satisfying 
the aim of the study. Positivist scholars often choose a quantitative approach, using 
predetermined research instruments (Saunders et al. 2009; Yilmaz 2013; Mason 2018). 
They often seek generalisations and embrace a deductive approach to explain social 
phenomena using arithmetical data (Yilmaz 2013; Bryman and Bell 2015). In doing 
so, social actors are prevented from expressing their perceptions in their own words, 
so positivists fail to consider actors’ emotions, experiences, thoughts and frames 
(Bryman and Bell 2015). Positivists often argue that researchers should play a neutral 
role in the research, so they seldom engage directly with the phenomenon under 
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investigation, but instead rely on remote or inferential empirical methods to explain it 
(Chua 1986; Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Patton 2002a). 
Interpretivist scholars, on the other hand, often choose a qualitative approach because 
they are “concerned with process, context, interpretation, meaning or understanding 
through inductive reasoning” (Yilmaz 2013, p.313). They often seek to understand 
and describe the phenomenon under investigation by capturing members’ perceptions 
and experiences and communicating with participants using interviews or 
observations (Saunders et al. 2009; Bryman and Bell 2015; Mason 2018). This, in turn, 
results in in-depth understandings of individuals’ lives and influential factors on their 
natural settings, which would not be provided by predetermined or standardised 
categories of analysis. In order to establish in-depth understandings, interpretivists 
often use an inductive research design with interactive and naturalistic research 
strategies, including case study and narrative analysis (Saunders et al. 2009). 
According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2012), various types of observations and 
interviews are dominant sources of data in qualitative studies, and researchers are 
directly involved with the phenomenon under investigation. 
A qualitative research approach was adopted in this study for many reasons. First, its 
aim was to gain a deeper understanding of NASBs’ decision-making processes with 
regard to their diverse behaviours toward IFRS for SMEs. The nature of the research 
question is that it seeks to “describe” and “understand” a process, which are features 
of a qualitative approach (Yilmaz 2013). Many individuals are involved in setting 
national accounting standards, so focusing on technical accounting issues would lead 
to neglect of significant environmental factors. This led to the second reason for a 
qualitative approach: NASBs’ decision-making processes are often influenced by their 
environments (e.g. Fogarty et al. 1994; Young 1995; Hodges and Mellett 2002, 2012; 
Mir and Rahaman 2005; Hail et al. 2010). Individuals’ experiences and thoughts are 
significant for gaining an in-depth understanding of their organisations’ processes, 
which is another characteristic of the qualitative approach (Saunders et al. 2009; 
Bryman and Bell 2015). Lastly, MRT prompts the use of a qualitative approach to 
investigate accounting phenomena because accounting is a social practice that takes 
place with various different social actors (Laughlin 1995, 2004, 2007; Broadbent and 
Laughlin 2014), emphasising individuals’ relevance and importance to the accounting 
field. Previous studies (e.g. Hodges and Mellett 2002, 2012; Howieson 2017; Baudot 
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2018; Klein and Fülbier 2018) describe NASBs’ decision-making processes with 
regard to issuing and accepting accounting regulations as a process that takes place in 
a “black box”, calling for scholars to interview NASB members and investigate their 
processes further. This study answers this call by conducting interviews with former 
and current members of EFRAG, ASB, FRC, ASCG, OIC and DASB in order to gain 
a deeper understanding of their decision-making processes with regard to IFRS for 
SMEs. 
The next sub-section discusses interviews as a primary source of data for this study. 
3.3.1 Semi-structured interviews 
According to Richards (1996), interviews are a useful source of data because they may 
provide insightful information on a specific event, or on issues that may intentionally 
or unintentionally be excluded from or undocumented in publicly available data. 
Previous scholars define three types of interviews: unstructured, semi-structured and 
structured (e.g. Noaks and Wincup 2004; Silverman 2006, 2015; Saunders et al. 2009; 
Myers 2013). In structured interviews, interviewers only discuss predetermined sets 
of questions, so the flow of the interview will be determined beforehand, and 
interviewees will be unable to provide further details or discuss any issues accidently 
omitted by the researcher. These are similar to predetermined questionnaires (e.g. 
Noaks and Wincup 2004; Silverman 2006, 2015; Saunders et al. 2009; Myers 2013). 
Unstructured interviews involve relatively informal, briefly prepared and mostly open-
ended questions, and the interviewees will determine the flow and the issues discussed 
(e.g. Noaks and Wincup 2004; Silverman 2006, 2015; Saunders et al. 2009; Myers 
2013), indicating a lack of structure and consistency with regard to the issues 
discussed. 
According to Myers (2013), semi-structured interviews adopt the best aspects of both 
structured and unstructured interviews, while minimising the risks of the two 
approaches. The benefits of conducting semi-structured interviews are that they 
provide some structure and consistency between interviews, while also allowing for 
some improvisation during the interview process (e.g. Silverman 2006, 2015; 
Saunders et al. 2009; Myers 2013; Mason 2018). This flexibility offers interviewees 
opportunities to provide individual insights and discuss issues not considered by the 
researcher, while previously prepared questions provide some structure to the 
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interviews. Similarly, interviewers may ask new questions not considered prior to the 
interview which may seem important during the discussion (Myers 2013). Thus, the 
flow of the interview has some structure, yet still offers some freedom for fruitful 
discussion. Scholars suggest that it is inappropriate to establish a sample size for this 
type of critical research; rather scholars should reach “saturation” (e.g. Myers 2013; 
Silverman 2014; Mason 2018). They define “saturation” as the discovery of no new 
insights in subsequent interviews, at which point the researcher should stop 
interviewing. 
According to Mason (2010), many issues influence the sample size and number of 
interviews in qualitative studies. In general, the sample size is much smaller in 
qualitative studies than in quantitative studies. For instance, as more interviews are 
conducted, less new information tends to be discovered, so conducting further 
interviews will not lead to the uncovering of new information (Ritchie and Lewis 
2004). This is because recording a code or discovering certain types of information 
once is sufficient, and all that matters is to ensure that it becomes part of the analytical 
framework (Ritchie and Lewis 2004). Since qualitative studies are not concerned with 
empirically generalising the research results (e.g. Laughlin 1995), frequency in 
qualitative studies is rarely relevant, because information or data appearing once are 
as valuable and beneficial as those appearing numerous times for understanding the 
phenomenon under investigation. Lastly, qualitative studies require considerable work 
because appropriate critical analysis of a vast number of interviews is very time-
consuming (Mason 2010). 
This study utilised semi-structured interviews as a method of data collection, similarly 
to previous studies of NASBs’ decision-making processes (e.g. Mir and Rahaman 
2005; Albu et al. 2011; Ram and Newberry 2017; Krishnan 2018). The next sub-
section discusses the development of the interview protocol used in this study. 
3.3.2 Interview protocol 
In addition to determining what type of interviews to conduct, researchers must also 
categorise their interview questions. Ritchie and Lewis (2004) define four types of 
interview questions: introductory questions, opening (general and surface) questions, 
in-depth (specific and detailed) questions and winding-down questions (mainly 
suggestions for important questions not discussed in the interview, and snowball 
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questions regarding potential future interviewees). These types of question were used 
in drafting the interview questions for this study. Appendices A and B presents the 
interview protocol for EFRAG and NASB members. 
Adoption of the MRT approach allowed the use of previous literature to gain a 
preliminary general understanding of NASBs’ decision-making processes. The 
interview protocol was driven mainly by key issues and general patterns discussed and 
illuminated by previous studies and publicly available documents (e.g. IFRS profiles 
and comment letters) that were deemed relevant to the research phenomenon, 
including IFRS. This process enabled the identification of general patterns that guided 
investigation of EU jurisdictions’ diverse behaviours in relation to IFRS for SMEs. 
With regard to the interview protocol, the first question was an opening question 
relating to participants’ responsibilities and involvement in their organisations. The 
second and third questions generally investigated NASBs’ decision-making processes 
with regard to adoption or non-adoption of IFRS for SMEs and participants’ 
perceptions of their organisations’ processes and final outcomes. The fourth question 
discussed the advantages and disadvantages of adopting the standard from their 
perspectives as NASB members, and how these influenced the final outcome. The fifth 
and sixth questions sought to identify and discuss NASBs’ interactions with various 
entities, and the boards’ perceptions of these entities and of the standard’s adoption. 
The seventh question discussed NASBs’ interactions with the IASB and EC in more 
detail. The eighth question discussed how NASBs’ interactions with identified 
relevant entities influenced their final outcomes. The ninth question explored 
interviewees’ perceptions of other NASBs’ behaviour toward IFRS for SMEs. The 
tenth and eleventh questions discussed NASBs’ environmental factors, including 
politics and culture. The last two questions wound up the interviews by requesting 
further suggestions of issues not discussed during the interviews, and of further 
potential interviewees. 
The research questions of this study were stimulated by the previous literature. For 
instance, the general skeletal patterns of previous studies provided useful information 
for the first research question (what was NASBs’ decision-making process with regard 
to adoption of IFRS for SMEs?), which was drawn from studies including those of 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2002), Eierle and Haller (2009), Ram (2012), Ram and 
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Newberry (2013, 2017), Uyar and Güngörmüş (2013), Kiliç et al. (2014) and Krishnan 
(2016). The second research question (what were NASBs’ perceptions of the 
advantages and disadvantages of IFRS for SMEs and their influence on the adoption 
decision?) was drawn from general skeletal patterns of studies by Bartůňková (2013), 
Hoxha (2014), Chand et al. (2015), Kaya and Koch (2015), Saucke (2015) and Gassen 
(2017). The last research question (which entities and factors influenced NASBs’ 
decision-making processes in the case of IFRS for SMEs, and to what extent?), 
benefitted from the general skeletal patterns, and information was drawn from 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2002), Hodges and Mellett (2002, 2012), Mir and Rahaman 
(2005), Howieson (2009, 2017), Albu et al. (2011), Burlaud and Colasse (2011), 
Danjou and Walton (2012), Ramanna (2013), Ram and Newberry (2013), Collis et al. 
(2017), Di Pietra (2017) and Fülbier et al. (2017). 
Although previous literature was used in order to establish general skeletal patterns 
for this study, some issues were not considered during this phase, but the MRT 
approach allowed for their exploration. For instance, after conducting a few 
interviews, an interesting question developed from discussion and data analysis which 
was added to the interview protocol and helped facilitate in-depth discussions of 
interviewees’ perceptions of their organisations’ final outcomes. Thus, the findings of 
this study helped develop and reshape the research design, and the skeletal theoretical 
framework did not lead the findings, but rather guided and was guided by the empirical 
results. The framework helped strengthen the research and allowed issues 
inadvertently missed during the preparation phase to be captured. Prior to conducting 
and gathering interviews, some further steps were necessary, as discussed in the next 
sub-section. 
3.3.3 Process of conducting semi-structured interviews 
Prior to engaging directly with the phenomenon under investigation, a few steps were 
needed to enable the interviews to be conducted properly, including preparation of an 
interview protocol and the collection of interviewees’ contact details. The next sub-
section discusses the method used to collect NASBs’ contact details. 
3.3.3.1 Collection of NASBs’ contact details 
The first step in gathering contact details was to identify former and current members 
of the ASB, FRC and EFRAG. Publicly available documents on their websites 
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facilitated this process, including annual reviews, annual reports and minutes of 
meetings. Similar lists were not made for ASCG, OIC and DASB owing to a lack of 
time and publicly available data. After manually collecting the names of board and 
technical members and any general information about them, Google searches were 
conducted to gather their contact details. These included many search options for each 
potential interviewee. For instance, one search included the name of the potential 
interviewee followed by the name of the board of which s/he was a member. If no 
result was found, another search was carried out using other information gathered, 
such as previous experience or the names of other organisations of which they were 
members. The internet search engine helped gather details of work addresses, 
telephone numbers, email addresses and/or LinkedIn accounts. LinkedIn and email 
addresses were used as the main contact method for sending invitation letters and 
making further arrangements prior to the interviews. 
With regard to potential participants’ email addresses, although these were 
occasionally provided by their organisations, in most cases they were not publicly 
available, and verifying them proved to be difficult. For instance, each organisation 
had its own format for employees’ email addresses, such as using the first name 
followed by a dot and the last name, or vice versa, so there were many potential 
combinations. These combinations were tested for each individual identified as a 
member if their current occupations were known. In case of an invalid email address 
combination, the sent email bounced back after a certain length of time, and the email 
was then resent using a different combination. If the email had not bounced back after 
a couple of days, this indicated that the combination was correct. 
The internet search engine helped identify many LinkedIn accounts under the same 
name. In order to ensure that the individuals’ LinkedIn accounts belonged to members 
of the organisations under investigation, verification mechanisms were used, which 
included searching for personal pictures from other websites, including those of their 
organisations, and comparing them with their profile pictures. Also, previous 
occupations and experiences listed under their LinkedIn profiles were compared with 
publicly available documents, including CVs and the websites of previous employers. 
Once contact information had been gathered for possible interviewees, the next stage 
was direct involvement with the phenomenon under investigation. However, owing to 
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the nature of studies involving interviews, ethical issues might arise during the 
research process. Thus, prior to direct contact with potential interviewees, ethical 
issues were considered. The next sub-section discusses these in more detail. 
3.3.3.2 Ethical considerations 
In qualitative studies, researchers often rely mainly on human participants’ responses 
for their data, so ethical issues and dilemmas may arise (Guillemin and Gillam 2004; 
Mason 2018). The researchers’ role in investigations of social phenomena is not 
limited to data gathering and analysis, but must take account of participants’ 
wellbeing. They must thus develop a research design that balances the research goals 
and participants’ rights. 
Ethical issues may arise from the nature of the research phenomenon under 
investigation, technical issues, the necessary data, the method of data analysis and/or 
specific characteristics of participants (Cohen et al. 2007; Mason 2018), so each stage 
of the research process may give rise to ethical issues. Accordingly, scholars must 
carefully plan their research process in order to ensure participants’ safety and 
wellbeing throughout the investigation. With regard to this study, several ethical issues 
that might harm possible participants were deemed relevant, including privacy, 
deception, anonymity and confidentiality. 
Privacy is defined as individuals’ freedom to determine the time, place, situations, and 
extent to which their beliefs, thoughts, perceptions are withheld or shared by others 
(e.g. Ruebhausen and Brim 1965; Livingstone 2008; Mason 2018). In order to 
safeguard participants’ privacy, researchers must not discuss questions that may 
include or lead to disclosure of sensitive, private and personal information unless 
participants consent to providing such information. In this study, if interviewees 
requested a copy of the interview protocol, it was first indicated that the interview did 
not require any preparation in advance, but simply brief recollections of previous 
experience, so the protocol was not essential. However, in rare cases, interviewees 
insisted on receiving the interview protocol beforehand, and in such cases this was 
provided in order to eliminate any feelings of anxiety or embarrassment and to satisfy 
their requests. 
In order to avoid deceiving participants, Vanclay et al. (2013) and Mason (2018) 
recommend that scholars should use informed consent forms that explicitly state that 
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participation is entirely optional and that participants are free to withdraw at any time 
and at any stage of the research, in which case the collected data will not be used in 
the study and will be destroyed. Walford (2005) and Mason (2018) define anonymity 
as a requirement to keep participants’ identify safe and prevent others from identifying 
their responses. Therefore, the researcher should avoid disclosing any unique 
characteristics that might easily identify them. For instance, in this study, NASBs have 
board chairs, and identifying them as chair would make it easy to identify them, so 
such characteristics are not divulged. Walford (2005) and Mason (2018) also define 
confidentiality as participants’ right to keep information to themselves and not share 
it with others. For instance, during interviews, participants may discuss and disclose 
specific information to prove a point or further discuss an issue, but they may classify 
such information as confidential. In such cases, researchers must not use the 
information provided in their research, regardless of its value. According to the BERA 
(2004, p.8): 
“The confidential and anonymous treatment of participants’ data is 
considered the norm for the conduct of research. Researchers must recognize 
the participants’ entitlement to privacy and must accord them their rights to 
confidentiality and anonymity, unless they or their guardians or responsible 
others, specifically and willingly waive that right. In such circumstances it is 
in the researchers’ interests to have such a waiver in writing. Conversely, 
researchers must also recognize participants’ rights to be identified with any 
publication of their original works or other inputs, if they so wish. In some 
contexts it will be the expectation of participants to be so identified”. 
The last step prior to engaging directly with the phenomenon under investigation was 
to secure ethical approval from the University of Bristol’s Ethics Committee. Many 
steps were required to achieve this approval. For instance, various documents, 
including the interview protocol, consent form, research proposal and invitation letter 
were sent to the committee. The committee provided feedback and mandated certain 
changes and amendments to these documents, including clarification of the nature of 
the research. Once the required changes had been made and the committee was 
satisfied that this study would not cause any harm to potential participants, ethical 
approval was granted. This study adheres strictly to these ethical rules. 
In light of previous studies and in line with the requirements of the University of 
Bristol’s Ethics Committee, the following precautions were taken. First, before 
conducting the interviews, every interviewee was provided with sufficient information 
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in written form regarding the purpose of the research. Second, every interviewee was 
required to complete a consent form before the commencement of each interview. 
Appendices C and D present the consent form and invitation letter based on the 
University of Bristol’s research ethics guidelines. These explicitly indicate that 
anonymity, privacy and data confidentiality will be respected. Third, the nature of the 
project and the invitation process ensured that participation was voluntary; however, 
it was made clear not only that participation was optional, but also that participants 
were free to withdraw from the project at any time. If subjects chose to withdraw after 
their interviews, it was made clear to them that any responses they had provided would 
be removed from the study and destroyed confidentially. However, no such issue was 
encountered during this study because none of the interviewees asked to withdraw. 
Fourth, permission was sought to record the interviews on two occasions: on the 
consent form and before the interview began. Permission was granted for the recorded 
interviews and any supplementary data to be used for the purposes of this study. 
Collected data were stored on the researcher’s computer in password-protected files. 
In addition, participants’ names were anonymised directly after each interview to 
ensure that interviewees could not be identified by a third party. If interviewees 
refused to be recorded, detailed notes could have been taken instead and would be kept 
in a locked filing cabinet in a locked room. Fifth, interviewees’ permission was sought 
to transcribe the interviews, and soft copies of the transcripts were sent to them by 
email, providing them with an opportunity to elaborate and confirm the accuracy of 
the transcriptions. Lastly, in line with the University of Bristol’s research ethics 
policies, all data will be appropriately destroyed seven years after completion of the 
research. 
Having considered ethical issues and received ethical approval, the next stage in the 
research process was direct engagement with the phenomenon under investigation. 
The next sub-section discusses the process of contacting the interviewees and 
conducting the interviews. 
3.3.3.3 Contacting interviewees 
One of the main issues in this study was to identify individuals involved in or 
responsible for decisions on IFRS for SMEs, because this information was not publicly 
available. In order to minimise this issue, the contact details of all individuals listed in 
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publicly available documents were gathered for the period 2009 to 2015, because IFRS 
for SMEs was officially published by the IASB in 2009 (IASB 2009; Ram 2012, 
2017), EFRAG conducted its comparability study between the standard and the Fourth 
and Seventh EC Directives in 2010 (EFRAG 2010a, 2010b; see Sub-section 6.2.1 for 
more detail), and the UK and Ireland adopted the standard with major modifications 
in 2013, with an effective date of 2015 (IASB 2018c; IFRS Foundation 2016f, 2016h). 
A total of 127 individuals was identified with regard to the FRC and its predecessor, 
the ASB, and 217 individuals for EFRAG, of which 92 and 138 individuals 
respectively had either a valid LinkedIn account and/or email address. Identified 
individuals had various roles within their organisations, including members of the 
board, project directors and technical members. However, EFRAG had a group 
dedicated to SMEs entitled the Small/Medium Entities Working Group (SMEs 
working group). 
The existence of various groups within organisations indicated that individuals would 
have different roles and responsibilities. EFRAG’s board members were responsible 
for all decisions made and positions taken at an organisational level (EFRAG 2016a). 
Its Technical Expert Group (TEG) was responsible for providing EFRAG’s board with 
expert advice on financial reporting issues. Its advice was not compulsory but in the 
form of recommendations after careful consideration of the organisation’s due process 
(EFRAG 2016b). EFRAG’s project directors were responsible for preparing papers 
for discussion by the TEG with regard to IFRS and IFRIC interpretations and possible 
future standards to be developed by the IASB (EFRAG 2009a). The role of the SMEs 
working group was to prepare discussion papers, and provide inputs, suggestions and 
recommendations on issues relating to the Fourth and Seventh EC Directives 
(78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC), IFRS for SMEs and any other issues relating to SMEs 
(EFRAG 2009b). 
However, the ASB’s board members and technical team responsibilities are no longer 
publicly available because it was taken over by the FRC. The FRC’s board members’ 
responsibilities are also not publicly available because its website does not include any 
details of their responsibilities. However, this missing information was discussed with 
interviewees during the interviews (see Chapter 5 for more information on their roles 
and responsibilities). 
66 
Having identified potential interviewees, the data collection stage was initiated 
through direct contact with them. Interviews were secured in two stages. The first 
included sending connection requests to those who had LinkedIn accounts. Once they 
had accepted these invitations, formal interview invitation letters were sent. 
Meanwhile, interview invitation letters were also sent to those for whom valid email 
addresses had been found. These letters were personalised with the individuals’ names 
and positions, and the reasons given for inviting them. This tailoring required 
personalisation of the first paragraph of each invitation letter, while the remaining 
paragraphs were identical because they discussed the nature of the research study, 
participants’ rights, and their level of involvement if they agreed to participate. A 
month after the first attempt, another round of invitation letters was sent to those who 
had not provided either a positive or negative response. 
However, with regard to potential UK interviewees, shortly after the data collection 
stage was initiated and a few invitation letters had been sent to current FRC board 
members, a favourable reply was received from the FRC, indicating that it accepted 
the invitation to participate in this study as an organisation, and nominating a member 
of its board with whom to speak. After discussion with the academic supervisors of 
this study, it was deemed necessary not to contact any current members until after the 
interview with the nominated board member, in order to ensure that this study did not 
disrupt the organisation. However, other FRC board member also agreed to 
participate, indicating that there would be two interviews with the FRC. Surprisingly, 
these were scheduled by the interviewees on the same day, in the same place and room 
and back-to-back, which seemed intentional, indicating that the FRC might encourage 
more board members to participate in future. However, after these interviews had been 
conducted, it turned out that the second interview had not been intended, and that the 
FRC would only allow one interview to be conducted with the person who had been 
nominated. After the recorder had been turned off, Interviewee 5 explicitly stated that 
the participation of one member was enough and that his/her views represented the 
process engaged in with regard to IFRS for SMEs, while Interviewee 4 further 
explained that few FRC members were aware of or understood the process followed 
with regard to the standard’s adoption, so few would be able to take part in this study. 
According to Interview 4: 
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The problem is a lot of the people who you originally approached would not 
have the detailed knowledge really or the thoughts around this … I’m the 
director obviously in this area on a kind of day-to-day basis. I think that’s 
probably… you’re probably getting as high as you can get while the people 
still know what the process was. 
A similar phenomenon occurred with EFRAG, but this did not surface until an 
interview was conducted and it became clear that the interviewee was not participating 
as a member of EFRAG, but rather as a member of another NASB. According to the 
interviewee: 
EFRAG has no mandate for the IFRS for SMEs, as the standard is not 
endorsed for use in Europe. Hence … no-one at EFRAG should respond to 
you in any formal capacity. 
Private correspondence with a member of EFRAG gave the following explanation for 
the lack of response from EFRAG’s current members: 
I’m afraid I don’t think I can help with your study. This is because EFRAG is 
not involved in any work on the IFRS for SMEs and has not taken any 
decisions in relation to this Standard. I believe you have also contacted a 
number of my colleagues. EFRAG management has explained to all our staff 
that they should not respond in an EFRAG capacity for the reason noted. 
As a result, none of EFRAG’s current members participated in this study, despite the 
fact that its current members included individuals who had been members of the 
technical and SMEs working groups, indicating their expertise with regard to IFRS for 
SMEs since they had been involved in the comparability study. However, invitation 
letters sent to former EFRAG and FRC members led many of them to participate in 
this study, as shown in Table 3.2. These issues cast significant doubt on whether this 
study could be conducted, because at that time only a handful of interviews had been 
conducted. Saturation had not been achieved since new information had been 
discovered during the last interview. 
In order to facilitate more interviews, the snowballing method was used. Palinkas et 
al. (2015) and Mason (2018) define snowball sampling as a method to identify 
individuals by using current interviewees’ social networks to encourage the 
participation of other members with generally similar characteristics. If the 
snowballing method is successful, a small number of participants will lead to the 
participation of more interviewees (Bryman and Bell 2015), which in turn will enable 
sufficient data to be gathered to explore and understand the phenomenon under 
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investigation. Accordingly, interviewees were asked whether they could nominate 
others that might participate in this study, indicating that they should have prior 
knowledge and experience of NASBs’ decision-making processes with regard to IFRS 
for SMEs. This method led one interviewee to identify EFRAG as a valuable source 
of information that might be used as a means to facilitate further interviews owing to 
its closeness with EU NASBs. The interviewee volunteered to discuss this issue with 
EFRAG, which led to its participation by circulating the interview invitation letter to 
all EU NASBs. However, prior to EFRAG’s involvement, it requested a list of who 
had been contacted so that double invitations were not sent out. According to private 
correspondence with an EFRAG member: 
We do of course have contacts with European National Standard Setters. If 
you could indicate which you have contacted already then we can forward 
your request to any others you have not contacted directly. 
The issue of double invitation was discussed with the interviewee, and he explained 
that: 
If you did also contact other standard setters but have not received any answer 
by them, you should say so, [name of EFRAG member who would circulate 
this study invitation letter] otherwise will be put in a very bad position 
However, in order to protect interviewees’ identities, and in line with the University 
of Bristol’s research ethics, detailed information on participants was not provided, 
rather just the fact that FRC and EFRAG had been contacted. Although this response 
might exclude former FRC and EFRAG members for whom EFRAG might have 
contact details in its database, it was deemed necessary to do so in order to protect 
interviewees’ identities. Once the EFRAG representative had been assured that 
correspondence had been engaged in only with EFRAG and FRC, the invitation letter 
was circulated to every NASB on EFRAG’s system. According to private 
correspondence with the EFRAG member: 
As requested, we have forwarded your request to all of the European National 
Standards Setters (NSS) on our database ... We have indicated that they 
should contact you directly if they are willing to participate. 
NASBs’ lack of willingness to allow many current members from the same 
organisation to participate not only applied to FRC, but also to DASB, indicating that 
this issue might be applicable to other NASBs. When Interviewee 20 was asked 
whether it would be possible to nominate any other DASB members for this study, he 
69 
asked, “yeah, but in what capacity should he speak at?” When it was clarified that s/he 
would follow the same interview protocol in order to gain a richer, deeper 
understanding of its decision and to reach saturation, he explained that this was 
insufficient and argued that this request was “difficult in the sense that I have to ask 
somebody then to invest another hour and that’s not really very efficient for us”. 
This was not the only issue with regard to investigating IFRS for SMEs. Interviewees 
5 and 7 suggested that lack of application of the standard in the EU and the EC’s 
rejection of it caused EU NASBs’ lack of interest of it, resulting in their limited 
participation in studies of that topic. According to Interviewee 7: 
When you ask somebody in Europe about you want to investigate the IFRS for 
SMEs then usually the shutters go down because the general environment is 
not really IFRS for SME-friendly in Europe for legal reasons. 
Their suggestions explained why few NASBs participated in this study, as well as why 
many interviewees were reluctant to nominate other members to be interviewed. 
The EC’s rejection of IFRS for SMEs, as well as NASBs’ limited time, their 
understanding of the standard, the processes that took place in their organisations 
relating to the standard and their belief that the participation of one member was 
sufficient, were the main obstacles to this study. However, the snowballing method 
and EFRAG’s circulation of the invitation letter helped facilitate more responses, 
which in turn led to the achievement of saturation. In total, 22 interviews were 
conducted, of which 20 were used, which resulted in saturation since later interviews 
provided no additional details. The data collection stage was then terminated. 
Table 3.1 provides details of interviewees’ backgrounds and characteristics. However, 
this table excludes some of their characteristics, including their roles in other 
organisations, to avoid revealing their identity, because if these characteristics were 
taken together it would be easy to identify them. Additionally, since this study focused 
on NASBs’ decision-making processes, Interviewees 16 and 17 were excluded 
because they seldom discussed the process, rather, they focused on the advantages and 
disadvantages of IFRS for SMEs. The fact that Norway had been considering adoption 
of IFRS for SMEs for the past nine years (IFRS Foundation 2016e) may explain 
participants’ behaviour. Although Interviewees 18 and 19 were not members of an 
NASB, they were nominated by interviewees in this study because they worked 
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closely with EU NASBs with regard to IFRS for SMEs, so their knowledge of EU 
NASBs’ processes was relevant to this study. 
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Table 3.1: List of interviewees 
Code Back-ground Gender Date Organisation 








Interviewee 1 Practitioner Female 01/07/2017 FRC Board member Former 85 minutes Telephone call UK 
Interviewee 2 Academic Female 26/10/2017 EFRAG SMEs Working Group Former 77 minutes Telephone call Spain 
interviewee 3 Academic Male 01/11/2017 EFRAG SMEs Working Group Former 54 minutes Face-to-face UK 
Interviewee 4 Practitioner Male 01/11/2017 FRC Former technical and current board member Current 32 minutes 
Face-to-
face UK 
Interviewee 5 Practitioner Male 01/11/2017 FRC Board member Current 39 minutes Face-to-face UK 
Interviewee 6 Practitioner Male 03/11/2017 FRC Board member Former 40 minutes Telephone call UK 
Interviewee 7 Academic Male 15/11/2017 ASCG Board member Current 105 minutes Face-to-face Germany 
Interviewee 8 Practitioner Male 16/11/2017 EFRAG 
Project manager and 
Communications 
Advisor 
Former 35 minutes Telephone call Netherlands 
Interviewee 9 Practitioner Male 17/11/2017 EFRAG Technical senior manager Former 54 minutes Skype Italy 
Interviewee 10 Academic Male 20/11/2017 EFRAG SMEs Working Group Former 59 minutes Skype Poland 
Interviewee 11 Practitioner Male 28/11/2017 FRC Board member Former  68 minutes Face-to-face UK 
Interviewee 12 Practitioner Female 30/11/2017 ASCG Board member Former 92 minutes Skype Germany 
Interviewee 13 Practitioner Male 4/12/2017 EFRAG SMEs Working Group Former 53 minutes Skype Italy 
Interviewee 14 Practitioner Female 08/12/2017 ASCG Project manager Former 66 minutes Skype Germany 
Interviewee 15 Academic Male 19/12/2017 EFRAG Research and Technical Director Former 51 minutes Skype Italy 
Interviewee 16 No data Male 02/01/2018 Norway ASB Secretary Current 55 minutes Skype Norway 
Interviewee 17 No data Male 03/01/2018 Norway ASB Secretary Current 40 minutes Skype Norway 
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Source: Author’s own work 
Interviewee 18 Academic Male 04/01/2018 Other Other No data 76 minutes Skype Serbia 
Interviewee 19 Practitioner Male 09/01/2018 IFAC Director SME and SMP Current 105 minutes Skype UK 
Interviewee 20 Academic Male 11/01/2018 DASB Board member Current 57 minutes Skype Netherlands 
Interviewee 21 Practitioner Female 11/01/2018 EFRAG SMEs Working Group Former 32 minutes Skype Germany 
Interviewee 22 Practitioner Male 31/01/2018 OIC Board member Current 69 minutes Skype Italy 
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In addition to interviews, archival and secondary data were also used in this study. The next 
section discusses these sources of data in more detail. 
3.4 Archival and secondary data 
According to Richards (1996), although interviews may provide insightful information on a 
specific event that may otherwise be undocumented, this method has limitations. The 
interviewees may provide answers that put themselves in a positive light, bias their replies to a 
specific event, or disclose partial information and withhold controversial information, pointing 
to a need for data triangulation. Patton (1999) defines triangulation in qualitative studies as the 
use of multiple methods or types of data in order to gain a deeper understanding of the 
phenomenon under investigation. Thus, the interviews conducted in this study were 
complemented by archival and secondary data, allowing triangulation of the data (e.g. Denzin 
and Lincoln 2000; Flick 2004; Moisander and Valtonen 2006). 
The archival data used in this study originated from various sources, including EC directives, 
reports and comment letters, the ASB’s and FRC’s EDs, minutes of meetings, basis for 
conclusions and final reports, the IASB’s jurisdictional profiles, IFRS for SMEs EDs, comment 
letters and basis for conclusions, the ASCG’s reports, minutes of meetings and commissioned 
studies, and the DASB’s and OIC’s letters and national governmental rules, regulations and 
reports, as well as those of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and the 
Department for Trade and Industry (DTI). These entities’ websites were searched manually 
using various phrases, including “small and medium”, “SME”, “SMEs”, “IFRS for SMEs”, 
“SME IFRS”, “SMEs IFRS” and “IASB”. The search results were manually checked and the 
“find” or “documents in search” function was utilised to identify relevant documents that 
discussed or mentioned the standard. 
The secondary data utilised in this study included published articles, books and various 
websites, including those of Deloitte, AICPA and ICAEW. Archival and secondary data were 
used to gain a preliminary understanding of NASBs’ decision-making processes. This was in 
accordance with the MRT approach, and considered interviewees’ intentional and 
unintentional omissions of information to ensure data triangulation. Having gathered primary, 
archival and secondary data, the next stage of the research process was to analyse the 
information collected. The next section discusses the data analysis in more detail. 
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3.5 Analysis of data 
The first step in analysing the interview data was to transcribe the recorded interviews. In order 
to ensure the accuracy of interview transcriptions, the same professional transcription company 
was used as is used by many qualitative academic researchers at the University of Bristol, 
owing to its confidentiality agreement with the University, and hence its alignment with and 
adherence to the University’s strict research ethics. Prior to sending each recorded interview to 
the transcription company, it was played to ensure that no personal details were discussed. This 
was the case for all interviews because the interview protocol did not include any questions of 
that nature. Once the transcription was completed, each interview transcript was read while 
listening to the interview recording in order to ensure the accuracy of the transcription. The 
final draft was sent to interviewees to allow them to review, comment and ensure its accuracy. 
The next step in the process was to analyse the interviews. Many methods are available to 
analyse qualitative data in the social sciences (Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Patton 2002a; Ahrens 
and Chapman 2006; Silverman 2006, 2015; Creswell 2013; Mason 2018). For insistence, 
Mason (2018) suggests three different approaches to qualitative data analysis: literal, 
interpretive and reflexive. The literal approach focuses on characteristics of the data, including 
form, style, structure and content. This approach may be used when researchers are interested 
in literal content, interaction sequences, or the structure of dialogue. Mason (2018) argues that 
scholars often do not stop at this stage, because the social universe has been previously 
interpreted, and such interpretations depend on the interpreter. This leads to the second 
approach. Mason (2018, p.191) defines the interpretive approach as researchers’ perceptions 
of their data, in demonstrating meaning, signifying, representing or suggesting how the data 
might lead to explaining or discovering phenomena. In this method, scholars read “through or 
beyond the data”. Lastly, the reflexive approach focuses on scholars’ own interactions with 
their data, processes of generation and interpretations, as well as openness to critical feedback 
and changes, and the study’s contribution to the field. Researchers are thus directly involved 
throughout the research process (Bloomberg and Volpe 2018; Mason 2018). 
Although studies may use all three approaches, which this study does, choices must be made 
between analysing data manually and/or using qualitative analytical software (e.g. Welsh 2002; 
Mason 2018). This study utilised NVivo software as a tool for data analysis because the 
transcripts were lengthy and semi-structured. Semi-structured interviews are rarely identical 
because the flow of each interview differs between interviewees since they have different roles, 
perceptions and backgrounds. Bazeley and Jackson (2013) describe NVivo as a useful tool for 
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sorting and managing data electronically, but it does not analyse, interpret or turn poor work 
into sound interpretation. In other words, NVivo is a set of electronic highlighters, scissors and 
paper used instead of physical ones, with the advantages of technology such as the ability to 
search for words or phrases in all sources at the click of a button, rather than manually reading 
all the data to find a specific phrase or sentence, as well as the ability to visualise data. 
According to Bazeley and Jackson (2013, p.2), NVivo helps researchers by opening up “new 
ways of seeing their data they missed when managing the information without software”. 
Aided by NVivo software, a content analysis method was used, meaning that a code or label 
was attached to a word, sentence, paragraph (Coffey and Atkinson 1996; Graneheim and 
Lundman 2004; Myers 2013; Silverman 2014; Mason 2018). These codes or labels were based 
on the skeletal theoretical framework (see Chapter 4 for more detail), which was driven by 
previous literature. Thus, theoretical and empirical issues were considered with regard to 
NASBs’ decision-making processes. However, although predetermined issues guided the 
process, the empirical data led to the creation of issues or nodes that had not been considered 
previously. Each time a node was created, all the interviews were recoded in order to 
incorporate the new node. The process of coding required each interview transcript to be read 
at least 5 times, resulting in an in-depth understanding and closeness to the data. After coding 
each interview, interpretation of the research findings was based on the theoretical framework, 
which guided and was guided by the study’s findings throughout the process because this study 
embraced Laughlin’s (1995) MTR approach. Figure 3.3 illustrates the main research questions 
and general themes developed, which were driven by the theoretical skeletal framework and 
empirical data. 
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Figure 3.3: Research questions and general themes 
Source: Author’s own work 
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2004). Manifest content analysis is defined as descriptions of visible, straightforward and 
obvious components of texts, and is often used in quantitative research studies. For instance, 
Ahuvia (2001, p.141) suggests that researchers interested in manifest content analysis will 
focus on whether an advertisement “explicitly claims that a car has more than 100 horsepower”. 
Latent content analysis is defined as the researcher’s consideration of what texts discuss, deal 
with or mean, and is often used by qualitative researchers, who must read and understand the 
texts in order to interpret them (e.g. Ahuvia 2001; Kondracki et al. 2002; Guillemin and Gillam 
2004). For example, Ahuvia (2001, p.141) suggests that scholars interested in latent content 
analysis will focus on whether an advertisement “positions the car as powerful”. 
The nature of latent content analysis and its use by many scholars in their investigations of 
social phenomena, and more specifically of accounting (Kondracki et al. 2002; Alon and 
Dwyer 2016; Wilkinson et al. 2003; Suddaby et al. 2007; Yilmaz 2013; Sudjali 2017; Brown 
et al. 2018), indicate its suitability and usefulness to this study. Thus, this study used latent 
content analysis to understand and incorporate archival and secondary data with interview data, 
hence achieving data triangulation. 
The last step in the data analysis was reflexive critical thinking about the data gathered and 
their plausibility, explanation and contribution to the phenomena under investigation. The aim 
of this study was to deepen understanding of EU NASBs’ decision-making processes with 
regard to IFRS for SMEs. Cohesive understanding of interview, archival and secondary data 
provided explanations of why their behaviours differed even though all EU jurisdictions are 
required to comply with EC directives, and added needed meat on the bones of the skeletal 
theoretical framework, thus contributing to understanding their processes (see Chapter 7 for 
more detail). Figure 3.4 illustrates the data analysis process adopted in this study. 
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Figure 3.4: Data analysis process in this study 
Source: Author’s own work 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has discussed possible methodologies and methods of research, and has provided 
detailed explanations of the approaches used in this study in light of the research questions. 
Also, it has provided detailed descriptions and explanations of each step taken to collect and 
analyse the data. The next chapter discusses the use of previous literature and institutional 
theory, and the incorporation of power and legitimacy theories to create the skeletal theoretical 
framework of this study. 
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework 
4.1 Introduction 
Through the lenses of institutional theory, power theory and legitimacy theory, this study uses 
“theoretical pluralism” in the context of IFRS for SMEs as a vehicle to gain a deeper 
understanding of NASBs’ decision-making processes. Hoque et al. (2013) explain that 
theoretical pluralism enables exploration of different, and even contradictory, information and 
processes in institutions and society. In a qualitative field study, theory combined with 
observation improves understanding of institutions and may consequently produce 
theoretically significant contributions (Ahrens and Chapman 2006). 
According to Clegg (1981), the importance of institutional theory lies in its acceptance that 
organisations are influenced by their environment and that the latter is in part socially 
constructed. Institutional theory is a dominant perspective in organisational analysis 
(Lounsbury 2008). An institution is a social structure consisting of individuals or organisations 
operating within a constrained environment continually altered by the passage of time (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). According to Davis and North (1970), the 
institutional environment is the set of social, political and legal contexts that regulate 
institutions’ production, exchange and distribution. Thus, in order to survive, an institution 
must comply with the norms and beliefs of its environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983). As a result of environmental pressures, organisations in different 
contexts react in various ways to similar external and internal factors (Weerakkody et al. 2009; 
Nobes and Parker 2012; Al‐Htaybat 2018; Krishnan 2018). 
Previous studies (e.g. Mir and Rahaman 2005; Albu et al. 2011; Al‐Htaybat 2018; Krishnan 
2018) have used DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) theoretical framework of institutional 
isomorphism in their investigations of various phenomena relating to NASBs’ decision-making 
processes, indicating the framework’s relevance and importance to the current study. The next 
section discusses institutional isomorphism in more detail. 
4.2 Institutional isomorphism 
According to early studies of institutional theory, organisations experience many changes over 
time, which lead them to become similar (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; 
Powell and DiMaggio 1991). Powell and DiMaggio (1991) suggest that organisations do not 
exist in a vacuum, but rather in an environment with various actors such as suppliers, 
competitors, customers, state organs and regulators. Organisations are influenced by their 
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organisational field when they are conscious of different players. As a result, organisations may 
alter their practices and goals, and new organisations may enter the field (Powell and DiMaggio 
1991). The process of isomorphism is propagated by organisations, through either 
encouragement or force, which leads to similarity in their actions. 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest that there are two types of 
isomorphism: competitive and institutional. They define competitive isomorphism as the 
necessity for organisations to consider each other, since they compete not only for resources 
and customers, but also for power in social and economic fields. In the case of innovation, 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) state that early adopters are commonly driven by a desire to 
improve their performance, which is considered to be rational. The authors regard such 
adoption as a form of competitive isomorphism. 
Scholars (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Kondra and Hurst 2009) 
identify three types of mechanism through which institutional isomorphic change occurs: 
coercive, mimetic and normative. Although such mechanisms change organisational actions 
and structures, leading to increased homogeneity, they limit potentially useful change in order 
to maintain organisational similarity. These mechanisms are discussed further in the next sub-
sections. 
4.2.1 Coercive isomorphism 
Coercive isomorphism has been described as formal and informal pressures exercised by one 
organisation over another, through “force, persuasion or invitations to join in collusion” 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p.150). For example, parent corporations may require their 
subsidiaries to adopt their accounting practices, performance evaluation systems and budgetary 
planning procedures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Similarly, when a weak party lacks funds 
or alternative resources, a stronger party may force it to adopt its own practices and 
accommodate its needs (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Kondra and 
Hurst 2009). 
Coercive isomorphism is frequently associated with governments, regulators and entities that 
have substantial authoritative powers, because they are able to establish sets of procedures to 
achieve certain goals and aims, and unification or harmonisation (Meyer and Rowan 1977; 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1987; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Kondra and Hurst 2009). 
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p.150), “other legal and technical requirements of 
the state – vicissitudes of the budget cycle, the ubiquity of certain fiscal years, annual reports, 
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and financial reporting requirements that ensure eligibility for the receipt of federal contracts 
or funds – also shape organisations in a similar way”. In the case of countries’ adoption of the 
IASB’s accounting standards, including IFRS, supranational entities such as the World Bank 
and the EC have exercised coercive pressure over national accounting regulations, providing 
an explanation for such moves (e.g. Ashraf and Ghani 2005; Mir and Rahaman 2005; Albu et 
al. 2011; Hassan et al. 2014; Sutheewasinnon et al. 2016). Thus, when a powerful entity 
dominates another, coercive isomorphism is present. 
4.2.2 Mimetic isomorphism 
Previous studies (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Kondra and Hurst 
2009) define mimetic isomorphism as the adoption of the rules, practices, behaviour and 
processes of an established organisation by newcomers or others that lack well-defined 
systems. They argue that organisations without clear goals avoid trial-and-error acquisition of 
knowledge and seek survival by obtaining legitimacy through mimicking the behaviours of 
well-established organisations. For instance, a new employee may mimic the behaviour of 
another who has received a reward, without a clear understanding of the link between behaviour 
and rewards (Kondra and Hurst 2009). Furthermore, organisations may seek compliance with 
an external group’s socially imposed norms and beliefs because they seek stability and approval 
by that group (Kondra and Hurst 2009). 
NASBs’ behaviours with regard to IASs/IFRS are diverse (Nobes 1998, 2006, 2013, 2018; Zeff 
and Nobes 2010; Nobes and Parker 2012). Jurisdictions either adopt, converge with or reject 
the international standards (IASB 2018b, 2018c). Even those that adopt differ, because some 
adopt the standards as issued by the IASB, while others modify them. (Nobes 1998, 2006, 
2013, 2018; Zeff and Nobes 2010; Nobes and Parker 2012). Countries that adopt or converge 
with these standards demonstrate mimetic behaviour toward other jurisdictions, since they seek 
to enhance similarities, gain legitimacy and become part of a larger group (Al‐Htaybat 2018; 
Krishnan 2018). Accordingly, mimetic isomorphism exists when an organisation accepts the 
norms and beliefs of a wider group in order to be part of it, or copies the behaviours of 
established organisations in return of rewards, recognition or survival. 
4.2.3 Normative isomorphism 
This type of isomorphism occurs when organisations become more similar, mainly due to 
professionalisation (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify two 
features of professionalisation that promote isomorphism. The first feature relating to 
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isomorphism is professions, as actions and behaviours develop and spread through professional 
systems that allow their quick diffusion. The second is legitimacy and education, through 
reasoning founded and shaped by educational experts. 
Previous studies suggest that normative pressure exerted by the accounting profession, 
including Big Four audit firms and educational institutions, cause the adoption of accounting 
standards such as US GAAP and IASs (e.g. Touron 2005; Hassan 2008; Judge et al. 2010; 
Oulasvirta 2014; Carneiro et al. 2017). In Iraq, normative pressure by the accounting profession 
was an influential factor in the application of IFRS beyond listed companies, whereas in 
Finland, normative pressure was relatively weak, which prevented the initiation of a notion to 
adopt International Public Sector Accounting Standards (Oulasvirta 2014). Thus, normative 
isomorphism occurs either through diffusion of education and research, or through normative 
pressure by the professions. 
However, scholars have criticised institutional theory owing to its limitations (e.g. Scott 2008; 
Phillips and Malhotra 2008; Weerakkody et al. 2009). 
4.3 Criticisms of the institutional theory framework 
For decades, scholars in various fields have used institutional theory to study the impact of the 
environment on organisations (Weerakkody et al. 2009; Vogel 2012; Greenwood et al. 2017). 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) accepted the influence of social factors on organisations’ structure 
and behaviour, but focused on how “myths” become formal rules that are imposed and then 
spread into society by powerful and influential organisations. Although Meyer and Rowan’s 
(1977) framework was revolutionary in its recognition of institutions, it was oversimplified and 
lacked appropriate recognition of institutions’ social essence because it ignored actors’ 
rationality and reflexivity (Phillips and Malhotra 2008). 
Early work on institutional theory has been criticised for its limited acknowledgement of 
significant institutional players. For instance, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) show that 
procedures, rules and laws are the main components of institutionalisation, enforced mainly by 
professions and regulatory institutions. They assume that when these components are imposed 
on institutions, adoption decisions are conscious because the rules and plans must be 
implemented. However, early institutional work lacks appropriate consideration of the 
influence of taken-for-granted behaviours, habits and prior assumptions, as well as unconscious 
cultural aspects, because it fails to consider agency issues and the fact that practices vary and 
change over time (Scott 2001; Vogel 2012; Ferry et al. 2019). 
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Zucker (1987) highlights that it is difficult to detect some indicators of institutionalisation, such 
as resource dependency, authority and power. For instance, if an organisation does not obey 
national or international laws, fines may be imposed, which in turn may affect the external 
norms adopted according to institutional theory. This makes it difficult to distinguish whether 
coercive, normative or mimetic mechanisms influence organisations’ behaviours because the 
mechanisms lack clarity and are interrelated. Mizruchi and Fein (1999) suggest that previous 
studies’ interpretation of organisations’ behaviour as a form of mimetic isomorphism can also 
frequently be explained as coercive or normative pressure, since mimetic behaviours may be a 
result of fear of sanctions, suggesting the existence of coercive pressure rather than a desire to 
acquire legitimacy or reduce trial-and-error acquisitions of knowledge. Also, organisations’ 
continued mimicking of specific behaviour may lead it to evolve into taken-for-granted and 
normative rather than mimetic behaviour (Kondra and Hurst 2009). 
According to Sahlin and Wedlin (2008), since practices, ideas, and beliefs are not set in stone 
but rather evolve over time, this may result either in isomorphism, as suggested by institutional 
theory, or in divergence. This means that, over time, a study’s findings may become obsolete 
and require updating in order to understand how an organisation has evolved. Suddaby (2010) 
suggests that, in order to distinguish between technical and institutional processes, researchers 
should focus on organisational motivations rather than on the results of the process, because 
the latter offer little explanation of what caused such behaviour. 
Many studies (e.g. Zuckerman 1999; Sutheewasinnon et al. 2016) recognise that early 
institutional theory neglects organisations’ and individuals’ roles as change agents because the 
framework focuses mainly on sources of acceptance, including change in return for legitimacy. 
Zuckerman (1999) suggests that actors may be neglected because they lack influence over 
institutions, and because actions are always directed by the latter which limits individuals’ 
behaviour. Scholars (Lawrence et al. 2009; Suddaby 2010) challenge institutional theory’s 
notion of isomorphism, which views organisations as prisoners of their institutional 
environment, and suggest the introduction of an agency perspective. DiMaggio (1988) revisits 
the “iron cage” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and introduces the concept of actors and agency 
by incorporating “institutional entrepreneurship” into institutional theory. According to 
Lawrence (1999), studies of agents’ roles concentrate mainly on the capacities and methods 
they use to create, alter or ensure that practices are institutionalised. 
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Zucker (1991) investigates the behaviour of individual actors in various institutional contexts. 
His study highlights that if an action is taken by an individual in a personal capacity, its effect 
on institutions will be weak, whereas an action taken by an individual or position holder within 
the organisation’s hierarchy will have greater institutional effect. More recent studies that have 
investigated actors’ capacity to form, structure or restructure institutions suggest that their 
effects depend on their resources (e.g. Lawrence 1999; Greenwood and Suddaby 2006), 
communication methods (e.g. Hardy and Maguire 2008), processes and collaboration (e.g. 
Hardy and Maguire 2008; Pacheco et al. 2010). According to Pache and Santos (2010), since 
organisations may face contradictory institutional demands, their responses may vary 
depending on organisational actors’ compliance with and support for a specific demand due to 
its nature or closeness. 
However, although Meyer and Rowan (1977) define “powerful myths” and control and power 
are tacit in DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) definition of coercive isomorphism, institutional 
theory has been criticised for its limited consideration of power (Cloutier and Langley 2013), 
since it concentrates on institutionalisation as a result rather than as a process (e.g. Zucker 
1987; Dillard et al. 2004; Lawrence 2008). Power is particularly significant in this context 
because, in order to achieve coercive isomorphism, punishments, controls and rules must be 
applied to limit organisations’ deviation from approved norms (Greenwood et al. 2008). 
Although power is important, Greenwood et al. (2008, p.25) highlight that our understanding 
is limited to “how power, conflict and fundamental social interests affect and are affected by 
institutional processes”, while Lawrence (2008) suggests that future studies should deal 
explicitly with power in order to help develop a more generalisable framework for institutional 
theory. 
Another limitation of institutional theory is that, although it overlaps with legitimacy theory, 
its recognition of legitimacy is oversimplified (e.g. Dart 2004; Phillips and Malhotra 2008; 
Scott 2008). According to Scott (2008), institutional theory often associates legitimacy with 
organisations’ compliance with and adherence to environmental norms and beliefs, rather than 
whether an action is morally right or wrong, thus disregarding different types of legitimacy. 
These criticisms of institutional theory have led to calls to incorporate other perspectives in 
order to minimise its limitations and to better understand institutions in a state of rapid 
development (Cloutier and Langley 2013; Rosa 2013; Bouilloud et al. 2019). 
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Despite the limitations of institutional theory, it provides a useful theoretical lens through 
which to explore accounting phenomena, owing to its recognition of the influence of social 
structures on human behaviour and its broad sociological framework (Khadaroo 2005b; Mir 
and Rahaman 2005; Al‐Htaybat 2018; Krishnan 2018). In order to understand governments’ 
and NASBs’ motivations and behaviour toward IFRS for SMEs, it is essential to understand 
their context. Scholars’ utilisation of institutional theory to explore and explain various 
accounting phenomena, including jurisdictions’ behaviour toward the IASB’s accounting 
standards, suggest its usefulness for this study. Thus, the next section discusses previous 
accounting studies’ use of institutional theory. 
4.4 Use of institutional theory in the accounting field 
Scholars (e.g. Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988; Carpenter and Feroz 2001; Hussain and 
Gunasekaran 2002; Dillard et al. 2004; Mir and Rahaman 2005; Albu et al. 2011; Al‐Htaybat 
2018; Krishnan 2018; Nisansala 2018) have utilised institutional theory as a theoretical lens to 
explore and investigate organisational phenomena on the accounting spectrum. Burns (2000) 
observes that, in the accounting field, emerging routines can be assumed to be institutionalised 
if they are widely used and undisputed by organisations. Thus, accounting practices may no 
longer actually be technical and administrative processes, but rather rationalised in order to 
enhance legitimacy (Dillard et al. 2004). For example, Hussain and Gunasekaran’s (2002) 
examination of the relationship between external institutional influences and the performance 
of both financial and non-financial institutions reveals that coercive, normative and mimetic 
factors influence both types of organisation. 
Hussain and Gunasekaran (2002) define coercive pressures as “the enforcing and regulative 
aspects of certain institutions” over others. In this context, the central bank, socioeconomic and 
political institutions and other associations are coercive factors. The authors define normative 
pressures as guidelines and responsibilities deemed appropriate for social conduct, as well as 
managers’ experience, training and education. These include managers’ competence and 
strategic orientation, and top-management and corporate culture. They define mimetic pressure 
as copying of the best practices of well-known organisations, such as integration of other 
organisations’ costing practices. 
In a case study of Fiji Posts and Telecommunications Limited (FPTL), Sharma and Lawrence 
(2008) observe how institutional theory helps reveal incorporated processual changes. They 
use institutional theory to investigate micro-processes, revealing that institutional 
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inconsistencies motivate organisational change, and that resistance to change is attributable to 
the cultural and political context. In order to achieve their objectives, the authors adopted a 
longitudinal method to understand the essence of institutions and how the framework of 
institutional theory enables understanding of institutional change. They suggest that, in their 
case study, there was a need for radical change as a result of external pressure from the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank. Thus, the Fijian government had to reconstruct its 
public sector. The involvement of external organisations caused an institutional crisis, which 
sparked a cultural change. The crisis caused conflict and tensions which were only resolved by 
the passage of time. 
Carpenter and Feroz (2001) used institutional theory to investigate the US government’s shift 
from cash-based accounting to the adoption of US GAAP. They highlight the importance of 
resource dependence on the decision to adopt US GAAP, and classify this as a coercive type 
of institutional pressure, while resistance to change was associated with a soft professional 
association. The results of their study show that, owing to strong institutional pressure from 
governmental and well-organised accounting institutions, resistance to changing from cash-
based accounting to US GAAP was likely to fail. 
Previous studies, such as those by Mir and Rahaman (2005), Albu et al. (2011) and Krishnan 
(2018), use institutional theory primarily as a theoretical lens to explore and explain 
jurisdictions’ convergence with or adoption of IFRS. Specifically, they use DiMaggio and 
Powell’s (1983) notions of competitive and institutional isomorphism to explain why countries 
behaved as they did toward these standards. NASBs do not adopt or issue accounting standards 
in a vacuum but are similar in nature to other organisations, and particularly to local authorities, 
in that they are not isolated from their external environment (e.g. Fogarty et al. 1994; Young 
1995; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Gomes 2004; Mir and Rahaman 2005; Hail et al. 2010). 
Therefore, they compete like any other organisation, not only for resources but also for power. 
In the case of innovation, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) state that early adopters are commonly 
driven by a desire to improve their performance, which is considered to be rational. They frame 
such adoption as competitive isomorphism. 
Mir and Rahaman (2005) and Albu et al. (2011) use the term coercive pressure to describe how 
the World Bank and the EC influence NASBs’ decision-making processes in developing 
countries (e.g. Bangladesh and Romania) as a result of control over economic capital. The 
wholesale adoption of IFRS in Bangladesh following the World Bank’s grant of US$200,000 
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to ICAB (Mir and Rahaman 2005) clearly demonstrates the Bank’s influence. In the case of 
Romania, the World Bank and the EC influenced the adoption of IFRS. During the second 
phase of Romania’s development of accounting standards, in order for it to secure a World 
Bank loan, certain conditions were imposed relating to the adoption of IFRS. However, at that 
time Romania was planning to join the EU, so only IFRS standards that complied with the 
Fourth and Seventh European Directives were adopted. 
Mir and Rahaman (2005) also show that DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) mimetic pressure is 
applicable to the diffusion of IASB accounting standards in developing countries, which they 
suggest is due not only to the IASB’s origins in developed countries, but also to a perception 
that the IASB is superior, causing many jurisdictions to adopt its standards without careful 
consideration of their own accounting needs. In later studies, Al‐Htaybat (2018) and Krishnan 
(2018) suggest that the notion of mimetic pressure helps identify other phenomena relating to 
Jordan’s and India’s behaviour toward IFRS. According to Al‐Htaybat (2018), Jordan’s desire 
to attract foreign investors caused it to mimic other jurisdictions that had adopted IFRS so that 
it would not be left out of the international market, whereas India’s mimicking of its trading 
partners, the US and Japan, led to gradual convergence with IFRS (Krishnan 2018). Krishnan 
(2018) suggests that the US’s rejection of IFRS and Japan’s cautious attitude toward the 
standards were the main reasons for India’s slow and careful move toward converging its 
national accounting standards with IFRS, which led it to miss its announced convergence 
deadlines several times. 
Previous studies that have employed institutional theory highlight its relevance and usefulness 
for explaining various accounting phenomena, including interactions among stakeholders, 
governments and NASBs, which provide explanations of what aspects drive jurisdictions’ 
behaviour toward IFRS (e.g. Mir and Rahaman 2005; Albu et al. 2011; Al‐Htaybat 2018; 
Krishnan 2018). In this study, previous literature on institutional theory was used in three ways. 
First, evaluation of previous studies that used institutional theory, and more specifically 
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) institutional isomorphism, facilitated the interview protocol. 
Second, analysis of previous studies highlighted the importance and suitability of institutional 
theory to this study. Third, previous studies helped to locate a gap in the theoretical framework 
of institutional theory. 
Although institutional theory considers power and legitimacy as relevant factors to explain 
organisations’ behaviour, its recognition of them is indirect or oversimplified (e.g. Zucker 
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1987; Dart 2004; Dillard et al. 2004; Lawrence 2008; Phillips and Malhotra 2008; Scott 2008). 
Scholars have called for other perspectives to be incorporated in order to minimise the 
limitations of institutional theory and address institutions’ rapid evolution and development 
(Cloutier and Langley 2013; Rosa 2013; Bouilloud et al. 2019). Therefore, in this study, 
institutional theory is supplemented by power and legitimacy theories to gain a deeper 
understanding of what factors influenced NASBs’ decisions on adopting IFRS for SMEs. 
Furthermore, since this study employs the MRT approach, its skeletal theoretical framework 
incorporates relevant issues and entities identified by previous studies, as discussed in Chapter 
2, including authority and historical and cultural accounting traditions, in order to further 
understand NASBs’ decision-making processes. The next section discusses power theory. 
4.5 Power theory: The issue of definitions of power 
Since governments and NASBs are similar in nature to other organisations, in that they are not 
isolated from their external environment (e.g. Fogarty et al. 1994; Young 1995; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 2003; Gomes 2004; Mir and Rahaman 2005; Hail et al. 2010), various entities with 
different perceptions and authoritative power may participate and modify their final outcomes 
(Hope and Gray 1982; Kwok and Sharp 2005; Albu et al. 2011; Hoffmann and Detzen 2013; 
Fülbier et al. 2017). Scholars criticise institutional theory for its weak consideration of power 
(e.g. Cloutier and Langley 2013) owing to its concentration on institutionalisation as a result 
rather than as a process (e.g. Zucker 1987; Dillard et al. 2004; Lawrence 2008). This is 
important for this study because Miller (1994) suggests that accounting practices and standard 
setting are explicitly affected by powerful institutions, which relates closely to and may offer 
possible explanations for the phenomenon under investigation. In order to minimise this 
limitation, Lukes’s (1974, 1977; 2005) work on power, including his three dimensions of 
power, is used to supplement institutional theory because previous studies have deemed his 
work useful for exploring and explaining NASBs’ decision-making processes (e.g. Hope and 
Gray 1982; Hussein and Ketz 1991; Sikka 1992; Kwok and Sharp 2005). 
According to Allison (2018), power takes various forms, including “force, persuasion, 
authority, coercion, and manipulation”. Dahl (1976) defines power as the possibility for an 
individual, entity or group of entities to achieve a desired behavioural change in another 
individual, entity or group of entities, whether by coercion, persuasion or inducement. A key 
issue in defining power is whether it relates to the possession or exercise of power (White 
1972). In other words, power may be considered as the ability or capacity to do something, as 
well as in terms of what can be done with it, such as influencing the behaviour of others through 
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various types of pressure (Clegg 1975, 2013; Allison 2018). White (1972, p.480) argues that 
power is difficult to define because of its divergent and sometimes contradictory definitions 
and because it often has multiple aspects, and that “there are important situations in which one 
cannot, even when in possession of all the pertinent facts, decide intuitively whether power is 
involved”. 
Lukes (1974, 1977; 2005) argues that power has multiple dimensions, allowing explorations 
and providing deeper understandings of how individuals, entities and groups of entities may 
force, influence, change, pressurise or reshape others’ preferences, beliefs and behaviours to 
reach desired outcomes. Hope and Gray (1982) use Lukes’s framework in investigating the 
creation of a research and development standard by the former UK standard setter, the 
Accounting Standards Committee (ASC). They highlight the importance and usefulness of 
Lukes’s framework for gaining a deeper understanding of NASBs’ decision-making processes 
(Hope and Gray 1982). They closely followed Lukes’s dimensions of power “because it 
provides the most thorough of the known and available political frameworks for exploratory 
research into accounting policy making” (Hope and Gray 1982, p.535). Kwok and Sharp (2005) 
also employed Lukes’s (1974, 1977) work on power because “all works of power acknowledge 
the need for influence in order for power to exist”. This was necessary for their exploration and 
investigation of the IASC’s decision-making process in issuing and developing its IASs, 
because many entities sought to lobby the IASC’s standard-setting process. 
These studies suggest that Lukes’s work on power provides a useful theoretical language for 
exploration of NASBs’ decision-making processes, which is the aim of this study. Accordingly, 
this study uses Lukes’s (1974, 1977; 2005) work on power, and particularly his three 
dimensions of power, to supplement the institutional theory framework and minimise the 
limitations discussed in Section 4.3 by focusing on institutions’ processes rather than outcomes. 
The next sub-sections discuss Lukes’s (1974) dimensions of power. 
4.5.1 First dimension of power 
A fundamental assumption of Lukes’s first dimension of power is that power is pluralistically 
centralised and distributed (Lukes 1974). Dahl (1957, pp.202-204) defines power in terms 
of “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not 
otherwise do”, but later clarifies that it involves “a successful attempt by A to get a to do 
something he would not otherwise do”. Lukes (1974) identifies a substantial difference 
between the two descriptions: the first clarifies A’s capacity and capability to exert power, 
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while the second shows the successful exercise of A’s power. The latter encapsulates the 
pluralist notion of power. Lukes (1974) suggests that the pluralist framework of power may be 
comprehended in terms of diverse interested organisations in society competing to control 
public policy outcomes. In other words, the framework does not define a single powerful elite 
entity, but rather a group of diverse actors. 
In an earlier work, Polsby (1963) supports the use of a pluralist framework which concentrates 
on the actual practice of power. He calls for further investigation of specific public policy 
outcomes to further understand who actually dominates the decision-making process. Lukes 
(1974) stresses that pluralist studies focus on investigating actual observable behaviour. This 
can be done either by direct investigation, or by reconstructing behaviour through documentary 
analysis of supplementary sources, such as newspapers and other relevant documents (Polsby 
1963). 
Lukes’s (1974) first dimension of power, which includes capability and capacity and the 
successful exercise of power, is applicable to this study because in the EU, all legislation must 
comply with EC directives, demonstrating the possession of power by a supranational 
organisation and how this may influence NASBs’ decision-making process. However, NASBs 
not only interact with the EC, but also with national governments, stakeholders and other 
NASBs. Thus, many actors seek to influence the decision-making process. Therefore, the first 
dimension of power provides a deeper understanding of which actors’ capacity or exercise of 
power influences NASBs’ outcomes. 
4.5.2 Second dimension of power 
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) extended earlier literature by proposing that power has two 
dimensions, rather than the single dimension of the pluralist view. They define the second 
dimension of power as A’s allocation of energies to form or support institutional behaviours 
and political and social values, thereby limiting the public political process to considering 
issues that support A’s preferences. When A influences B, this restrains the latter from any 
practical behaviour, such as discussion of any issues which, if resolved, would seriously 
damage A’s preferred choices. In other words, an individual or group possesses power that 
unconsciously or consciously builds or supports barriers to public discussion of political 
conflicts (Bachrach and Baratz 1970). 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970) further develop the second dimension of power by presenting the 
concept of “mobilisation of bias”. This notion was first introduced by Schattschneider (1960), 
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who defined it as any political organisation having a bias for using particular types of conflict 
with and restrictions over others (Bachrach and Baratz 1970). Bachrach and Baratz (1970) 
define the mobilisation of bias as a set of dominant values, ceremonial beliefs and institutional 
behaviours – the “rules of the game” – which continually and systematically operate to serve 
the needs of certain groups or individuals at the expense of others. Those who benefit have a 
distinguished status enabling them to enhance and defend their vested interests. 
Bachrach and Baratz’s (1970) main criticism of the pluralist definition of power is that it 
focuses mainly on the exercise of power, and gives insufficient consideration to limiting or 
restricting the scope of decision making. Lukes (1974) criticises their two dimensions of power, 
arguing that if B anticipates A’s reactions but fails to act, the result is a non-event, and if 
nothing happens, it cannot be empirically verified. However, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argue 
that non-decisions that limit the scope of decision-making are observable. Such non-decisions 
need not necessarily be conscious, explicit or specific to a certain issue. Also, unawareness 
“does not mean, however, that the dominant group will refrain from making non‐decisions that 
protect or promote their dominance. Simply supporting the established political process tends 
to have this effect” (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, p.50). Thus, investigation of the two 
dimensions of power includes both decisions and non-decisions. The authors explain that non-
decisions result in disappointment, restriction or challenges to decision makers’ benefits or 
values, whereas other approaches consider decisions as deliberately chosen behaviours 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1970). In the case of NASBs, for instance, not all board members have 
equivalent power and influence over the board’s agenda, decision-making or final outcomes. 
This is because the chair may have certain authority not possessed by any other member, 
enabling the former to alter the board’s final outcomes, and limit or permit accounting issues 
or changes to current accounting standards by controlling the agenda or discussion. In other 
words, an NASB chair may have substantial power over the board in the case of both decisions 
and non-decisions. 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970) propose that in order to recognise non-decisions, scholars must 
first identify every individual or group engaged, directly or indirectly, in the decision-making 
process. Detailed investigation must then be undertaken to identify which actors are preferred 
by decision makers. The authors’ two dimensions of power reclassify what might be considered 
to be political issues. On the one hand, pluralists argue that a political issue does not materialise 
until a significant political entity recognises it (Dahl 1961). On the other hand, the two 
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dimensions of power highlight the significance of unmaterialised political conflict, barred or 
prohibited from materialising by powerful political actors (Lukes 1974). 
The two dimensions of power expand the single dimension by including social practices in the 
context of public behaviour and decision-making processes, as well as the “rules of the game” 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1970) and how they may influence the community. However, Lukes 
criticises Bachrach and Baratz’s (1970) two dimensions of power for focusing only on 
observable power, whether hidden or obvious, making them subject to the same limitation as 
the pluralist view. The next sub-section discusses Lukes’s third dimension of power. 
4.5.3 Third dimension of power 
Lukes’s criticism of the second dimension of power forms the basis for his third dimension. As 
previously discussed, Lukes’s first criticism is that the two dimensions of power focus only on 
actual conflicting behaviour, whether hidden or obvious. Lukes contends that, although 
individuals make choices from alternatives, bias toward a specific system or the “rules of the 
game” may cause specific decisions. Thus, the outcome is neither rational nor chosen by a 
particular individual (Lukes 1974). 
Lukes’s third dimension of power has three key concepts. The first is that power holders may 
be persuasive and protected so that dominated individuals lack knowledge of alternative 
systems or options. The rules of the game are not only sustained by individuals’ choices or 
behaviour, but are also shaped by the cultural and social behaviour of institutions, practices 
and groups. Lukes argues that power is exercised in conflicting circumstances and may take 
the form of either authority or manipulation. These types of power can be exercised without 
conflict. Thus, Lukes defines power as A exercising power not only to make B do something 
that B would not otherwise do, but also to influence, change and shape what B wants. In doing 
so, A guarantees B’s compliance by dominating the latter’s desires and ideas. Thus, unlike the 
first and second dimensions of power, Lukes’s argument does not require actual conflict, as the 
exercise of power effectively prevents the creation of such conflict (Lukes 1974). 
Lukes’s (1974) third dimension of power overcomes criticism of the second dimension in the 
case of non-decisions by suggesting that lack of conflict may be caused by how individuals’ 
assumptions, perceptions and preferences are shaped or created, such that they accept their 
position in the current system because they see no alternative, or because they evaluate it as 
somehow divinely ordained. It also investigates the potential for “latent conflict”, which refers 
to a conflict of interest between power holders and the “real interests” of those excluded by 
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them. Lukes (1974) highlights that the real interests of excluded groups may not be visible or 
recognisable because there may be latent conflict between the perceptions and preferences of 
those exercising power and those influenced by it. Therefore, Lukes’s third dimension of power 
avoids the limitations of the first and second dimensions by taking into account that issues may 
be omitted from decision-making processes through institutional practices, social forces or 
individual decisions (Lukes 1974). 
In summary, Lukes’s (1974) three dimensions of power have three key aspects: latent conflict, 
control over the political agenda, and a distinction between subjective and real interests. Since 
Luke’s work, including his three dimensions of power, is relevant to the phenomenon under 
investigation, the next section discusses its use in accounting studies that have investigated 
NASBs’ decision-making processes. 
4.6 Use of Lukes’s three dimensions of power in the accounting field 
In setting accounting standards, the first step is to recognise an accounting issue or problem as 
appropriate or worthy of NASBs’ action (Walker and Robinson 1994; Howieson 2009; Ram 
2012; Klein and Fülbier 2018; Schührer 2018). NASBs’ decision-making processes then 
include formal and informal procedures that allow various parties to exercise power, 
influencing the process to differing degrees (e.g. Hope and Gray 1982; Hussein and Ketz 1991; 
Sikka 1992; Kwok and Sharp 2005). Scholars have used Lukes’s work on power, including his 
three dimensions of power, to explore NASBs’ decision-making processes (e.g. Hope and Gray 
1982; Hussein and Ketz 1991; Sikka 1992; Kwok and Sharp 2005) because NASBs must 
interact with various entities throughout their development and issuance of accounting 
regulations (e.g. Cobb et al. 1976; Lowe et al. 1983; Wallace 1990; Fogarty 1992; Klumpes 
1994; Rahman et al. 1994; Howieson 2009; Stevenson 2010; Hoffmann and Zülch 2014; 
Krishnan 2018). Thus, one entity may dominate the process, as in the case of EU countries’ 
adoption of IFRS due to the EC’s endorsement of the standards (EC 2000, 2002; Chiapello and 
Medjad 2009), preventing or minimising other parties’ involvement. 
Kwok and Sharp (2005) use the first dimension of power to investigate the standard-setting 
process employed by the IASC to issue two accounting standards: segment reporting and 
intangible assets. Their data analysis uses three categories to distinguish how different entities 
influence standard setting: “sanctions”, “persuasion (ex ante)” and “persuasion (ex post)”. They 
define sanctions as beneficiaries boycotting standards issued by the IASC owing to lack of 
enforcement. Persuasion is defined as the operation of power over the basis of an argument, 
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and argue that differentiating between “ex ante, decision-relevant information” and “ex post 
information, evaluated against some objective notion of a benchmark” may provide helpful 
insights into the standard-setting process (Kwok and Sharp 2005). They suggest that four 
entities influenced the IASC: preparers, users, auditors and regulators. However, none of these 
entities dominated the standard-setting process, which can therefore be classified as a “mixed 
power system”. 
Sikka (1992) uses Lukes’s (1974) argument that conflict is unnecessary for the existence of 
power, which is Lukes’s main criticism of the first and second dimensions of power. In doing 
so, he investigates audit policy making in the UK by examining the issuance of a 1985 
guideline, “The auditor’s considerations in respect of going concern”, by the Auditing Practices 
Committee (APC). He investigates various aspects of the APC, including the social and 
political environment within which the guideline was issued, and comments received following 
the committee’s issuance of the ED and the agenda underlying it. Sikka (1992) concludes that 
the guideline was issued not as a regulatory restriction, but rather as a legal protection for audit 
firms, resulting from a lack of trust in auditors due to the severe economic crisis and the 
collapse of many companies that had received unqualified audit reports. He also highlights that 
the pluralist assumption of power is inadequate, and that decisions or views may be taken for 
granted or institutionalised. In this case, audit firms indirectly funded the APC, which allowed 
them to dominate the issuance of the guideline. Although standard setters argue that they issue 
standards in the general interest, what determines the general interest is “inevitably coloured 
by their business and professional interests” (Sikka 1992, pp.384-385). 
Hope and Gray (1982) embrace Lukes’ three dimensions of power in their investigation of the 
decision-making process of the UK’s former standard setter, the ASC. According to Hope and 
Gray (1982, p.532), “In common with much of the literature” and based on Lukes’ (1974, p.26) 
notion that “the absolutely basic common core to, or primitive notion lying behind, all talk of 
power is the notion that A in some way affects B”, the terms “influence” and “power” were 
used interchangeably. They propose that the ASC changed the accounting treatment and 
disclosure requirements of the R&D standard based on recommendations and suggestions 
made by the aerospace industry. However, the authors could not determine what caused the 
ASC to accept the aerospace industry’s recommendations, owing to a lack of evidence on 
whether other organisations were also able to influence its decision-making but were not 
documented. Power in this context may have taken various forms and shapes, including the 
accounting profession’s perception of the R&D standard. 
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These previous studies illustrate that different entities may shape or influence NASBs’ 
decision-making processes, but it is unclear why they are able to do so. This suggests that 
investigating NASBs based solely on power theory may exclude other relevant explanations 
that might provide more detail on how these entities are able to influence final outcomes, 
including institutions’ self-image and legitimacy. Thus, it is necessary to investigate NASBs’ 
legitimacy because this is granted by aspects of their environment, including various 
stakeholders, as discussed in the next section. 
4.7 Legitimacy theory: Types of legitimacy 
Scholars have criticised the institutional theory framework for being too simple and, despite its 
overlap with legitimacy theory, for lacking recognition of different types of legitimacy (e.g. 
Dart 2004; Phillips and Malhotra 2008; Scott 2008). This study also incorporates Suchman’s 
(1995) framework as a supplement to minimise the limitations of institutional theory by 
recognising different types of legitimacy, which may provide a deeper understanding of 
NASBs’ decision-making processes. 
Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as an assumption or perception of the actions of an entity 
as appropriate, desirable and adequate according to its socially-constructed system of 
definitions, beliefs, principles, values, rules and norms. Organisations desire legitimacy from 
wider social groups rather than a few individuals, as such acceptance will grant social 
legitimacy (Suchman 1995; Deephouse and Suchman 2008; Deephouse et al. 2017). Thus, 
organisations share similar ideas, values, beliefs and preferences with their cultural 
environment (Meyer and Scott 1992). 
Early studies of legitimacy took two approaches: strategic and institutional (Suchman 1995; 
Deephouse et al. 2017). Strategic studies highlight how managers or individuals use evocative 
symbols to acquire social support, whereas institutional studies highlight the influence of 
cultural pressures on organisations’ behaviour. Although strategic and institutional studies 
provide extensive explanations of legitimacy, they overlap (Suchman 1995). Suchman (1995) 
further contributes to the legitimacy literature by synthesising these strands to create three types 
of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral and cognitive. 
Pragmatic legitimacy is based on an organisation’s self-interested behaviour toward its most 
immediate audiences, involving direct reciprocation between these audiences and the 
organisation. It is also evident where an organisation has a noticeable influence on the 
audience’s wellbeing, as well as in changes to economic, political and social interdependencies 
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(Suchman 1995). Organisations pursuing their own self-interests may use advertisements to 
gain legitimacy, as well as to disseminate attributes of good practice (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). 
Whether such behaviour is driven by strategic or institutional factors, the motivation is 
organisations’ desire to build and maintain characteristics of reliability and competence. Thus, 
“at the simplest level, pragmatic legitimacy boils down to a sort of exchange legitimacy – 
support for an organisational policy based on that policy’s expected value to a particular set of 
constituents” (Suchman 1995, p.578). In other words, an organisation’s legitimacy will 
increase if the expected outcome of its operation complies with the expected values and beliefs 
of constituents. 
Unlike pragmatic legitimacy, moral legitimacy does not rely on whether an organisation’s 
behaviour satisfies or complies with its evaluators’ preferences, beliefs or economic benefits, 
but instead focuses on whether its behaviour or decision is “the right thing to do”, regardless 
of environmental evaluators’ perceptions and preferences (Suchman 1995, p.579). The essence 
of moral legitimacy is selflessness, because although an organisation may behave contrary to 
what society believes or expects is the right thing to do, that does not necessarily mean that it 
will be unacceptable to the environment. For instance, an NASB may modify or eliminate an 
accounting standard that it believes permits abuse of an accounting system. Although such 
decisions may have negative economic effects and may not comply with environmental 
evaluators’ perceptions, preferences and beliefs, prevention of abusive accounting behaviour 
is the right thing to do. 
The third type of legitimacy is cognitive legitimacy, which is based on cognition rather than 
on others’ assessments or self-interest (Aldrich and Fiol 1994) and is based on taken-for-
grantedness and comprehensibility (Suchman 1995). Cognitive legitimacy is the outcome of 
evaluators’ long-term experiences and perceptions of an organisation’s pragmatic and moral 
legitimacy (Kumar and Das 2007). In other words, it is the product of multiple events and 
decisions that cumulatively and gradually lead to a tipping point where cognitive legitimacy 
forms. According to Kumar and Das (2007, p.1443), cognitive legitimacy “is something that 
only gradually evolves and finds its roots in the schemata of the individuals working in an 
organization”. Suchman (1995) identifies that organisations with taken-for-granted legitimacy 
reject any change to the current social structure and believe that alternative systems or changes 
are “literally unthinkable”. On the other hand, legitimacy based on comprehensibility results 
from participants’ struggle to unify their systems and beliefs into “coherent, understandable 
accounts” (Suchman 1995). The concept of comprehensibility explains actors’ social behaviour 
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through cultural models that offer rational suggestions for organisations’ behaviour. Suchman 
(1995, p.582) suggests that: 
“organizational activity will prove predictable, meaningful, and inviting; in their 
absence, activity will collapse not necessarily because of overt hostility (although this 
is certainly possible, given the threatening nature of the inexplicable), but more often 
because of repeated miscues, oversights, and distractions”. 
Previous studies indicate that Suchman’s (1995) types of legitimacy intertwine, overlap and 
co-exist (Brinkerhoff 2005; O’Dwyer et al. 2011; Watts et al. 2018), and that there is a 
“durability pendulum” (O’Dwyer et al. 2011). Pragmatic legitimacy is the easiest to achieve, 
but compared with the other types it is less durable. Cognitive legitimacy, on the other hand, is 
the hardest to acquire but the most durable (Cashore 2002; Kumar and Das 2007; O’Dwyer et 
al. 2011; Belal and Owen 2015). The next section discusses the use of legitimacy in accounting 
studies. 
4.8 Legitimacy in accounting studies 
In the accounting field, studies have investigated how NASBs use legitimacy to accomplish 
their institutional roles. Booth and Cocks (1990) define standard setting as a legitimisation 
process, stating that its main focus is on issuing standards that reflect and satisfy the prevailing 
hegemony. In this context, legitimacy theory supplements institutional theory with different 
types of legitimacy. These help deepen understanding of how NASBs’ perceptions of 
legitimacy may influence their decision-making processes, because they may have varying 
levels of toleration for different entities and stakeholders in order to enhance legitimacy. In 
other words, NASBs may accept calls from major stakeholders but disregard the remainder in 
order to increase their pragmatic legitimacy. Suchman (1995) highlights that legitimacy theory 
has been used predominantly as a theoretical lens through which to address cognitive and 
normative forces that structure, constrain and empower actors. The essence of legitimacy 
theory is the concept of social contracts, whereby an organisation behaves or performs acts 
accepted by society in return for rewards, approval, and ultimately survival (Guthrie and Parker 
1989; Deephouse et al. 2017). Richardson (1987, p.352) further emphasises “the role of 
accounting as a legitimating institution, i.e. providing a means by which social values are linked 
to economic actions”. Society may place sanctions on organisations that fail to comply with 
the terms of their social contracts (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Deephouse 1996; Deegan and 
Unerman 2011). These sanctions may take various forms, such as social action (e.g. negative 
press, protests and destruction of image and reputation), legal action (e.g. lawsuits), and 
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economic action, including boycotts, reduced demand for products, withdrawal of financial 
support and strikes (Deegan 2002; Aguilera et al. 2007; Deegan and Unerman 2011). However, 
according to Meyer and Rowan (1977, p.351), legitimacy “protects organizations from 
immediate sanctions” and is essential for their survival. For NASBs, acquiring and maintaining 
legitimacy suggests societal approval and protection. 
Previous research on NASBs highlights the importance of legitimacy for accounting standard 
setting (e.g. Fogarty et al. 1994; Larson 2002; Durocher and Fortin 2010; Larson and Herz 
2013; De Luca and Prather-Kinsey 2018). These studies demonstrate that legitimacy helps 
NASBs not only to survive, but also to acquire wider acceptance and approval of their outcomes 
and accounting standards. Fogarty et al. (1994) highlight that accomplishing legitimacy is a 
very important aim of NASBs, and Burlaud and Colasse (2011) observe that legitimacy is an 
essential element to assess and ensure appropriate implementation of accounting standards. 
This, in turn, helps accounting standards to be regarded as rational, institutional and taken for 
granted (Georgiou and Jack 2011). 
Scholars have used Suchman’s (1995) types of legitimacy to investigate NASBs’ decision-
making processes (e.g. Durocher and Fortin 2010; Georgiou and Jack 2011; Bamber and 
McMeeking 2016). Georgiou and Jack (2011) find that pragmatic legitimacy relates to the 
extent to which NASBs react to stakeholders’ feedback and incorporate their interests into final 
decisions. Fundamental elements of NASBs’ conceptual frameworks, which include 
transparency and decision-usefulness, are also assessed in terms of moral legitimacy. 
Procedural legitimacy is a strain of moral legitimacy and relates to procedural features of 
NASBs’ decision-making processes (Durocher and Fortin 2010). In order to acquire procedural 
legitimacy, an NASB must establish a well-developed process that incorporates its stakeholders 
and their perceptions (Durocher and Fortin 2010; Bamber and McMeeking 2016). 
Suchman’s (1995) legitimacy management strategies have also been used to examine NASBs’ 
strategic approaches. For instance, Durocher and Fortin (2010) investigate the legitimacy 
management strategies of the Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) with regard to its 
financial statement users. They highlight that the AcSB focuses on symbolic features rather 
than pragmatic concerns in order to acquire legitimacy. According to Durocher and Fortin 
(2010, p.497), “the AcSB’s legitimacy management strategies clearly highlight that users 
remain a symbolic rhetorical category and not a true pragmatic concern in standard setting”. In 
other words, the AcSB devotes its efforts to satisfying cultural accounts, rather than seeking 
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the opinions of sophisticated users. Therefore, an NASB seeking to acquire or increase its 
legitimacy must be aware of its stakeholders’ perceptions. In another study, Sinclair and Bolt 
(2013) examine how the New Zealand accounting standard setter incorporates the opinions of 
third-sector (voluntary and not-for-profit) entities into the standard-setting process. They find 
that the NASB achieves pragmatic legitimacy by complying with its environment. Their 
conclusion also supports the notion that compliance with external expectations may help build 
legitimacy, which ultimately helps to achieve cognitive legitimacy. 
In summary, previous scholars’ investigations of legitimacy in the context of NASBs highlight 
the importance of legitimacy in retaining the right to issue and modify accounting standards 
(e.g. Fogarty et al. 1994; Larson 2002, 2007; Kim 2015; Bamber and McMeeking 2016). 
Previous studies also demonstrate the importance of strategically managing legitimacy for 
NASBs’ survival. The next section summarises and provides conclusions on the material 
covered in this chapter, and presents the process of creating the skeletal theoretical framework 
of this study based on institutional theory, power theory and legitimacy theory, as well as 
relevant entities and factors discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2, including authority, 
history and culture. 
4.9 Skeletal theoretical framework 
This study’s adoption of the MRT approach permits the use of previous literature to create a 
skeletal theoretical framework that can be used throughout the research process. Scholars have 
used institutional theory as a theoretical lens in their investigations of various phenomena 
relating to NASBs’ decision-making processes, and more specifically DiMaggio and Powell’s 
(1983) institutional isomorphism (e.g. Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988; Carpenter and Feroz 
2001; Hussain and Gunasekaran 2002; Dillard et al. 2004; Mir and Rahaman 2005; Albu et al. 
2011; Al‐Htaybat 2018; Krishnan 2018). This indicates the importance and relevance of 
institutional theory and DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) institutional isomorphism to this study, 
since its aim is to gain a deeper understanding of EU NASBs’ decision-making processes and 
behaviours toward IFRS for SMEs. However, scholars have also used other theoretical lenses, 
including power theory, and more specifically Lukes’s (1974, 1977) work on power (e.g. Hope 
and Gray 1982; Hussein and Ketz 1991; Sikka 1992; Kwok and Sharp 2005), and legitimacy 
theory, including Suchman’s (1995) different types of legitimacy (e.g. Fogarty et al. 1994; 
Larson 2002, 2007; Kim 2015; Bamber and McMeeking 2016; De Luca and Prather-Kinsey 
2018), in their investigations of various phenomena relating to NASBs’ decision-making 
processes. Scholars’ utilisation of different theoretical lenses highlights the importance of 
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various environmental factors that are deemed relevant to understanding NASBs’ behaviours 
toward issuing, accepting or rejecting accounting regulations. A single theoretical lens cannot 
capture every characteristic of every phenomenon under investigation. Thus, the foregoing 
discussion of institutional theory, power theory and legitimacy theory is essential to this study 
because it forms the basis for its skeletal theoretical framework. The previous literature 
discussed in Chapter 2 also forms the basis of the skeletal theoretical framework because it 
highlights relevant entities, including the EC, national governments and stakeholders, and 
environmental factors such as authority, history and culture that may influence governments’ 
and NASBs’ decision-making processes and final outcomes. 
Institutional theory implicitly discusses the influence of power in the context of coercive 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). However, its limitations include considering 
institutionalisation as an outcome rather than as a process (e.g. Zucker 1987; Dillard et al. 2004; 
Lawrence 2008), which is significant for this study because it aims to investigate NASBs’ 
decision-making processes. In order to minimise this limitation, this study supplements 
institutional theory with power theory, and more specifically Lukes’s (1974, 1977, 2005) work 
on power, including his three dimensions of power, to develop different dimensions of coercive 
isomorphism. In other words, the skeletal framework creates three levels of coercive 
isomorphism that capture various entities’ levels of influence throughout NASBs’ decision-
making processes, including discussion of accounting issues, agenda entry, discussion of the 
ED and final outcomes, as shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Skeletal theoretical framework based on institutional theory 






Explicit influence of an 
individual, entity or group of 
entities modifying or having the 
potential capacity to modify 
NASBs’ decision-making 
processes. 
Lukes (1974, 1977, 2005), 
DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), Hope and Gray 
(1982), Mir and Rahaman 





Implicit or explicit influence of an 
individual, entity or group of 
entities to limit NASBs’ agenda 
entry or discussion of a particular 
issue which, if discussed and 
resolved, might challenge or 
damage their preferences 
(political, technical, cultural or 
personal) in cases of decision and 
non-decision making. 
Lukes (1974, 1977, 2005), 
Hope and Gray (1982), 
DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), Mir and Rahaman 




Domination of an individual, 
entity or group of entities over 
NASBs’ agenda entry and 
decision-making processes which 
Lukes (1974, 1977, 2005), 
Hope and Gray (1982), 
DiMaggio and Powell 
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Mechanism Type Definition References 
cause them to reject or 
unconsciously ignore suitable 
alternatives to the current system 
meaning accounting regulations 
are taken for granted and that 
changes were never considered. 
(1983), Mir and Rahaman 






An NASB’s adoption of 
accounting standards issued by 
other entities that address similar 
issues to its own environment, 
aiming to satisfy its closest 
evaluators to acquire legitimacy. 
DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), Suchman (1995), 
Mir and Rahaman (2005), 
Albu et al. (2011), Bamber 




An NASB’s adoption of 
accounting standards issued by 
other entities after proper 
evaluation and consideration to 
solve current issues or problems, 
regardless of the perceptions of its 





An NASB’s continuous adoption 
of accounting standards that 
successfully resolve 
environmental issues or technical 
problems; or continuous 
acceptance of taken-for-granted 
accounting standards because the 
NASB does not believe other 







Influence of the education system 
or accounting profession to 
diffuse what external entities 
believe is right, which may 
increase their legitimacy and 
influence over the NASB’s 
agenda entry or decision-making 
process. 
DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), Suchman (1995), 
Albu et al. (2011), Bamber 




Influence of the education system 
or profession to diffuse 
appropriate and rigorous 
behaviour, regardless of self-
interest and external entities’ 
beliefs, which may influence the 





Influence of the education system 
or profession to continually 
diffuse appropriate and acceptable 
behaviour, or taken-for-granted 
behaviour, causing external 
parties and the environment to 







An NASB’s adoption of 
accounting standards if it shares 
similar characteristics with 
national accounting standards as 
developed over time; or 
Lukes (1974, 1977, 2005), 
Perera (1989), Ding et al. 
(2005), Richard (2005), 
Sharma and Lawrence 
(2008), Albu et al. (2011), 
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Mechanism Type Definition References 
acceptance of accounting 
standards if they do not 
contradict, or have a high level of 
proximity, with external 
stakeholders’ beliefs and 
preferences. 
Hoffmann and Detzen 
(2013), Ramanna (2013), 
Nobes and Parker (2012) 
Authority Power 
Influence of an NASB’s 
legislative power on its behaviour 
toward the adoption of IFRS for 
SMEs. 
Hail et al. (2010), Zeff 
(2010), Ramanna (2013), 
Krishnan (2016)  
Source: Author’s own work 
Institutional theory’s acknowledgement of legitimacy is limited (e.g. Dart 2004; Phillips and 
Malhotra 2008; Scott 2008) because it disregards different types of legitimacy (Scott 2008). In 
order to minimise this issue, the skeletal theoretical framework supplements normative and 
mimetic isomorphism with legitimacy theory, and more specifically Suchman’s (1995) 
different types of legitimacy. An NASB’s compliance or non-compliance with normative and 
mimetic pressures may positively or negatively influence its environmental entities’ 
perceptions of it. This may lead to an increase or decrease in legitimacy, indicating that its 
decision-making process may be influenced by its desire to improve its image by promoting its 
own legitimacy. This shows the existence of multiple levels of normative and mimetic 
isomorphism, depending on the type of legitimacy that an NASB is trying to maximise. In other 
words, an NASB’s normative and mimetic isomorphism can each be explained at three 
different levels, based on its decision-making process and whether it has analysed and properly 
considered its environment’s best interests in that process, as shown in Table 4.1. 
In addition, scholars also criticise institutional theory for focusing only on institutions and 
disregarding individuals. In the context of institutional theory, actors are embedded in 
institutions and are influenced by cognitive, normative and regulative processes that shape their 
preferences and identities (Friedland and Alford 1991; Clemens and Cook 1999; Seo and Creed 
2002; Van Dijk et al. 2011). This raises questions about how individuals can innovate new 
practices and convince others to adopt them, and why they would innovate in the first place 
(Garud et al. 2007; Englund et al. 2013). Influential or power-holding individuals may be 
capable of forcing change but lack the motivation to do so, whereas innovative individuals may 
be capable of creating new practice but lack the power to enforce it (Garud et al. 2007). 
In order to minimise this limitation, researchers (e.g. Garud and Karnøe 2003; Mutch 2007) 
suggest that individuals are knowledgeable agents who reflect on their actions and behaviour, 
rather than accepting taken-for-granted rules and preferences. All individuals have various 
103 
types of identity, such as occupational or career (Ashforth et al. 2008). These may shape their 
preferences, motivations and self-definition, and ultimately their behaviour (Riketta and Van 
Dick 2005; Ullrich et al. 2007; Horton and de Araujo Wanderley 2016). This illustrates the 
importance of individuals and highlights the need to investigate them further. This study 
addresses this issue by interviewing previous and current members of NASBs. Each board is 
composed of individuals, and each individual may have different identities. Thus, the focus of 
this study is on these individuals and how they interact with and are influenced by their 
environment and other entities’ perceptions. 
Since this study considers the influence of various environmental factors on governments’ and 
NASBs’ decision-making processes, it was deemed important to categorise them as visible or 
unseen, as shown in Figure 4.1. The visible factors are more evidential, obvious, and concrete 
(foreground), while the unseen factors are more nebulous, less obvious, interacting, intangible 
(background) factors. The visible environmental factors include: the influence of various 
entities such as the EC, national governments, board members or stakeholders on governments’ 
and NASBs’ decision-making processes. Their participation, involvement or demanded 
changes could be documented; meaning concrete evidence of such influence might be 
available. For instance, even though EU NASBs may be independent entities, they do not have 
absolute authority since they cannot issue accounting standards that would contradict EC 
accounting directives or national governments’ laws and regulations. This is because such 
compliance might be embedded and documented in their roles as standard-setters. Thus, the 
EC and national governments’ coercive pressure on NASBs is obvious and concrete evidence 
of their influence might be available. On the other hand, unseen environmental factors include 
authority, and the national accounting history and culture. These factors are seldom discussed 
during governmental and NASBs’ decision-making processes, meaning their influence is less 
obvious and lacks concrete evidence but they still influence decision makers’ processes. The 
influence of these factors might be discovered by interviewing individuals who participated in 
the decision-making process because, as a result of their direct involvement, they may shed 
light on how these less obvious factors influenced the board’s process. 
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Figure 4.1: Skeletal theoretical framework 
Source: Author’s own work 
The visible and unseen environmental factors form an important part of the skeletal theoretical 
framework as shown in Figure 4.1 above. Within the Figure, the unseen factors are separated 
to reflect their more background and less obvious nature. The unseen (background) 
environmental factors include mimetic isomorphism, normative isomorphism and coercive 
isomorphism which are drawn from institutional theory and have already been discussed in 
Section 4.2 of this chapter. The other unseen factors: authority, accounting history and culture 
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were identified and discussed in the review of previous literature in Chapter 2 but are now 
further developed below. 
Previous studies have suggested that governments’ and NASBs’ perceptions of their authority 
influence their decision-making processes (Hail et al. 2010; e.g. Zeff and Nobes 2010; Van 
Mourik and Walton 2018). For instance, Hail et al. (2010) suggest that the US is unwilling to 
adopt IFRS because this decision would have a significant impact on its legislative power, as 
it would certainly affect the US Congress, the FASB and the SEC. This is because IFRS is set 
by the IASB, meaning adoption requires authority for accounting standards to be relinquished 
to a supranational entity, placing NASBs in the position of agents or consultants of the IASB. 
Unlike the US approach, the EC mandated adoption of IFRS and has established mechanisms 
to protect its authority by granting it the right to veto any future changes, and any amendments 
to IFRS must be endorsed by the EC, the European Parliament, the Standards Advice Review 
Group, EFRAG and the Accounting Regulatory Committee (Zeff and Nobes 2010; Van Mourik 
and Walton 2018). Thus, these entities’ perception of their authority, and how this might be 
hindered by adopting accounting standards issued by a foreign entity, have influenced their 
behaviour towards IFRS. Since the prior literature discussed in sub-section 2.2.4 suggests the 
relevance of such entities’ authority on the decision-making process, the skeletal theoretical 
framework of this study defines authority as being the influence of an NASB’s legislative 
power on its behaviour towards the adoption of IFRS for SMEs. 
Moreover, as practices, ideas and beliefs are not set in stone but, rather, evolve over time 
(Sahlin and Wedlin 2008), environmental factors, including authority, and history and culture, 
may interact with, overlap or influence one another. For instance, NASBs’ authority may 
influence and/or in turn be influenced by national accounting history and culture. This is 
because NASBs’ acquisition of authority may help protect accounting history and culture by 
issuing accounting regulations that comply with and preserve national accounting features. 
Furthermore, if NASBs suggest or introduce accounting standards that do not comply with 
historically and culturally embedded accounting traditions, society may place sanctions on 
them, since NASBs failed to comply with the terms of their social contracts (Meyer and Rowan 
1977; Deephouse 1996; Deegan and Unerman 2011), which may diminish their authority. This, 
in turn, suggests that regulators’ authority may influence and/or be influenced by history and 
culture. 
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It is especially difficult to segregate accounting history and culture as they are interrelated and 
influence one another. For instance, a history of certain accounting features may cause them to 
become embedded in national culture. As a result, accounting history and culture were 
simultaneously defined in the skeletal theoretical framework presented in Table 4.1 and 
discussed together in the review of prior literature, the findings of this study and is further 
elaborated in the remainder of this chapter. 
As discussed in sub-section 2.2.3, Ramanna (2013) suggests that one of the two reasons that 
explain Canada’s adoption of IFRS lies in its British roots, since Canada is a former UK colony. 
This historical association influenced the early development of Canada’s accounting profession 
to follow the British tradition, it used Britain’s Companies Acts as a framework. The second 
reason is that Canada’s principles of corporate disclosure were created in accordance with “the 
1844 British law on joint stock companies” (Gray and Kitching 2005 cited in Ramanna 2013, 
p.15). Therefore, Canada’s closeness to the UK caused it also to be proximate to the IASB 
accounting standards, which provides an explanation for its adoption of IFRS and how a 
historical context influenced the country’s NASB decision-making process. 
Albu et al. (2011) also suggest that a country’s cultural accounting tradition can influence its 
reformation or adoption of accounting standards. According to Albu et al. (2011, p.85), the first 
stage of Romania’s accounting reform was based on the French accounting standards because 
“the adoption of a French-based accounting model was, in this context, considered as being a 
natural decision, owing to close cultural and economic ties between Romania and France”. 
Similarly, the UK’s adoption of IFRS illustrates the influence of national accounting history 
on accounting regulations. For instance, in the UK an essential accounting feature, the “true 
and fair view”, was introduced in the 1948 Companies Act (HMSO 1965; Parker 1989; Nobes 
1993; FRC 2014b). Since the introduction of this phrase it has played a significant role and 
been widely used in the accounting standards published in the country, while it has also been 
exported to British Commonwealth countries, the EC and many EU countries (Parker 1989; 
Nobes 1993; Nobes and Parker 2012; FRC 2014b), meaning such a historical event has shaped 
the UK accounting standards and influenced its standard setters’ decision-making processes. 
When the EC mandated the adoption of IFRS in 2002 (EC 2000, 2002), the FRC (2014b, p.3) 
suggested that implementation of IFRS in the UK did not hinder the essential concept of the 
“true and fair view” because “fair presentation under IFRS is equivalent to a true and fair view”. 
The existence of this feature in the IASB’s accounting standards eased adoption of IFRS in the 
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UK. In other words, accounting standards issued by UK NASB share similar historical and 
cultural features and characteristics to the accounting standards issued by the IASB. 
Based on the previous literature discussed in sub-section 2.2.3, this study defines accounting 
history and culture as an NASB’s adoption of accounting standards if it shares similar 
characteristics with national accounting standards as developed over time; or the acceptance of 
accounting standards if they do not contradict or have a high level of proximity, with external 
stakeholders’ beliefs and preferences. The main difference between the definition of this study 
and prior literature is that the former focuses on and articulates the influence of historical and 
cultural accounting traditions on NASBs’ decision-making processes rather than the latter’s 
general and broad concepts. In addition, the definition of this study considers how these factors 
influence stakeholders’ and NASB members’ behaviour, suggestions or demanded changes, 
because these entities’ perceived beliefs and preferences might be developed based on national 
accounting history and culture. 
Therefore, a review of previous literature provides useful definitions and discussion of visible 
and unseen environmental factors. This review has helped define and enrich the skeletal 
theoretical framework presented in Table 4.1 and in Figure 4.1 and suggests how these factors 
may interrelate and/or influence one another. This, in turn, enables exploration of EU 
governments’ and NASBs’ interactions with, and the influence of, visible and unseen 
environmental factors on their decision-making processes with regard to their varying 
behaviours towards IFRS for SMEs, thus providing a deeper understanding of their processes. 
4.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed relevant theories based on previous studies of NASBs’ decision-
making processes, which have been used to create the skeletal theoretical framework used 
throughout the research process of this study. In the remainder of this thesis, Chapters 5 and 6 
present analyses of the data gathered and the primary findings of this study in light of the 
skeletal theoretical framework; Chapter 7 develops the skeletal theoretical framework by 
creating a version of it for each jurisdiction, showing the strength of some visible and unseen 
environmental factors; and Chapter 8 discusses the contributions and limitations of the study 
and makes suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 5: UK NASB’s Decision-Making Process – Adoption of IFRS for 
SMEs 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how and why the UK NASB adopted IFRS for SMEs with major 
modifications, the influence of the standard’s advantages and disadvantages on the adoption 
outcome, and who was involved and to what extent they influenced the UK board’s final 
decision. The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 provides an overview of the UK’s 
adoption of IFRS for SMEs. Section 5.3 sets out the events that led to adoption of the standard 
and its mandatory application in 2015. Section 5.4 discusses the advantages and disadvantages 
of adopting the standard and how it influenced the UK NASB’s decision-making process. 
Sections 5.5 to 5.8 draw on the theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 4 (Table 4.1) to 
analyse various factors that influenced the UK NASB’s adoption decision. Section 5.5 
discusses the perceptions of interviewees from the UK NASB regarding the decision (e.g. 
adopt, reject, or adopt with major modification). Section 5.6 focuses on various entities 
involved in the UK NASB’s adoption decision, and how they influenced the final outcome. 
Section 5.7 illustrates the UK NASB’s authority, and how it was perceived as a reason for 
making certain changes to protect its legislative power. Section 5.8 explains the UK’s 
historical, cultural and accounting tradition, as well as its proximity to the IASB and the US, 
which were seen as another motive for adopting IFRS for SMEs. Finally, Section 5.9 
summarises and provides conclusions on the topics covered in this chapter. 
The next section provides an overview of the UK NASB’s decision-making process for the 
adoption of IFRS for SMEs with major modifications. 
5.2 Overview of UK NASB process of IFRS for SMEs adoption 
As a result of the EC mandated adoption of IFRS for use by public companies’ group financial 
statements, the UK started the process of updating the version of UK GAAP that existed 
between 2002 and 2005 (DTI 2004; ASB 2004). UK GAAP was issued by the FRC’s 
predecessor the ASB which is now entitled the Corporate Reporting Board and is part of the 
FRC (ICAEW 2018a). The ASB’s due process was initially for the board to discuss approaches 
and strategies with regard to the regulation of accounting standards. Depending on the stage of 
the process, staff members would either prepare a discussion paper or an ED, which were 
ultimately deliberated on by board members prior to publication. There would then be a 
consultation process inviting the general public to provide comment letters and feedback on 
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the proposed ED. Occasionally, staff members would seek advice from stakeholders if the 
board deemed it necessary, and in the case of IFRS for SMEs, they proactively reached out to 
UK SMEs and their investors to consult them further on the EDs (Interviewees 6 and 11). Also, 
if the decision was complicated, staff members would prepare a discussion paper setting out 
the various options available. The board would discuss these options and agree on the most 
appropriate choice, and staff members would then draft a paper based on the specific option 
selected by the board. When the public feedback window closed, staff members would analyse 
the comment letters and create new proposals based on them. Any new proposal would again 
be discussed by the board, and the suggested amendments and final standards would be based 
on comments received and decisions taken by the board (Interviewees 1 and 6). Figure 5.1 
summarises the timeline of events that led to the UK’s adoption of IFRS for SMEs with major 
modifications. These are discussed in more detail in Section 5.3. The next section discusses in 





























Figure 5.1: Timeline of events in the adoption of IFRS for SMEs in the UK 
5.3 UK NASB’s decision-making process: The case of adoption of IFRS for SMEs 
One characteristic of the ASB’s accounting standards was their similarity with the IASB’s 
accounting regulations. According to a former FRC member, “financial reporting standards 
developed by the ASB and those later standards were, in effect, UK versions of international 
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ASB made reference to IFRS. Between 2002 and 2005, various consultation processes were 
conducted on how UK financial reporting should change. In 2004, the then DTI and the ASB 
consulted on a strategy for convergence with IFRS (DTI 2004; ASB 2004). The ASB (2004) 
proposed that large companies should use IFRS, that UK GAAP should converge with IFRS, 
and that smaller companies should follow the existing Financial Reporting Standard for 
Smaller Entities (FRSSE). However, the ASB highlighted that although the FRSSE would not 
currently be modified in accordance with IFRS standards, future periodic reviews would take 
these into account. 
The ASB issued another ED in 2005, which aimed to discuss further the ASB’s future role as 
the UK standard setter. This ED indicated that the previously proposed financial reporting 
changes did not affect the ASB’s fundamental aim, and reiterated the plan to fully converge 
UK GAAP with IFRS (ASB 2005). There was opposition to this from consultees who argued 
that the implementation of IFRS would be complicated, because at that time public companies 
were grappling with the use of IFRS: “Ooh this looks more complicated than we thought so 
should you be doing this?” (Interviewee 11). 
In January 2006, the ASB conducted a public meeting aiming to discuss its convergence of UK 
GAAP with IFRS, but also seeking to issue accounting standards that placed a proportionate 
burden on entities applying them, as well as adopting a phased approach (ASB 2006). At that 
time, the ASB knew that the IASB was working on a project entitled the “SMEs Project”, 
which might provide financial reporting solutions for smaller companies. During the meeting, 
ASB chair, Ian Mackintosh discussed the feedback received on the previously published EDs 
and indicated that various issues had been raised by the comment letters that the ASB had 
received, including that the adoption of IFRS might be complex and difficult to implement 
(ASB 2006). In addition, the ASB discussed the IASB’s SMEs Project and there was general 
support for its use, but with modifications in order to make it applicable to the UK economy 
(ASB 2006; Interviewee 5). Yet, in 2009, the ASB issued a policy proposal on the future of 
UK GAAP, seeking feedback from stakeholders with regard to its plan to adopt IFRS for SMEs 
as issued by the IASB (ASB 2009). In adopting the standard, the ASB proposed a three-layered 
system. Companies with traded securities or fiduciary capacity would be required to follow 
EU-adopted IFRS; the second tier would comprise large private companies; and SMEs would 
apply IFRS for SMEs as well as the FRSSE for smaller companies. 
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Similar to the IASB, the ASB suggested a distinction between companies based on the public 
accountability principle rather than a quantified size. Remarkably, the ASB definition of public 
accountability was based on, and qualitatively identical to, that introduced by the IASB. 
According to the ASB (2010a, p.7): 
“An entity has public accountability if: as at the reporting date, its debt or equity 
instruments are traded in a public market or it is in the process of issuing such 
instruments for trading in public market (a domestic or foreign stock exchange or an 
over-the-counter market, including local and regional markets); or as one of its 
primary businesses, it holds assets in a fiduciary capacity for a broad group of 
outsiders and/or it is a deposit taking entity for a broad group of outsiders. This is 
typically the case for banks, credit unions, insurance companies, securities 
brokers/dealers, mutual funds or investment banks”. 
The distinction based on public accountability was relevant in this thesis because it is used to 
distinguish which companies are mandated to comply with EU-adopted IFRS instead of 
simpler accounting standards, such as IFRS for SMEs, UK GAAP or FRSSE. This in turn 
fuelled opposition of many national stakeholders, including banks, credit unions and entities 
that applied sector-specific Statements of Recommended Practice (SORPs), such as insurance 
companies and charities, and demanded removal of such a distinction from the final accounting 
standard. 
In the meantime, the ASB had to consider whether the proposed IFRS for SMEs standard 
complied with EU law, specifically the EC Fourth and Seventh Directives. The ASB conducted 
a comparison of EC accounting directives and IFRS for SMEs and: 
… didn’t find any legal differences that were seeming to be a show stopper. And then 
EFRAG … found six areas of incompatibility, none of which was huge, so with some 
tweaking you could have some changes to the SME standard that could make it 
compatible with European law (Interviewee 11). 
As previously indicated, the ASB’s original plan was to adopt IFRS for SMEs as issued by the 
IASB; however, changes would have to be made to the EC directives in order to make it legal 
to adopt the standard. In addition, the ASB received many comment letters that opposed both 
suggested definitions, as well as the adoption of IFRS for SMEs with no modification (ASB 
2012b; Interviewee 11). As a result, in order to enable adoption of the standard, the ASB had 
to change its plan, and changes were required by law and demanded by stakeholders. The ASB 
then issued another ED in 2010 entitled “Financial reporting standards for medium sized 
entities” (FRSME). This new proposal retained public accountability to distinguish between 
the use of IFRS and FRSME; however, it exempted entities that met certain criteria, and made 
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adjustments to the standard itself, as illustrated in Table 5.1 (ASB 2010a). For example, the 
ASB changed Section 29 Income Tax of IFRS for SMEs to the wording of IAS 12, because the 
latter had been recently updated under IFRS whereas the former was an old draft of it. The 
ASB exemption allowed any entity, such as small credit unions, to use FRSME if they had 
assets less than £3.26 million, and a turnover below £6.5 million and fewer than 50 employees. 
In other words, at that time the ASB did not significantly modify IFRS for SMEs because it 
believed that “the IFRS for SMEs, modified as little as is feasible, is the best option to replace 
UK FRS” (ASB 2010a, p.13). 
Table 5.1: Changes proposed to IFRS for SMEs 
Amendment Reason 
Conflicts with EU directives, for example: 
• Negative goodwill 
• Extraordinary items 
• Treatment of associates and joint ventures 
Ensure compliance with legal requirements 
Refer to company law for requirement to 
prepare consolidated accounts 
Exemption from parent company and 
subsidiary cash flow statements 
Avoidance of gold-plated legal requirements 
Replace Section 29 Income Tax with IAS 
12 
IFRS for SMEs reflects abandoned proposal 
for IFRS 
Source: ASB, 2010 
Two years later, the ASB issued amendments to the previously published proposal for FRSME, 
for the last time as the UK national accounting standard setter before it became part of the FRC. 
According to a former FRC member: 
There are two boards. The main standard setting – the main board that does all the 
recommendations, does all the work – is the Accounting Standards Board, but the FRC 
itself, which is the overarching body across all standards in the UK, as a board which 
doesn’t get into the detail of standards setting but legally has to approve, it’s the body 
that’s approved by company law to actually issue the standards (Interviewee 1). 
The major changes made by the ASB included changing the title of the standard to FRS 102, 
reintroducing options that had been eliminated in the previous EDs, such as capitalisation of 
borrowing costs, revaluation of intangible and tangible assets and carrying forward certain 
development costs, and basing balance sheet and income statement presentation requirements 
on UK company law (ASB 2012b; Interviewee 11). The proposed changes were to be enforced 
by 1 January 2015, with an option for early application. Although the proposed changes seemed 
more significant than previous proposals, the ASB highlighted that they were based on careful 
consideration of comment letters received, and would reduce transition costs because 
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eliminating public accountability would limit the use of EU-adopted IFRS, while the 
reintroduced options permitted the use of current treatments available at that time. 
Having taken over the ASB’s responsibilities as the UK national accounting standard setter 
(ICAEW 2018a), the FRC issued eight amendments to FRS 102 between 2013 and 2015, 
including changes to hedge accounting, pensions obligations, shares-based payment 
transactions, fair value hierarchy disclosures and other amendments arising from updated EC 
directives and company law. The new accounting Directive 2013/34/EU imposed significant 
changes on the small companies regime, including reductions in the financial reporting 
disclosure requirements for micro and small entities only to the extent indicated in the new 
directive, the introduction for the first time in the UK of a definition of micro-entities, 
previously called “smaller entities”, an increased turnover limit from £6.5 million to £10.2 
million for entities to apply FRS 102, and prohibition of the use and remeasurement of current 
value by micro-entities (FRC 2014a). As a result, the FRC had to update FRSSE and parts of 
FRS 102 in order to comply with the new accounting directive. 
After the FRC had consulted on the expected new changes, it decided that FRSSE should be 
withdrawn because it would not be beneficial for smaller companies to use accounting 
standards based on an older version of UK GAAP which was no longer in use. It issued FRS 
105, based on FRS 102 but with limited disclosure as required by the new EC directive, and 
added Section 1A to FRS 102 for small entitles regime (FRC 2015a, 2015b). Therefore, the 
UK currently have FRS 105 as a regime for micro-entities, FRS 104 for entities using FRS 102 
to prepare their interim reports, FRS 103 for insurance contracts, Section 1A of FRS 102 for 
small entities, FRS 102 for entities not included under FRS 105 or FRS 101, including not-for-
profit entities and SMEs based on size criteria, FRS 101 with reduced disclosure requirements 
for the individual financial statements of subsidiaries and ultimate parents and disclosure and 
measurement requirements for EU-adopted IFRS, and FRS 100 for entities required to prepare 
financial statements in accordance with accounting standards, legislation or regulations 
applicable in the UK. Thus, all UK accounting standards currently enforced are based on the 
IASB’s IASs, regardless of size of entity. The level of complexity in these standards and 
disclosure requirements increases as entities move through each regime, as shown in Figure 
5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Complexity of UK accounting standard regimes 
Source: FRC, 2015a 
From this discussion of the UK decision-making process with regard to the adoption of IFRS 
for SMEs, it can be seen that many actors were influencing in the decision. These included the 
EC, the UK government, and various national stakeholders such as preparers, credit unions and 
not-for-profit entities. Therefore, a range of entities may have significantly affected the board’s 
decision-making process, which may have influenced the UK NASB to change its plans. 
The next section discusses the UK NASB’s perception of the advantages and disadvantages of 
IFRS for SMEs and its influence on the decision outcome. 
5.4 UK NASB’s perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of IFRS for 
SMEs and its influence on the decision 
When the IASB issued its IFRS for SMEs ED, it stated that the motive for issuing the standard 
was that NASBs worldwide supported the IASB’s development of a standard aimed at SMEs 
(IASB 2007b). The IASB promoted the adoption of its standard based on an argument that the 
perceived benefits would include reduction of the financial reporting burden on SMEs if they 
were required to apply IFRS, improved audit consistency, easing of the education and training 
burden, harmonisation of SMEs’ financial reporting which would help them access 
international funds, and simplification of SMEs’ cross border activities, including SMEs’ 
relationships with foreign suppliers (IASB 2007b). Research has found that adoption of 
accounting standards is determined mainly on the basis of cost–benefit analyses (Kaya and 
Koch 2015; Saucke 2015). Therefore, this section discusses the UK NASB’s perception of the 
perceived advantages of IFRS for SMEs and how it influenced the adoption decision. 
5.4.1 Advantages of IFRS for SMEs 
5.4.1.1 Shared conceptual framework for IFRS and IFRS for SMEs 
A fundamental feature of IFRS for SMEs, and an advantage of adopting the standard, was its 
shared conceptual framework with IFRS (IASB 2009; Ernst & Young 2010; EC 2010; AICPA 
2018). According to Interviewee 1, an essential reason for adopting the standard was the UK’s 
desire to align SMEs’ accounting standard principles with those applicable to large companies 
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because, as companies grow, accounting becomes more difficult. At some point, companies 
will have to change their accounting system completely if accounting regulations are 
inconsistent between large entities and SMEs. 
However, in addition to the UK NASB’s desire to reduce small companies’ transition burden 
as they grow, harmonisation or use of a common framework for SMEs and public entities 
would also help the standards setter because it would no longer have to maintain and update 
two different sets of financial reporting regulations. Interviewee 4 stated that adoption of IFRS 
for SMEs as issued by the IASB would have eased the standard-setting process because IFRS 
and IFRS for SMEs shared a similar conceptual framework.  
Another reason for the standard’s adoption was that the UK NASB had an urgent need to update 
UK GAAP, which was perceived as “very old fashioned” (Interviewee 5) and included a 
mixture of ancient, old and newer convergences and some unconverged accounting standards: 
Old UK standards had this mix of statements of standard accounting practice, original 
financial reporting standards produced by the Accounting Standards Board. You had 
then converged standards prepared by the Accounting Standards Board that were very 
very similar to IFRSs but some of the older ones were not and so there was a real mix 
of standards … It was basically sweeping away that mix of very old, slightly old, newer 
convergences, some not converged (Interviewee 11). 
The last advantage relating to the shared conceptual framework of IFRS for SMEs was a 
reduction in education and training costs (EC 2010). Prior to the adoption of IFRS, accountants 
studied UK GAAP in universities, their accounting exams were based on it, and they were 
trained to audit financial statements prepared in compliance with it. However, due to the shift 
requiring all public companies to comply with IFRS, education started to change and 
accountants started to learn IFRS rather than UK GAAP, and when they tried to learn both, 
inconsistencies between them caused great confusion (Interviewee 1). Thus, when the ASB 
proposed the adoption of IFRS for SMEs, it aimed to eliminate the confusion caused by the 
existence of two different bases for preparing financial reporting. This would reduce training 
and education costs for accountants and other institutions (ASB 2009, 2010b, 2012b; 
Interviewees 1 and 6). 
The ASB wanted to reduce the number of different frameworks available and to update UK 
GAAP in order to eliminate the existing mixed standards, as well as reduce the cost of 
educating and training accountants. However, these benefits were not the only reasons for the 
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adoption decision. The next sub-section investigates the proximity of IFRS for SMEs to UK 
GAAP and its influence on the adoption decision. 
5.4.1.2 IFRS for SMEs’ proximity to UK GAAP 
Since the former UK GAAP was influenced by IFRS/IASs, national stakeholders were already 
familiar with the concepts of IFRS for SMEs, but were not completely familiar or satisfied with 
the IASB’s simplification of and limited options in the standard. As a result, when the ASB 
consulted with national stakeholders, they generally supported the concepts in IFRS for SMEs 
but requested amendments to the proposed standard (ASB 2010a). The ASB often contributed 
and participated in the IASB decision-making process which increased the standard’s closeness 
to the UK in turn eased its acceptance. According to Interviewee 6: 
The fact we had input into the IASB’s process tended to mean that they produced 
standards that were more akin to UK GAAP than they might otherwise have been, and 
therefore, at the end of the day, adopting IFRS, or indeed IFRS for SMEs, was easier 
or more palatable. 
Another explanation for national stakeholders’ desire to adopt IFRS for SMEs was that, in the 
UK, the IFRS philosophy was accepted as part of the country’s existence, so it was much easier 
to move to IFRS for SMEs (Interviewees 13 and 14). In the case of the UK’s adoption of IFRS, 
when the EC mandated its adoption in 2002, the UK was less affected than other countries 
because the pre-IFRS standards were closer to the adopted IFRS (Interviewee 2). In addition, 
stakeholders supported the adoption of IFRS for SMEs because it was much less complicated 
burdensome and required less disclosure than the ASB’s proposed plan to converge UK GAAP 
with IFRS. According to Interviewee 1: 
IFRS is very complex, which is not applicable to many companies. It’s got very, very 
heavy disclosure requirements which are really geared up to public companies, and 
the more we looked at this, the more it seemed obvious that it was not appropriate to 
use that across the board. 
In the case of large companies, they also supported the adoption of IFRS for SMEs because it 
would be easier for their subsidiaries to prepare group financial statements in accordance with 
the standard rather than IFRS, which would reduce preparation costs (Interviewee 11). Thus, 
national stakeholders’ general support was another motivation for the UK NASB to adopt IFRS 
for SMEs. However, the standard also had disadvantages because national stakeholders 
demanded changes and the FRC had frequently amended FRS 102. These disadvantages are 
discussed in the next sub-section. 
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5.4.2 Disadvantages of IFRS for SMEs 
5.4.2.1 Oversimplification 
According to the ASB (2012a, 2012b), adoption of IFRS for SMEs with no modification did 
not satisfy stakeholders’ needs and was oversimplified compared with UK GAAP. The 
standard removed many options that were permitted under IFRS and UK GAAP. These 
included revaluation of intangible and tangible assets, carrying forward certain development 
costs, and capitalisation of borrowing costs. The UK’s advanced economic environment 
comprised many financial institutions and very large private companies, such as John Lewis 
(Interviewee 1). Although these entities were not required to produce financial statements in 
accordance with EU-adopted IFRS because they were not listed, very complex businesses 
could not simply apply IFRS for SMEs. According to Interviewee 4, the FRC: 
… identified those areas in the IFRS for SMEs that either were not, I’d say, sufficiently 
sophisticated for what the UK was already used to so … we introduced some more 
sophistication, I’d say, into IFRS for SMEs. 
Adoption of IFRS for SMEs as issued by the IASB would have caused major changes to the 
UK economy and burdensome transition and implementation costs, without perceived benefits. 
For instance, entities with agreed bank loan covenants based on revalued demands would have 
had to renegotiate their bank facilities, with uncertain outcomes (Interviewee 5). Another 
drawback related to IFRS for SMEs was that harmonisation of SMEs’ financial reporting was 
not deemed essential because entities were not aiming to access foreign capital and were not 
trying to secure loans from international banks. Therefore, no UK board members interviewed 
perceived this as an advantage and Interviewee 5 stated that “countries can’t necessarily see, 
or couldn’t see, a particular reason why it would want to harmonise accounting between 
countries for small companies”. 
In turn, although contradicting the IASB’s perceived advantages of harmonisation of SMEs’ 
financial reporting requirements, which was a fundamental feature prompting adoption of the 
standard, this supports the observation of previous studies that SMEs do not seek cross-border 
investors or regard foreign suppliers as users of their financial statements (Eierle and Haller 
2009; EC 2010; Aboagye‐Otchere and Agbeibor 2012; Bartůňková 2013). The next sub-section 
discusses another disadvantage of IFRS for SMEs. 
5.4.2.2 IASB’s due process and objectives of IFRS for SMEs 
Similarly to national stakeholders, members of the UK NASB had various concerns about 
adopting IFRS for SMEs, one of which was the IASB’s desire to update IFRS for SMEs only 
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every three years. This was deemed to be infrequent compared with IFRS, which is updated 
yearly. According to Interviewee 1, “IFRS for SMEs is only reviewed on a three-yearly basis, 
which is just not quick enough for the environment we are operating in in the UK.” 
Members of the UK NASB flagged another issue relating to the IASB’s due process which was 
use of IFRS to produce IFRS for SMEs (IASB 2007b). Board members were divided on 
whether a top-down approach was appropriate, since SMEs’ needs were different from those 
of listed companies, and the IASB’s political environment was turbulent because various 
parties were trying to lobby it to issue standards suitable or tailored to their needs (Interviewee 
6). Interviewee 1 stated that “the IASB … are subject to political pressures which do not 
necessarily always give the best outcomes for all companies”. 
The UK NASB’s concerns with regard to the IASB’s due process have been observed in 
previous studies, which have highlighted that the IASB’s purpose in developing IFRS for 
SMEs was not to create a different set of financial reporting standards, but to issue a light 
version of IFRS for use by SMEs (Ram and Newberry 2013, 2017). In a formal letter to the 
ASB and the BIS, Bush (2010), former member of the ASB’s Urgent Issues Task Force, argued 
that the ASB’s proposed changes based on IFRS for SMEs were legally and fatally flawed. He 
argued that proposed changes to the objectives of capital maintenance and creditor protection, 
associated with stewardship, conflicted with UK companies act because “the IASB has set the 
IFRS-SME on the basis that the objective is to provide information of a quality that is “useful 
to users”. This is a very subjective, if not woolly, objective” (Bush 2010, p.15). In other words, 
IFRS for SMEs is focused on investors rather than stewardship. He further argued that: 
“The project history of the IFRS-SME states that the IASB decided that it was not the 
purpose of the IFRS-SME to be used for assessing tax (i.e. making a distribution of 
profits at the pre tax level) or dividends (i.e. making a distribution of profits at the post 
tax level). That is contradictory to what Parliament has set out that accounts are for 
and which was re-decided as recently as 2006 with the introduction of the new 
Companies Act” (Bush 2010, p.15). 
However, other FRC members believed that in the UK it was “very clear that the objectives of 
accounting are not to produce profits for tax purposes, and that’s important” (Interviewee 
1).This led to the end of the decision-making process on the adoption of IFRS for SMEs 
because the perceived advantages “outweighed any concerns that one might have, or residual 
concerns one might have around the quality of IFRS for SMEs” (Interviewee 6). This in turn 
illustrate that IFRS for SMEs had flaws that influenced the FRC’s decision to adopt it with no 
adjustments. However, UK NASB members held contradictory views with regard to the fact 
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of the adoption. Two interviewees accepted the IASB’s classification that the UK adopted IFRS 
for SMEs with major modifications, while the rest strongly denied adoption of the standard.  
The next section further discusses the UK NASB’s perceptions of the decision outcome. 
5.5 UK NASB members’ perceptions of the adoption of IFRS for SMEs 
The remainder of this chapter draws on the theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 4 
(Table 4.1), which includes the coercive dimensions of power, mimetic-pragmatic moral and 
cognitive legitimacy, and normative-pragmatic moral and cognitive legitimacy, as well as 
culture, history and authority, to examine how various entities and factors influenced UK 
NASB’s decision-making processes. It focuses specifically on the influence of the coercive 
first and second dimensions of power, culture, history and authority, and pragmatic and 
cognitive legitimacy over NASBs, because analysis of the interviews and publicly available 
documents illustrate their importance and relevance, and provide enriched explanations of the 
data gathered for this study. 
Although the IASB’s website includes the UK as an adopter of IFRS for SMEs with major 
modifications (IFRS Foundation 2016f, 2016h), UK NASB members provided contradictory 
responses to the question of whether UK had adopted the standard. With the exception of two 
interviewees who stated that the UK had adopted IFRS for SMEs with major modifications, 
UK NASB members strongly denied this. According to Interviewee 4, “just to be clear, we 
don’t apply the IFRS for SMEs in the UK”, while Interviewee 5 stated that “there are a lot of 
differences. IFRS for SMEs was not adopted. 102 was adopted.” Interestingly, when 
interviewees were asked whether the IASB’s website classification of the UK as an adopter of 
IFRS for SMEs was accurate, they all agreed that the adoption fact was fairly presented: 
Yeah, I think that is a fair description. I think we adopted it but we don’t call it the 
IFRS for SMEs. We call it FRS 102 because, whilst many of the sections are the same 
or substantially the same, the differences that have been made are important 
(Interviewee 4). 
It is interesting that the word “adoption” triggered negative responses from UK NASB 
members, because their initial plan was to adopt the standard as issued by the IASB. Various 
factors may explain their negativity or reluctance to admit high similarities between FRS 102 
and IFRS for SMEs, regardless of the fact that the vast majority of FRS 102 is based on IFRS 
for SMEs. For instance, all EU NASBs must comply with EC directives (EC 2016b). Since the 
EC has not so far mandated adoption of IFRS for SMEs, members of the UK NASB and other 
boards cannot claim compliance with it. 
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Another reason is that when the IASB issued the standard, it was aiming to help jurisdictions 
that did not have accounting standards or NASBs. In other words, the standard was designed 
to be used by developing rather than developed countries (Kaya and Koch 2015; Saucke 2015). 
The UK already had a well-established UK GAAP with various accounting options similar to 
IFRS, and adopting IFRS for SMEs seemed to be moving backward rather than forward owing 
to its unsophisticated accounting options unsuited to advanced economies such as the UK (ASB 
2012a, 2012b; Interviewees 1, 4 and 5). In the case of developing countries and jurisdictions 
without NASBs, IFRS for SMEs would be a much easier solution than starting to develop 
accounting standards from scratch (Interviewee 5). Since NASBs seek to improve their 
legitimacy and illustrate that their processes are fair (Young 2003), UK NASB members were 
reluctant to admit that they had adopted the standard, because the IASB claimed that IFRS for 
SMEs was meant for developing jurisdictions and those without NASBs (Kaya and Koch 2015; 
Saucke 2015), which meant that adopting the standard might be viewed as downgrading the 
UK from a developed to a developing country. This was evident when a speaker at an ICAEW 
symposium entitled “Is the IFRS for SMEs good for SMEs?” used the UK as an example of a 
developing country that had adopted IFRS for SMEs (ICAEW, 2017). Saucke (2015, pp.280-
281) further suggests that “the role of the UK Accounting Standards Board has changed 
fundamentally from one of developing and improving UK GAAP to one of implementing IFRS 
into UK GAAP”. This in turn may explain interviewees’ negative responses because adoption 
of IFRS for SMEs would reduce the UK NASB’s power and legitimacy as the UK standard 
setter. Since UK NASB is not isolated, its decision-making process is influenced by various 
actors as discussed in more detail in the next section. 
5.6 Coercive dimensions of power, the influence of various entities over the UK 
NASB’s decision-making process 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) define coercive isomorphism as formal and informal pressures 
exercised by one organisation over another, through “force, persuasion or as invitation to join 
in collusion” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p.150). Miller (1994) suggests that NASBs are 
explicitly affected by the social influence of powerful institutions, indicating the importance of 
defining power. Allison (2018) suggests that power has various forms, including “force, 
persuasion, authority, coercion, and manipulation”. Since different entities have varying levels 
of power and based on these studies, the proposed theoretical framework of this study defines 
the coercive first dimension of power as the capacity of an individual, entity or group of entities 
to influence, change, or have the potential to modify, NASBs’ decision-making processes 
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(Lukes 1974; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Allison 2018; Kwok and Sharp 2005). The 
framework defines the coercive second dimension of power as implicit or explicit influence of 
an individual, entity or group of entities to limit NASBs’ agenda entry or discussion of a 
particular issue which, if discussed and resolved, might challenge or damage their preferences 
(political, technical, cultural or personal) in cases of decision and non-decision-making (Lukes 
1974; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Allison 2018; Kwok and Sharp 2005). The next sub-sections 
draw on this framework to deepen understanding of who, and how various actors including 
national stakeholders were able to change the UK NASB’s decision-making process. 
5.6.1 Coercive first dimension of power, the influence of stakeholders on UK NASB’s 
decision-making process 
Previous studies (e.g. Georgiou 2002; Jorissen et al. 2012) have found that stakeholders are 
more likely to participate in NASBs’ decision-making if proposed changes or new regulations 
would impact negatively on their accounting treatments, or impose extra costs or unjustifiable 
accounting burdens. Georgiou (2002) further argues that stakeholders are less likely to 
participate in NASBs’ decision-making process if they perceive that those NASBs will not 
meet their demands for change. 
In the case of the UK NASB, it would seem that national stakeholders’ often participate when 
the UK NASB requests feedback from the public. For instance, the UK NASB received 154 
comment letters in 2009 and 293 in 2012 when public feedback was requested with regard to 
its proposed amendments to UK GAAP. According to Interviewee 1, each comment letter that 
the UK NASB receives: 
has to be analysed, discussed … you might go back out to consultation if you have 
made a change which hasn’t been consulted on, which means comments are carefully 
read, considered and analysed. In other words, stakeholders’ responses cause board 
members to think in more detail how the proposed changes would affect them. 
However, if stakeholders would try to change already established concepts, board 
members would not consider their arguments. There are some people who have basic 
conceptual disagreements, and once you have established what the concepts are, you 
don’t then accept recommendations that say you should change your concept 
completely. 
In 2009 the ASB published an ED that proposed adoption of IFRS for SMEs with no 
modification (ASB 2009), and national stakeholders sent in comment letters. The participants 
included listed entities, professional accounting bodies (e.g. ICAEW and ACCA), not-for-
profit organisations, housing associations, co-operatives, credit unions, local banks and other 
entities. The proposed adoption of IFRS for SMEs as issued by the IASB “received major 
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pushback” (Interviewee 5) because it would cause fundamental changes as a result of the 
limited options available, and because the basis for distinguishing between entities was to be 
public accountability rather than size (Interviewees 4, 5 and 11). This would have caused many 
entities to have to apply EU-adopted IFRS, rather than UK GAAP (ASB 2012b). However, the 
proposed distinction was supported by a few large public companies because it would allow 
them to avoid the application of IFRS. 
Despite the major concerns expressed by stakeholders, the changes proposed in the ASB’s 2010 
ED were minimal because it believed that the IFRS for SMEs standard should be adopted as 
issued by the IASB (ASB 2010a). This illustrates that, although stakeholders’ responses were 
carefully considered and analysed, other factors influenced the decision not to introduce major 
changes in 2010. Even though the ASB issued another ED in 2012, which introduced major 
changes to the proposed standard, this can be explained by the influence of board members 
rather than stakeholders because if the ASB had intended to make these changes to satisfy its 
stakeholders in the first place, it would have done so in 2010, rather than waiting for two years 
before it ceased to exist. This is discussed further in the next sub-section. 
5.6.2 Coercive second dimension of power, the influence of board members on UK 
NASB’s decision-making process 
Previous studies have illustrated that different board members possess various levels of power 
that allow them to influence and alter boards’ agenda entry, decision-making processes and 
final outcomes (e.g. Ram 2012; Ram and Newberry 2017). In the case of the ASB, it is 
important to note that Ian Mackintosh, former chair of the ASB, left office on 1 November 
2010, and Roger Marshall has since been chair of the ASB and of the FRC (FRC 2010). The 
new chair had been a senior partner at PwC, where he had been responsible for auditing FTSE 
100 companies (Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index). He was a former member of the 
ASB between 2001 and 2007, indicating that his background was mainly in large and listed 
companies, whereas the previous chair was originally from New Zealand, had chaired the 
Australian Accounting Standards Board, had been financial manager at the World Bank in 
South Asia, and had participated in accounting standard setting for more than 30 years, with 
extensive public sector experience (Integrated Reporting no date; ISAR 2015; FRC 2010). 
Therefore, the background and former experience of the previous chair was very different. Ian 
Mackintosh had participated in standard setting in more than one jurisdiction, and had been 
involved with the World Bank, which was a strong supporter of the IASB’s accounting 
standards (e.g. Mir and Rahaman 2005; Ashraf and Ghani 2005; Annisette 2004; Albu et al. 
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2011), whereas Roger Marshall had focused mainly on large and listed companies in his role 
at PwC. This meant that the transition from Ian Mackintosh to Roger Marshall would cause 
major changes to the board’s decisions owing to the significant differences in their background 
and experience: 
It was the transition from Ian Mackintosh to Roger … iMac was very much in favour, 
and you have to bear in mind his New Zealand/Australian background, and he worked 
for the World Bank for a long time. Very much international and, coming from the 
World Bank, very much oriented towards SMEs which need World Bank help, 
countries that need World Bank help, and therefore wanting to have a system of 
accounting which helps accountability. Then Roger comes, much more as an ex-PwC 
partner and being on boards of big insurance groups, from the other end (Interviewee 
12). 
The last changes published by the ASB during the final month of the Mackintosh era in October 
2010, a month before Marshall was appointed chair, highlighted its desire to adopt IFRS for 
SMEs with as little modification as possible (ASB 2010a). At that time, it only introduced a 
few changes to the proposed adoption plan for IFRS for SMES as issued by the IASB (listed 
in Table 5.1), disregarding both the comment letters it had received and Timothy Bush’s (2010) 
letter which had highlighted the legal flaws in the ASB’s adoption plan. As Interviewee 4 
commented: 
There was support for basing it on the IFRS for SMEs, and then what came out in the 
consultation were these issues that actually, yeah, the IFRS for SMEs is a very good 
start for private companies but to identify these areas – indeed I was one of those who 
sort of raised concerns and looked for ways of improving it, and that’s what the FRC 
has done (Interviewee 4). 
After Marshall became chair of the ASB and FRC, major changes were introduced to the 
adoption plan, including eliminating the distinction based on public accountability, and 
reintroducing prohibited accounting treatments such as carrying forward certain development 
costs, capitalisation of borrowing costs and revaluation of intangible and tangible assets (ASB 
2012b): 
Because the decision was taken before my time to use IFRS for SMEs as the basis for 
102. But it was also probably decided during my time that we would make quite a lot 
of changes to IFRS for SMEs, whilst the original intention has been to try and use it 
almost unaltered, so it was during my time that we decided, as I say, to make quite a 
lot of changes (Interviewee 5). 
Interviewee 12 further explained the influence of the chair’s perceptions of IFRS for SMEs on 
the board’s decision-making process: 
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It comes back to when Paul Pacter wrote the IFRS for SMEs: he tried to make it as 
simple as possible, and therefore have not that many choices in there to make it a rule 
book. Then, as the UK always wanted to revalue, then Roger almost argued that UK 
accountants were too developed to be brought down to this simple cookbook level, and 
therefore all the nicer, better options that are in IFRS shouldn’t be cut out of the IFRS 
for SMEs, because it couldn’t be argued that accountants in the UK were not able to 
apply these more sophisticated options ... Therefore, in the process of developing the 
accounting for smaller entities in the UK, I sense that these arguments that all 
accountants are sophisticated and therefore don’t have to be protected from options 
or whatever, brought back in changes which makes the UK-derivative of the IFRS for 
SMEs more like UK GAAP on the one hand, and more like IFRS than the real IASB 
IFRS for SMEs. 
Therefore, the needs of stakeholders appear to have been met not simply through participation 
in the decision-making process, but through support from powerful board members. The 
presence and influence of powerful entities – in this case the former and current chairs – on the 
adoption decision but such domination was not documented in publicly available documents. 
However, stakeholders’ lack of participation would have reduced the potential to influence the 
board’s decision because any drawbacks not picked up on or considered by members of the 
NASB would not have been flagged or considered in the decision-making process. Thus, their 
participation was crucial in bringing these issues to the board’s attention. 
Although, to some extent, stakeholders and powerful board members influenced the UK 
NASB, they were not the only actors involved in the process. For instance, the UK government 
also participated in the decision-making process, as discussed in the next sub-section. 
5.6.3 Coercive first dimension of power, the influence of the UK government on UK 
NASB’s decision-making process 
Although the UK NASB’s responsibilities and authority are established by the UK government 
and documented by the Companies Acts, including those of 2004 and 2006 (FRC no date), the 
government does not interfere in the decision-making process because it has surrendered its 
legislative power over UK accounting standard setting to the NASB: 
FRC decides what UK accounting rules should apply under delegated authority from 
ultimately the Treasury, so the government as such is not consulted. The government 
doesn’t have an immediate right of veto and nor does the government have to actively 
approve any particular accounting standard (Interviewee 6). 
Nonetheless, its association, involvement and influence on the UK NASB’s decision-making 
process is not entirely clear. For instance, in 2004, when the ASB consulted on its plan to 
converge UK GAAP with IFRS, the DTI issued a regulatory impact assessment that proposed 
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changes to the UK accounting regulations (DTI 2004; ASB 2004). If the government were 
completely segregated from the NASB’s decision-making process, why would it suggest 
changes to the regulations, request feedback from national stakeholders and allocate further 
resources to analyse the situation if the sole decision maker were the UK NASB? 
The Department for Trade and Industry did a consultation on IFRS and convergence 
with IFRS back in 2004, so the UK government was broadly on board with the 
direction of travel to take a global internationalist approach. We would liaise and 
discuss with the government all the way through (Interviewee 11). 
Interviewee 4 explained that the UK government’s role and its relationship with its NASB is 
informal and indirect because: 
The government doesn’t really have a direct role in the decision making, in so much 
as the application of accounting standards is effectively – and I say effectively because 
it’s not a very formal process – effectively delegated to the FRC. We’re identified in 
law as an accounting standard setter … but there is an indirect role there in so much 
as if the original IFRS for SMEs conflicts with UK law. 
When the ASB first introduced its plan to adopt IFRS for SMEs as issued by the IASB, it did 
not consider the consequences of EC directives and UK company law (ASB 2009, 2010b). The 
UK NASB cannot issue any regulation that may conflict with UK company law because such 
compliance is embedded in its role as an NASB (FRC no date; Interviewees 1 and 4). In order 
for the UK government to ensure that the UK NASB is creating regulations in accordance with 
company law, observers from BIS and the Treasury have the right to attend board meetings, 
and occasionally do so (Interviewees 1 and 4). According to Interviewee 1: 
We used to on occasions have an observer at board meetings from what was then BIS… 
It’s a liaison process to make sure that everyone is thinking in the same direction. The 
UK government has always taken the view that it’s the standard setting bodies that 
know more about accounting than they do … The main reason they were there was, at 
the same time as we were producing IFRS for SMEs, they were amending the 
Companies Act, so they obviously needed to be liaising to make sure that we didn’t do 
something in the standards that was against company law … Because obviously we 
draft the accounting standards in accordance with company law, in the framework of 
company law, and therefore we couldn’t produce standards that actually said we are 
just going to ignore what company law said. That would be a slightly suicidal thing to 
do, I think (Interviewee 1). 
Interestingly, board members provided mixed accounts of the extent of national government 
involvement and influence in the decision-making process. Interviewees 5 and 6 denied direct 
national government participation; nor did they consider that it was indirectly involved, unlike 
the other participants. One explanation is that if the government were seen to be actively 
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involved in the UK NASB’s decision-making process, this might influence the latter’s 
independence and authority in issuing accounting regulations, which in turn might conflict with 
company law. However, the government’s indirect involvement with the UK NASB meant that 
it was also able to influence the issuance of company law because it was able to discuss and 
demonstrate why certain changes were needed: 
We tried very hard to get amendments made, and we did get some amendments made. 
There were one or two areas where we had to accept that the law told us to do 
something we didn’t particularly think was right, and there we had to write the 
standards to deal with that … The main issue to remember is that the way the UK 
approaches tax is to create taxable profits which are not necessarily the same as 
accounting profits. To reach your taxable profits you make amendments to your 
accounting profits. There are some areas where they rely on the accounting and one 
of the particular areas in which they rely on accounting is in the area of foreign 
exchange. If you are looking at the way in which you tax profits which are generated 
in a foreign currency, there is a presumption that you take into account the way in 
which its been accounted for. That can give you unrealised gains or losses. For 
example, if you are looking at long term liability. Particularly when you get into the 
area of derivatives, hedging, there was some real concern from the Treasury that they 
didn’t lose their ability to tax in the way they have been doing, so we didn’t change 
anything to reflect what the taxable authorities wanted (Interviewee 1). 
Interviewee 11 further explained and provided an example of the government’s relationship 
with its NASB: 
Many companies reported extraordinary items every year, and there seemed to be 
some abuse of that, and in its early years the ASB produced a standard called FRS 3 - 
Reporting Financial Performance – that didn’t totally ban extraordinary items but 
made it really hard for a company to be able to do it. You could say, was that 
incompatible with the law? I think the UK government agreed that it was being not 
applied properly … some companies I should say - as a means of reporting things that 
shouldn’t have been reported as extraordinary, so in that sense it was… It was a 
flexible relationship, if I can put it that way. 
Therefore, in the case of the UK, although the government was indirectly involved in the 
decision-making process to ensure that the NASB did not create standards that conflicted with 
company law, it was also influenced by the NASB, indicating a flexible relationship between 
the two. Since the UK NASB is bound by the EC’s directives, the latter is another actor that 
influenced the former’s decision-making process. This is discussed further in the next sub-
section. 
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5.6.4 Coercive first dimension of power, the influence of the EC’s directives on UK 
NASB’s decision-making process 
In theory, each jurisdiction has absolute power over its regulations and laws, but the reality is 
otherwise in the EU. The EC directives are compulsory, and each jurisdiction must comply 
with every directive and cannot issue any laws or regulations that contradict them (EC 2016b). 
Therefore, no EU jurisdiction has absolute power over its national regulations. As a result, the 
UK NASB is bound to comply with and issue accounting regulations in accordance with 
company law and EC directives. According to the ASB (2010a), changes to the proposed IFRS 
for SMEs were necessary to ensure compliance with EC directives, including changes to 
extraordinary items, treatment of associates and joint ventures, and negative goodwill. In a 
letter to the EC, the ASB indicated that it was closely monitoring EFRAG’s comparability 
study and would modify its adoption plan if necessary (ASB 2010b; EFRAG 2010b). 
Interestingly, all UK NASB members interviewed, without exception, stated that EC directives 
had mandated changes to the proposed adoption plan for IFRS for SMEs (Interviewees 1, 4, 5, 
6, and 11): 
The original IFRS for SMEs conflicts with UK law. We’ve had to amend for that 
reason. Bear in mind UK company law in this area is derived directly from the EU 
accounting directives, so effectively it’s EU law on company reporting. And so if there 
is a clash, then there is an issue (Interviewee 4). 
Interviewee 5 further explained why it was infeasible to adopt IFRS for SMEs as issued by the 
IASB: 
There’s a Fourth Directive we have to comply with; and there were a number of 
differences between IFRS for SMEs and the Fourth Directive which we had, where we 
had to modify IFRS for SMEs … there were a number of issues. For example, I think 
amortising goodwill is one example (Interviewee 5). 
The changes required by the EC (2010) that were flagged by the EFRAG (2010b) study were 
deemed minimal, enabling the ASB to comply with them in order to adopt the standard based 
on firm legal grounds. However, the EC then updated the Fourth Directive (Directive 
2013/34/EU), which mandated more changes to SMEs’ financial reporting (EC 2013). These 
included reducing financial reporting disclosure requirements and making more entities 
eligible to comply with FRS 102 rather than EU-adopted IFRS. Even though the imposed 
changes contradicted the FRC’s financial reporting vision, it had to comply with and implement 
the required changes (FRC 2014a): 
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“The most significant change arising from the new Accounting directive relates to the 
small companies regime, where accounting standards may not specify disclosure 
requirements in addition to the limited number of disclosures set out in the new 
Accounting directive … The Financial Reporting Standard applicable in the UK and 
Republic of Ireland, it would not have proposed such a reduction in mandatory 
disclosures if it were not required to” (FRC 2014a, p.3). 
Interviewee 5 further explained the influence of the EC directive on UK accounting regulations, 
and provided an example of where the new directives conflicted with FRC’s perceptions of 
micro-entities’ financial reporting requirements: 
It’s fair to say that the UK didn’t agree with the micro-entity regime brought in 
because it effectively banned any requirement for disclosures other than a very 
restrictive number. There’s about six disclosure requirements and that’s all that you’re 
allowed to require … For example, you couldn’t require a disclosure of derivatives, 
so there was nothing we could do about it because it was a maximum harmonisation 
regulation … but we would have required more disclosures, even for micro-entities, 
for certain issues like derivatives (Interviewee 5). 
In this case, the EC was very powerful and had vast capacity to mandate changes to UK 
accounting standards and regulations applicable to SMEs and micro-entities, even if the UK 
NASB disagreed or believed were unsuitable for its stakeholders. When participants 
hypothetically were asked what the UK decision or outcome would have been if the EC had 
mandated adoption of the standard with no modification, interestingly, no one suggested that 
the change would have been opposed or denied. Some dodged the question by arguing that this 
scenario would never have happened owing to political factors imposed on the EC: 
The Commission would have had to have brought in a new directive. The Commission 
can’t just mandate it; it would have had to be a new directive. And the question is, 
would they have ever got support from government because, as I say, it would have 
created a huge cost in a number of countries? … They would have had to approve it, 
yes. Well, it would have been that the European Council would have had to approve 
it, and the European Parliament. There’s a big political process, as you know, and 
yeah, either a directive or a regulation (Interviewee 5). 
Others admitted that the UK would have had to comply and adopt it, regardless of the perceived 
assumption of IFRS for SMEs: 
If there had been external pressure on countries to change, so if Brussels had said 
everyone has to apply IFRS for SMEs … There would have been political pressure on 
every country in Europe to change their standards (Interviewee 1). 
However, despite the influential actors previously discussed, a few UK NASB participants 
believed that the UK NASB is solely responsible for issuing UK accounting standards and 
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regulations because such influence may hinder its authority and independence over national 
accounting standard setting. This issue is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
5.7 Influence of UK NASB’s authority on the adoption decision of IFRS for 
SMEs, and vice versa 
Previous studies have argued that NASBs’ authoritative power influence their decision-making 
processes in issuing or accepting accounting standards (e.g. Hail et al. 2010; Zeff 2010; Cox 
2014; Krishnan 2016; Van Mourik and Walton 2018). Based on these studies, the proposed 
theoretical framework of this study defines NASBs’ authority as their perceived legislative 
power and capacity to modify and issue accounting regulations, and examines how loss of 
authority influenced and were influenced by IFRS for SMEs adoption. 
According to the FRC (no date, p.1), it is solely responsible for issuing UK accounting 
standards and is “the independent UK regulator”. However, in the EU, NASBs’ legislative 
powers vary significantly. For example, the FRC has much greater legislative power than the 
German NASB, the ASCG, because the latter is not responsible for issuing accounting 
regulations, which is the responsibility of an advisory body to the German Federal Ministry of 
Justice (Federal Ministry of Justice 2011). In other words, the UK government’s approval of 
the FRC provided it with authoritative power to adopt IFRS for SMEs. 
When the EC mandated the adoption of IFRS, NASBs lost their authority over issuing 
accounting standards for group financial statements of listed companies to the IASB. Thus, 
NASBs currently only have legislative power in the arena of their SMEs (Napier 2010). If IFRS 
for SMEs were adopted, it would eliminate their remaining legislative power: 
If you have a jurisdiction that has not had a standard setter, it’s easy to say, “Well, 
buy it off the shelf in London.” If you had a standard setter, that standard setter has to 
redefine its own role if the product outcome is not its own product but the product 
outcome of the IASB. Then your own reason for your existence is reduced, but the word 
“reduced” is already loaded, to make sure that you play part of the due process. The 
final product is a product of compromise, where in the IASB, the UK voice is only one 
amongst others. It’s like everything in politics (Interviewee 12). 
Previous studies have shown that governments and NASBs are reluctant to surrender their 
legislative power to another entity such as the IASB (Hail et al. 2010; Zeff 2010; Cox 2014; 
Krishnan 2016). However, if they want to adopt the IASB accounting standards, in order to 
protect their authority, they may establish mechanisms to shield and protect their own interests. 
The FRC is no different from any other NASB or governmental entity in its desire to protect 
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its authority and legislative power. When the FRC took over the ASB, it was an independent 
standard setter; however, its plan to adopt IFRS for SMEs was seen as one reason for its loss 
of authority. According to Interviewee 11: 
[sighs] Yes, but there are other factors at play as I mentioned earlier … They were 
independent, and I think in moving the standards setter from the Accounting Standards 
Board to the Financial Reporting Council… personal view, I think that has impacted 
on independence. Yes, I do think that the adoption of the IFRS for SMEs as modified 
had an impact. It wasn’t the only one. 
The FRC’s modifications or carve-outs and frequent amendments were another approach to 
protecting its authority, similar to the EC’s behaviour with regard to IFRS. When the EC 
adopted IFRS, it made amendments that included changes to IAS 39 and IFRS 9 (ICAEW 
2014). The FRC carved out a classification based on public accountability, and reintroduced 
options prohibited by the IASB (ASB 2012b): 
There was a view at the FRC that basically its standard-setting functions could 
disappear. That statement would no longer be relevant because basically the UK 
would be tied to IFRS and basically rule entities. I think the way that has played out 
has been quite the opposite. I think, given the frequency of amendments, I think it 
reinvigorated the role of the FRC as the, you know, UK accounting standard setter, 
because they’ve had to really make all these changes. So I think the intention was, yes, 
that it would sort of disappear, but the reality has been really the opposite … Even 
though there was this almost ideological decision to move towards the IASB and IFRS, 
I think the market UK constituent has basically said “no”, and so de facto the Board 
has been given another life to continue to set UK standards, because given the number 
of amendments, it’s pretty clear that there is a role for UK standard setters 
(Interviewee 15). 
Therefore, although adoption of the standard was perceived as ending the FRC’s authority or 
reducing it simply to mediating between national stakeholders and the IASB, the process 
actually resurrected it and provided more legitimacy for its decision-making and role as the 
UK standard setter. 
The next section discusses the UK’s culture and history which also influenced the adoption of 
IFRS for SMEs. 
5.8 Influence of UK history and culture on the IASB and adoption of IFRS for 
SMEs 
Previous studies have illustrated that historical and cultural accounting traditions influence 
NASBs’ decision-making processes (e.g. Mir and Rahaman 2005; Ramanna 2013; Degos et al. 
2018). Based on the previous literature, the proposed theoretical framework of this study 
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defines accounting history and culture as governments’ and NASBs’ acceptance of accounting 
standards if it shares similar characteristics with national accounting standards as developed 
over time; or have a high level of proximity with external stakeholders’ beliefs and preferences 
(e.g. Mir and Rahaman 2005; Albu et al. 2011; Ramanna 2013; Hoffmann and Zülch 2014). 
In 1969, the ASSC was established by the ICAEW as a result of a series of scandals (Chiapello 
and Medjad 2009; Napier 2010; Rutherford 2007). The ASSC’s purpose was to issue 
authoritative statements in order to reduce “the areas of difference and variety in accounting 
practice” (Napier 2010). In 1975, the ASSC was renamed the ASC (Napier 2010), and shortly 
afterwards the six UK professional bodies joined it and operated collectively to issue 
accounting standards (Rutherford 2007; ICAEW 2018b). In 1990, the ASC was redefined and 
the ASB was created and modelled on the US FASB in order to achieve similar results, 
including the board’s independence from the accounting profession (Chiapello and Medjad 
2009). Sir David Tweedie was ASB chair, and then became chair of the IASB when that was 
established (IASC 2000; Napier 2010). According to Napier (2010), during Tweedie’s time as 
ASB chair, he highlighted many flaws in its financial reporting approach and suggested how 
they might be resolved. 
Many of the ASB’s early FRSs were influenced by Tweedie’s ideas, including the prominence 
of accounting for substance over form. Psaros and Trotman (2004) define substance over form 
as accounting standards written in general wording, principles-based, providing guidance 
rather than very direct requirements or standards that are rule-based. Allan Cook, the ASB’s 
first technical director, was also secretary of the IASC (Napier 2010). Therefore, the UK NASB 
and the IASB had common staff members and chairs: 
The IASB is based in London. There are a lot of people who work for the IASB who 
have worked for the FRC and vice versa. There is a good relationship between the two, 
so there is open communication and they understood what we were doing all the way 
through (Interviewee 1). 
These similarities and proximity are not simply a result of location, but rather of shared ideas 
and culture. The IASB’s headquarters is located in London, and it is influenced by its external 
environment (e.g. Ram 2012; Ram and Newberry 2013, 2017; Warren 2017). This explains 
Collis et al.’s (2017) argument that IFRS for SMEs is similar to the former UK GAAP. 
A fundamental accounting requirement in the UK, introduced in the 1948 Companies Act, 
determined that financial reporting should provide a “true and fair view” of companies’ 
performance and financial position (HMSO 1965; Parker 1989; Nobes 1993; Nobes and Parker 
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2012; FRC 2014b). Since then, the phrase “true and fair view” has been present in many of the 
UK’s national accounting standards, including the FRC’s current six collective financial 
reporting standards (Parker 1989; Nobes 1993; Nobes and Parker 2012; FRC 2014b, 2018), so 
it has a longstanding history in the UK’s accounting culture: 
When Great Britain joined the EU in ’73, they were demanding a change to the 
accounting requirements that were under discussion at that time … The UK delegation 
said, “We want the provision in there that says that financial statements ought to give 
a true and fair view of the companies’ situation” (Interviewee 7). 
According to the FRC (2014b, p.3), adoption of IFRS in the UK did not hinder the fundamental 
concept of the “true and fair view” because “fair presentation under IFRS is equivalent to a 
true and fair view”. The FRC regards the true and fair view as something that cannot be added 
to accounting standards; rather it is the whole essence of the standards that reflect economic 
reality. Since IFRS and UK accounting standards are in essence similar, this also illustrates the 
IASB’s proximity to the UK’s historical and cultural accounting regulations. 7 
Many interviewees said that one of the main historical and cultural distinctions of UK 
accounting is the use of current value, which was restricted under IFRS for SMEs since, for 
instance, the standard prohibited revaluation of long-term assets. The FRC had to reintroduce 
these options in order to preserve the long history and culture of the UK accounting tradition: 
So back in 2012, the FRC took the IFRS for SMEs and then considered the previous 
history of the UK’s accounting and thought. Well… IFRS for SMEs was not quite fit 
for purpose in the UK, that previous UK GAAP accounting options, such as the 
revaluation of fixed assets, such as the capitalisation of interest, that these should be 
retained. But I think mainly there was support for the notion that an IFRS-based 
solution that was proportionate to the needs of non-listed companies and the dialogue 
they’re having with their users of accounts was the right way forward. But to ensure 
that where the standard could be improved or expanded on to reflect kind of UK-
specific historic experience of accounting and expectations, then it was the way 
forward (Interviewee 4). 
This indicates that IFRS for SMEs is not entirely proximate to the UK accounting tradition. 
Interviewee 1 further explained how the standard omitted accounting options traditionally 
accepted in the UK: 
                                                 
7Although the FRC claims that adoption of IFRS did not hinder the fundamental concept of the “true and fair 
view” because “fair presentation under IFRS is equivalent to a true and fair view”, this study cannot confirm such 
compliance. In order to do so, it would be necessary to evaluate the true and fair view before and after the 
introduction of IFRS, which is beyond the scope of this study and might be investigated in future research. 
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It is a cultural factor. I think it’s, for example, the concept of revaluation. It has always 
been a tendency in the UK to move towards fair values where they can, in a way which 
is much more extreme than in other parts of Europe for example. So we were the first 
ones to fair value investment properties; we were very keen on making sure we had 
fair values for financial instruments and also allowing companies to re-value 
properties and other fixed assets if they wanted to do so. 
Another reason for the FRC’s modification of IFRS for SMEs was its perceived legitimacy. 
An NASB’s legitimacy, like any other entity, depends on evaluations and perceptions of its 
society. Larson and Herz (2013) highlight that any entity that seeks to survive, succeed and 
obtain legitimacy must be approved and justified by its society. For instance, the IASC/IASB 
accounting standards are not mandatory, but the more jurisdictions adopt its standards, the more 
legitimacy it acquires. According to Interviewee 1: 
The IASB is in a difficult position, because it has no power; it relies on other people 
adopting what it does … I mean, the IASB would have liked us just to have adopted 
IFRS for SMEs. It would have given them a huge amount of credibility … But I think, 
obviously, they would have preferred us to have taken IFRS for SMEs and just picked 
it up and run with it. 
In order for an NASB to acquire legitimacy, the procedure that it uses to create accounting 
standards has to be well-developed and transparent, and must incorporate its stakeholders and 
their perceptions into the decision-making process and final outcome (Durocher and Fortin 
2010; Bamber and McMeeking 2016). An NASB’s legitimacy provides its standards with a 
fundamental grounding so that its stakeholders will regard the standards as appropriate and 
worth complying with (Burlaud and Colasse 2011; Camfferman and Zeff 2018). 
The FRC and its predecessor have often consulted on new regulations and amendments to 
current standards. This indicates that it often incorporates stakeholders into the decision-
making process to satisfy their demands, which increases its pragmatic legitimacy. In the case 
of IFRS for SMEs, the UK NASB consulted on each of the proposed changes since the ASB 
decided to converge with IFRS. As related by many interviewees, some changes, such as the 
use of current value including revaluation of assets, were reintroduced by the FRC in response 
to calls by stakeholders and to maintain the UK’s historical and cultural accounting traditions 
(Interviewees 1, 4, 5 and 11): 
Well, it’s partly history. You know, where the accounting has come from. It’s partly 
who sets the standards, so in Germany it’s the Ministry of Justice which sets domestic 
accounting standards, and the German Accounting Standards Board is only 
responsible for consolidation accounting, for example. And then the question is, is the 
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local accounting standard used directly for preparing tax computations? In the UK 
there’s a history of there being differences (Interviewee 5). 
Interviewee 1 further explained the extent of the influence of the UK’s accounting history and 
culture on national accounting regulations: 
If you do it by law, you lose flexibility. You can’t change the law every time you want 
to change a standard; it just becomes ridiculous … This is British arrogance I am 
afraid, the whole notion of true value developed in the UK. And it’s something which 
UK accountants feel very strongly about. And I think if you look at some of the options 
that were taken in deciding how to approach IFRS – sorry how to approach IFRS for 
SMEs – so FRS 102, when there was a choice that had to be made, the choice was 
driven by the way in which British accountants have always done things (Interviewee 
1). 
Some of the FRC’s changes to IFRS for SMEs were made to preserve historical and cultural 
features of the UK’s accounting system and to satisfy the needs of its stakeholders. The latter 
increased the FRC’s pragmatic legitimacy as a standard setter, which had always been at the 
forefront of accounting standard setting, leading to increased cognitive legitimacy as a result 
of its long history of setting appropriate accounting standards: 
We were always at the forefront of standard setting. Even amongst private companies, 
there’s always been fairly sophisticated accounting (Interviewee 4). 
Another historical and cultural factor that influenced the UK NASB’s adoption of IFRS for 
SMEs was the UK’s orientation toward the Anglo-Saxon model, unlike other EU jurisdictions 
which are oriented toward the Continental European model (Nobes 1998; Burlaud and Colasse 
2011; Hellmann et al. 2013). Degos et al. (2018) define the Anglo-Saxon model as a system of 
accounting standards that provide investors with credible and useful information, including 
information with regard to financial returns, which are not linked to the tax system. The UK’s 
alignment with the Anglo-Saxon model makes it proximate to the US, which also uses an 
Anglo-Saxon model (Nobes 1998; Burlaud and Colasse 2011; Hellmann et al. 2013). One of 
the main criticisms of the IASC/IASB’s accounting standards is that they are more tailored or 
proximate to Anglo-Saxon countries than to the rest of the world (Nobes 1998; Mir and 
Rahaman 2005; Hail et al. 2010). According to Burlaud and Colasse (2011), the vast majority 
of IASB members have been educated, trained and gained experience in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, which indicates high proximity to the culture and history of the UK and US. For 
example, Paul Pacter, who wrote the IFRS for SMEs, was born, educated, trained and gained 
experience in the US (Christodolou 2010). In other words, Pacter’s Anglo-Saxon knowledge 
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and culture made it easier for the UK to adopt IFRS for SMEs owing to shared cultural and 
historical preferences: 
If the UK is a kind of Anglo-Saxon communication to investors, Germany was probably 
more traditional creditor protection (Interviewee 11). 
Everybody was understanding that not all the member states were in favour of 
introducing IFRS for SMEs in Europe, and the main division was between somehow 
the Anglo-Saxon world – the UK, or I think the UK endorsed IFRS for SMEs in their 
legislation quite soon… But the majority of member states, Italy for sure, France for 
sure, Germany also, they were not so happy to use for SMEs, the SMEs discounting set 
proposed by IASB (Interviewee 12). 
Thus, the UK’s history and culture influenced board members’ preferences and national 
stakeholders’ demands for changes, which led to major modifications to the adopted IFRS for 
SMEs. The geographical, cultural and historical proximity of the IASB with the UK meant that 
IFRS for SMEs was to some extent tailored to the needs of national stakeholders, which made 
adoption of the standard easier and more possible in the UK. 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the UK NASB’s decision-making process with regard to the 
adoption of IFRS for SMEs. It has highlighted the perceived advantages and disadvantages of 
the standard, as well as visible environmental factors (foreground) such as the EC, UK NASB 
chair, national governments and stakeholders, and unseen environmental factors (background) 
including authority, history and culture that influenced the adoption decision. The evidence 
presented in this chapter has shown that the ASB’s adoption plan and the FRC’s execution of 
it differed as a result of many interrelated factors. Therefore, adoption of IFRS for SMEs and 
the major changes introduced were not related to a single factor nor based on simple cost–
benefit analyses, but rather on multiple interrelated factors. In other words, the assumption that 
accounting is purely technical or merely bookkeeping is untrue; rather, the process is 
enormously complex and unseen environmental (background) factors such as national pride 
played a role in the decision to adopt IFRS for SMEs in the UK. 
The next chapter discusses EFRAG’s decision-making process, jurisdictions that rejected 
adoption of the standard, and influential factors behind their decisions. 
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Chapter 6: NASBs’ Decision-Making Processes – The Case of EFRAG and 
EU Non-Adopters of IFRS for SMEs 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses EFRAG’s process for conducting a comparability study between the 
standard, and the EC directives to which the EC referred in its decision not to mandate the 
standard in the EU. The chapter also examines how and why the German, Italian and Dutch 
NASBs rejected adoption of IFRS for SMEs, the influence of the standard’s advantages and 
disadvantages on their rejection, various entities’ involvement, and to what extent they 
influenced the NASBs’ final decisions. In doing so, this chapter addresses research questions 
relating to EFRAG and jurisdictions that rejected the standard, their decision-making 
processes, how the standard’s perceived advantages and disadvantages influenced NASBs’ 
final decisions, and the extent to which visible and unseen environmental factors influenced 
NASBs’ decision-making processes in the case of IFRS for SMEs. 
EFRAG is not a board member of the EC, but its responsibilities include providing advice and 
support for the EC in various matters such as amendments to IFRS (EC 2016a), as well as 
participating in the IASB’s standard-setting process (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 2014). In 
2009, the EC mandated it to conduct a comparison study between IFRS for SMEs and the 
Fourth and Seventh EC Directives, with the aim of highlighting incompatibilities between them 
(EFRAG 2010a). Therefore, EFRAG’s role is deemed to have been significant, so former 
members of its SMEs working group, senior technical managers, project managers and research 
directors were interviewed for this study. All EFRAG interviewees, with the exception of 
Interviewee 3 with a British background, were from jurisdictions classified as part of 
Continental Europe, including the Netherlands, Italy and Germany. Their responses are 
discussed in this chapter, together with those of interviewees from NASBs that rejected 
adoption of IFRS for SMEs, because they share similar characteristics such as accounting 
traditions. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 sets out the decision-making process adopted 
by EFRAG, the OIC, DASB and ASCG with regard to IFRS for SMEs. Section 6.3 discusses 
the advantages and disadvantages of the standard, and how it influenced NASBs’ decision-
making process. Sections 6.4 to 6.6 draw on theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 4 
(Table 4.1) to analyse various factors that influenced the EU NASBs’ decision with regard to 
IFRS for SMEs. Section 6.4 focuses on various entities involved in the EU NASBs’ adoption 
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decision, and how they influenced the final outcome. Section 6.5 explains how the authority of 
these governments and EU NASBs was perceived as a reason for rejecting the standard in order 
to protect their legislative power. Section 6.6 explains the historical, cultural and accounting 
traditions of EU jurisdictions, as well as their proximity to the Continental European 
accounting model, which were seen as additional motives for rejecting IFRS for SMEs. Finally, 
Section 6.7 summarises and provides conclusions on the topics discussed in this chapter. The 
next section conducts a detailed discussion of EFRAG’s compatibility study and NASBs’ 
decision-making processes in rejecting the standard. 
6.2 EFRAG’s and NASBs’ decision-making processes in rejecting IFRS for SMEs 
6.2.1 EFRAG’s decision-making relating to its comparison study between IFRS for SMEs and 
the Fourth and Seventh EC Directives 
In 2009, EFRAG, in its advisory role, was mandated by the EC to conduct a comparison study 
between IFRS for SMEs and the EC’s Fourth and Seventh Directives that were available in 
2009 (EFRAG 2010a). The EC’s Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978, based 
on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies 
including limited liability companies, and the Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 
June 1983, based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts, were updated in 
2006 in order to incorporate EU-adopted IFRS (EC 2006). Therefore, these directives often 
refer to IFRS standards with regard to various accounting treatments rather than to IFRS for 
SMEs, since the latter is not endorsed in the EU. The EU has around 24 million companies “of 
which approximately 80% are limited liability companies, while around 98-99% of limited 
liability companies are SMEs” (EC 2006), so the EC’s Fourth Directive regulates the vast 
majority of EU SMEs. In order to satisfy the EC’s mandated comparability study, EFRAG 
assessed and compared each paragraph of IFRS for SMEs with the Fourth and Seventh 
Directives. It highlighted each paragraph of the standard in either dark green for not 
incompatible, light green for incompatible depending on interpretation of the directives, yellow 
for not assessed, or red for incompatible (EFRAG 2010b). EFRAG’s (2010a, 2010b) analysis 
indicated that the vast majority of IFRS for SMEs was compatible with the EC directives, with 
the exception of the following issues: 
• IFRS for SMEs prohibited classification of items as “extraordinary items”, whereas the 
EC directives permitted such classification. However, the EC did not specify which 
items should be considered as extraordinary items, so incompatibility would rarely arise 
in practice and this issue could be ignored. EFRAG had to flag up this issue because it 
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was specifically requested to raise any incompatibilities, regardless of how often they 
might occur. 
• IFRS for SMEs provided entities with an option to use IAS 39 Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement. However, it did not specify which version of IAS 39 should 
be applied. Therefore, EFRAG was unable to consider whether the standard’s requirements 
with regard to financial instruments were compatible with the EC directives. 
• In the case of associates’ and jointly controlled entities’ consolidated and non-separate 
financial statements, IFRS for SMEs mandated the use of a fair value model to measure 
investments if a published price quotation was available; whereas the EC directives 
required the use of an equity method for associates’ consolidated financial statements, and 
either an equity method or a pro rata consolidation for controlled entities’ statements. For 
non-separate financial statements, the EC directives referred to IFRS as endorsed on 5 
September 2006, which would generally not permit associates and jointly-controlled 
entities to use a fair value model. 
• In the case of negative goodwill, IFRS for SMEs required immediate recognition in profit 
and loss, whereas the EC directives would not permit such a treatment if, for instance, 
expected future results were deemed to be unfavourable. 
• IFRS for SMEs banned the reversal of impaired goodwill, whereas the EC directives 
permitted it if the reason for it had perished. EFRAG argued that in certain cases, such as 
goodwill generated internally, impairment losses should not be reversed; however, it might 
be evident in some cases that goodwill had not been internally generated, and in such cases 
the EC directives permitted its reversal. 
• IFRS for SMEs estimated the useful life of goodwill as 10 years if an entity was unable to 
determine it more accurately. If, for example, an entity assumed that the useful life of 
goodwill would be between two and 11 years, the standard would require the use of 10 
years, whereas the EC directives would require the use of five years for the same example. 
Based on EFRAG’s study and discussions with stakeholders and EU governments, the EC 
(2010, 2011) argued that, owing to IFRS for SMEs’ short history and its lack of application by 
other jurisdictions, mandatory adoption of the standard was impossible, and full application 
would also be impossible unless changes were made, including amendments to the expected 
useful life of goodwill. The EC had asked EFRAG to conduct a purely technical exercise, rather 
than providing advice on the adoption of IFRS for SMEs. The majority of EFRAG participants 
(Interviewees 2, 3, 10, 13, 15 and 21) were aware that its task had been simply to conduct a 
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comparison in order to flag up any incompatibilities between IFRS for SMEs and the EC 
directives: 
I remember they wanted advice detailing in which points this standard could be 
incompatible with the directive, and that’s what we did … So this specific requirement 
of analysing the compatibility of this standard with the directives was very specific, 
because for us this standard [IFRS for SMEs] never was very important, because it 
was not under our role, because it was not going to be endorsed. So that’s why the 
working group was created, for a very specific requirement, this requirement; and then 
we complied with that requirement and we gave our advice to the European 
Commission (Interviewee 2). 
Interestingly, although the majority agreed on EFRAG’s perceived mission, their 
interpretations of the flagged issues and incompatibilities differed. Some perceived that these 
issues were minor and could easily have been overcome (Interviewees 15 and 21), while others 
perceived them as major obstacles that would hinder adoption of IFRS for SMEs (Interviewee 
9). Interviewee 9 stated that the flagged issues were deemed to be major constraints, and argued 
that the EU jurisdictions would not adopt the standard unless the EC directives and IFRS for 
SMEs were aligned with each other. However, Interviewees 15 and 21 expressed completely 
different views on the flagged issues. According to Interviewee 15: 
If you go back to that study and you look at the differences, the differences between the 
directive and IFRS for SMEs were not huge, and it was a matter of how you looked at 
those differences. So the differences could be viewed as minor, I think, that could be 
worked around, or they could be considered as complete roadblocks making it 
completely impossible. So I think the differences ended up being an excuse to kind of 
maintain the status quo. 
Thus, EFRAG’s role was not to drive the EC decision in a particular direction, but to provide 
a simple answer to the question asked. The next sub-section discusses NASBs’ decision-
making processes and the influence of EFRAG’s flagged issues on their rejection decisions. 
6.2.2 OIC’s and DASB’s decision-making processes in rejecting IFRS for SMEs 
NASBs’ levels of discussion, in-depth analysis and vocal participation in IFRS for SMEs 
varied significantly. For instance, the OIC and DASB wrote only a handful of letters discussing 
IFRS for SMEs. The vast majority were addressed to EFRAG or the EC, and were rarely 
directly addressed to the IASB (OIC 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 2014a, 2014b; DASB 2007, 2010a, 
2010b, 2011, 2012, 2014a, 2014b). In other words, the OIC neither consulted and discussed 
with national stakeholders, nor conducted a single field study with regard to IFRS for SMEs. 
According to Interviewee 22, in Italy, adoption of IFRS for SMEs was neither voted on nor 
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discussed in detail because there was no need for it in Italy, and the obvious option was for the 
OIC to continue to develop Italian GAAP: 
OIC interacted through EFRAG, mostly through EFRAG, so we had a second-level 
relationship with the European Commission and the IASB. We provided our feedback 
and our comments to EFRAG, and then EFRAG spoke as a single European voice to 
the European Commission and the IASB (Interviewee 22). 
In the Netherlands, the DASB did not participate directly in the issuance of IFRS for SMEs, 
but only conducted a round-table discussion with national stakeholders on the EC’s 
consultation draft (DASB 2010a) and briefly considered adoption of the standard. According 
to Interviewee 20, the standard did not fit with the Dutch accounting framework, so it was not 
seriously considered as a possible replacement for Dutch GAAP. The DASB does not: 
…interact with the IASB on IFRS for SMEs because we don’t apply the standard and 
also we don’t interact with the European commission because that is up to the Dutch 
government. We do share our views with Dutch government (Interviewee 20). 
The OIC expressed its perception of IFRS for SMEs in a letter addressed to the EC, which 
stated that the standard was deemed to be robust and complete, maintained the fundamental 
principles of IFRS, and was suitable for private companies (OIC 2010a). However, it argued 
that the standard was not welcomed in Italy because Italian GAAP was directly linked with 
taxation and capital maintenance. Adoption of the standard would increase Italian SMEs’ 
burden because they would have to prepare additional sets of accounts in accordance with 
Italian GAAP for tax purposes, and it would also burden the Italian government owing to the 
need to incorporate the standard into its regulations, tax system and accounting practice. The 
expected advantages, including attractiveness to international investors, would not outweigh 
the expected costs, so existing barriers would not be overcome. The OIC also noted major 
inconsistencies between IFRS for SMEs and the EC directives: “we noted several significant 
specific differences in the ‘rules’ expressed by the Standard versus the provisions of the 
directives presently in force” (OIC 2010a, p.7). Interviewee 22 added that: 
Obviously, adopting IFRS for SMEs was probably not considered as an option – not 
as a viable option – because of the previous incompatibilities and because of other 
incompatibilities which have not been listed at the European accounting directive. 
Similarly, the DASB expressed its perception of IFRS for SMEs through letters to EFRAG and 
the EC. For instance, in a letter to EFRAG in 2007, it raised fundamental concerns about the 
standard. According to the DASB (2007), ED-IFRS for SMEs was too complex, its scope was 
too extensive, and the IASB’s top-down approach was inappropriate. A bottom-up approach to 
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issuing the standard was necessary because this would enable various stakeholders’ needs and 
preferences to be investigated, leading to the development of a balanced standard. The DASB 
only conducted a single round-table discussion with national stakeholders, and the results of 
its consultation were presented in a letter to the EC. According to the DASB (2010a), although 
the IASB had simplified the standard, it was deemed to be too complex, not useful, and 
disregarded the need for SMEs to harmonise their financial statements internationally. The 
DASB argued that Dutch SMEs preferred their own national GAAP because it satisfied their 
needs. It also indicated that many other incompatibilities had not been identified by EFRAG’s 
comparison study, indicating the level of incompatibility between the standard and the EC 
directives (DASB 2010a, 2010b). 
It can be seen that the adoption of IFRS for SMEs was, at most, briefly discussed by the OIC 
and DASB, owing to the perceived lack of need, inadequacy and inconsistencies between the 
standard and EC directives. They both agreed that there were inconsistencies between the EC 
directives and the standard which were considered to be roadblocks to adoption. However, the 
ASCG had a different view and level of involvement with regard to IFRS for SMEs, as 
discussed in more detail in the next sub-section. 
6.2.3 ASCG’s decision-making process in rejecting IFRS for SMEs 
According to Interviewees 7, 12 and 14, the ASCG participated extensively in discussions on 
IFRS for SMEs because it thought that the standard might be adopted in the EU or Germany, 
indicating a need to promote the voice of German SMEs. According to Interviewee 7: 
There was a feeling that we should closely monitor what is happening at the IASB, and 
we should probably exercise our technical influence in getting the IFRS for SMEs 
closer to where we believed it would be of benefit for German entities, should the time 
come that the circumstances changed and the government would allow using the IFRS 
for SMEs. 
The standard was deemed to be important, and was considered to have significant potential for 
German companies, which led the ASCG to conduct in-depth analyses of the standard and its 
suitability for German SMEs (Interviewee 14). A letter sent in 2006 (ASCG 2006) illustrates 
the importance of the IASB’s IFRS for SMEs project, because at that time the Federal Ministry 
of Justice, with the ASCG’s support, was considering modernising German GAAP. The 
standard was then being considered as a possible solution to replace German GAAP; however, 
the letter flagged many concerns about the IASB’s project, including a need for simplification. 
143 
In 2007, the IASB asked for surveys and field tests to be carried out with regard to its ED-IFRS 
for SMEs (ASCG 2007b). In turn, the ASCG commissioned Prof. Dr. Axel Haller and Dr. 
Brigitte Eierle to conduct a survey study, which aimed to gather empirical evidence on whether 
the proposed standard met the needs and expectations of German SMEs. According to the 
ASCG (2007b), German SMEs’ participating in the survey revealed that the main users of their 
financial statements were managers, owners, banks and tax authorities. Therefore, the IASB’s 
focus on general-purpose financial statements aimed at external users would be inappropriate. 
Shortly thereafter, the ASCG commented on EFRAG’s draft response to the IASB’s ED-IFRS 
for SMEs, and supported EFRAG’s argument that the standard needed significant 
simplification, better measurement and more rigorous evaluation of the needs of SMEs and 
users of their financial statements (ASCG 2007a). 
The ASCG (2008) later conducted another field test in which 15 participants were persuaded 
to apply ED-IFRS for SMEs. The participants produced eight balance sheets, seven income 
statements, six cash flow statements, and five notes between them. The ASCG found that, in 
general, application of the standard was burdensome and would be impossible without the help 
of external auditors, and its increased disclosure requirements and detailed notes would lead to 
the publication of sensitive business information. According to the ASCG (2008, pp.2-3): 
“As most German SMEs have not yet looked into IFRS in more detail, the field test 
was especially challenging for German SMEs … For example, notes were too 
burdensome to prepare. For one solely due to the vast number of required notes, but 
also because additional information would have had to be generated and prepared … 
Therefore, all companies noted that it is very likely that various additional issues 
would arise when preparing “real financial statements” and when actually having to 
deal with problematic details of the requirements. For example, “cost of inventories” 
seemed like a sensitive approach for most participants; however, those trying to 
determine the cost of inventories realized just how difficult it was to apply. Therefore, 
the results presented in this report can only be indicative of the range of problems 
SMEs might face when applying an IFRS for SMEs”. 
The results gathered by the ASCG were written up and presented to Paul Pactor, advocating 
the views of German SMEs (Interviewee 14), and thereby indicating the ASCG’s faith in, 
involvement with and high expectations of IFRS for SMEs. 
In 2010 the ASCG commissioned another survey study to investigate the usefulness of the final 
issuance of IFRS for SMEs to Germany’s small but publicly traded entities (ASCG 2010c). 
The ASCG’s (2010c) results illustrate that the majority of participants supported using the 
standard because it would introduce major simplifications and reductions in disclosure 
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requirements compared with IFRS. However, non-publicly traded entities were less likely to 
support using the standard, and had less knowledge of it than publicly traded entities. 
Shortly thereafter, the ASCG commented on the EC’s discussion of IFRS for SMEs. It argued 
that the IASB had simplified the standard compared with its former draft, and that it would be 
useful to companies that had international business activities, were members of international 
groups or planned to be publicly listed. However, it suggested that the scope of entities subject 
to the standard should be based on size criteria rather than qualitative characteristics (ASCG 
2010a). Also, the ASCG proposed application of IFRS or IFRS for SMEs to entities’ separate 
financial statements, without the need to prepare additional statements in accordance with 
national GAAPs. Such a move would cause many issues for jurisdictions that did not permit 
use of the IASB’s standards in separate financial statements, as in Germany where profit 
distribution, taxation and capital maintenance were linked with the national GAAP. However, 
these obstacles and issues were not insuperable, regardless of the accounting system used for 
separate financial statements, and it supported its argument by pointing to the results of a 
KPMG (2008) study (ASCG 2010a). 
The ASCG also commented on EFRAG’s comparability study between IFRS for SMEs and 
the EC directives. According to the ASCG, the issues flagged in EFRAG’s analysis did not 
provide sufficient basis for rejecting the standard’s adoption in the EU, and that SMEs should 
be given the option of applying it (ASCG 2010b). The ASCG’s perception of EFRAG’s flagged 
inconsistencies contradicted those of the OIC and DASB, indicating different interpretations 
of these issues at a national level. It can be seen the ASCG’s support for the standard, and its 
active participation in the standard’s issuance, field tests and surveys, indicate that it perceived 
certain advantages in adopting it. The next section discusses the advantages and disadvantages 
of IFRS for SMEs from the perspectives of EFRAG and those EU jurisdictions that rejected 
adoption. 
6.3 EFRAG’s and EU NASBs’ perceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of 
IFRS for SMEs and their influence on decisions 
6.3.1 EFRAG’s and EU NASBs’ perceptions of the advantages of IFRS for SMEs 
Previous studies and the participants from EFRAG, the ASCG, OIC and DASB agreed that 
many of the expected advantages of the standard’s adoption related to the shared conceptual 
framework between IFRS and IFRS for SMEs (e.g. IASB 2009; EC 2010; Ernst & Young 
2010; AICPA 2018; Interviewees 2, 7, 20 and 22). Since, adoption of IFRS had caused many 
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jurisdictions to introduce courses to educate new accountants on the standards, in turn had led 
to fewer courses on national GAAPs. According to Interviewee 14, courses focusing mainly 
on IFRS had not been taught in German universities, but when the EU mandated adoption of 
the standards in 2002, that had affected the education system. German universities now taught 
IFRS and rarely taught courses on German GAAP, even though many companies still applied 
the latter. Adopting IFRS for SMEs would ease the process of educating accountants on IFRS, 
because IFRS for SMEs would provide a fundamental basis for learning IFRS owing to their 
shared conceptual framework (Interviewee 14). It would also improve SMEs’ preparation of 
financial statements because they would be based on a high-quality accounting standard (EC 
2010; Interviewees 3, 8 and 22). According to Interviewee 3: 
In terms of “quality”, my version of quality would be something derived from that, 
processes that people have used to establish a standard … And arguably, if a standard 
has been developed at IFRS level, it’s gone through a lot of due diligence, more than 
anywhere else. 
SMEs preparing accounting statements in accordance with IFRS for SMEs would benefit from 
international comparability and harmonisation. Unified accounting regulations for SMEs 
worldwide would eliminate many national GAAPs, which in turn would ease SMEs’ 
communication with other entities around the world (e.g. EC 2002; 2010, 2013; Yu and Wahid 
2014; Amiram 2012; Interviewees 2, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 20 and 22). According to Interviewees 
2 and 8, EU jurisdictions have completely different accounting regulations, even though 
NASBs comply with the EC directive because the latter is very general, and interpretations of 
its laws vary across the EU. The IFRS for SMEs would provide a solution to minimise 
inconsistencies among EU SMEs’ accounting regulations, which would create a unified 
accounting language across the EU. According to Interviewee 22, the main advantages of 
adopting IFRS for SMEs were “portability and better comparability of financial statements 
across borders”. Interviewee 7 further explained that: 
The key driver for IFRSs, either big or small, is the consistent application, so we don’t 
follow 200 different sets of accounting standards, but we follow one set and we try to 
do it the same as best as possible. And the same obviously would go for the IFRS for 
SMEs as well. 
In order for SMEs to raise capital internationally, they must adhere to transparent accounting 
regulations, and IFRS for SMEs would fulfil this requirement. According to Interviewee 3, it 
is very difficult for creditors and credit rating agencies to allocate available funds, owing to 
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their need to understand various different sets of accounts. Adopting the standard would ease 
their decision-making because all entities would adhere to a single set of accounting standards: 
Harmonisation has a goal to enable the companies to trade over to it, to move the 
capital from one camp to another, to allow the investors to assess which country, which 
region, which company, etcetera, etcetera is better for locating the capital, though of 
course the most advantage of this standard is worldwide use (Interviewee 10). 
Since EU-listed companies are required to publish consolidated financial statements in 
accordance with IFRS (EC 2002; IASB 2018b), SMEs’ transition from national GAAPs to 
IFRS would require a fundamental overhaul. According to Interviewee 22, one of the main 
advantages of adopting IFRS for SMEs would be the ease of transition from IFRS for SMEs to 
the IFRS environment because: 
As a company grows in size and becomes a listed entity, the transition from IFRS for 
SMEs to IFRS would be a smoother one than the transition from the old Italian 
national accounting standards to IFRS. 
In the case of subsidiaries and entities with cross-border operations, their accounting statements 
would benefit from adoption of IFRS for SMEs. Adoption would improve competition within 
and between markets because it would enhance comparability through the use of a shared 
accounting framework, which firms need in order to better understand and assess their rivals 
and other markets (Interviewee 13). It would also be easier for subsidiaries to prepare and 
assess their performance under consistent accounting regulations such as IFRS for SMEs 
compared with various inconsistent national GAAPs (Interviewees 2, 3, 9, 12, 13 and 14). 
According to Interviewees 3, 9, 12 and 14, it would make no sense for SMEs engaged in cross-
border operations to have their business transactions recorded under different accounting 
standards, since they would have to maintain multiple sets of books, which would be costly, 
because they would have to consolidate financial statements in order to better assess the 
group’s performance. According to Interviewee 3: 
The amount of trading across borders for SMEs is significant … if you’re in Germany 
and you’re in the Netherlands, you may only be five miles away, or even 500 yards 
away, and it’s likely you’re going to be trading cross-border. So harmonisation’s a 
very good thing. I went to one conference many years ago in The Hague in the 
Netherlands, and one of the most impressive speakers was a woman who owned 
nurseries – these are gardeners, not children’s nurseries. It was a small company, and 
one of her units, one of the nurseries, was in the Netherlands and the other one was in 
Germany; there was a difference of something like 10 or 20 miles. And she had to 
produce two sets of accounts, based on very, very different principles and criteria, and 
147 
measurement and recognition, things such as that. And she couldn’t therefore see… 
One of the things she wanted to see is which one is performing the best. 
Adoption of IFRS for SMEs would benefit not only SMEs, but also NASBs. Participants stated 
that adopting IFRS and IFRS for SMEs as issued by the IASB, as well as any future 
amendments, would ease NASBs’ decision-making processes (Interviewees 2, 7, 8, 12, 20 and 
22). They argued that issuing accounting regulations requires a thorough decision-making 
process, which is costly and time-consuming compared with readily usable accounting 
standards such as those of the IASB (Interviewees 20 and 22). According to Interviewees 7 and 
12, adopting the IASB standards would satisfy listed entities and SMEs, which would reduce 
the cost of issuing accounting regulations. Jurisdictions that adopted these standards would not 
need to have national standard setters in their ministries of finance to produce accounting 
regulations; they could just buy them off-the-shelf and implement them. 
However, such an approach is deemed appropriate for developing countries and jurisdictions 
that do not have national standard setters, because such countries either have no standards or 
use the IASB’s accounting standards (e.g. Kaya and Koch 2015; Interviewee 7). According to 
Interviewee 12: 
If you have this IFRS for SMEs as a booklet of 2,000 pages, including all the basis for 
conclusion, that’s easy. Someone does it in London, you trust in the people who did it 
in London. You’ve got a booklet and you don’t have to set up someone in your 
backroom, in your own ministry of finance or whatever, and think about it and produce 
it. As a smaller country, a newer country, you’d look for a product which is easy to 
buy in more than one sense, not only pay for it, but buy into it. That’s a good advantage. 
It has, supposedly, all the technical issues in it that are likely to appear. It even has 
financial instruments in there which means that if you don’t have financial instruments, 
just skip that chapter. That’s why it was adopted in a number of countries, I believe. 
Therefore, it can be seen that participants associated adoption of IFRS for SMEs with many 
benefits. However, not all participants were convinced that such advantages would materialise 
or would outweigh the costs. Adopting IFRS for SMEs would not be costless, so there were 
disadvantages to the adoption, as discussed in the next sub-section. 
6.3.2 EFRAG’s and EU NASBs’ perceptions of the disadvantages of IFRS for SMEs 
Despite the perceived advantages of adopting IFRS for SMEs, many participants condemned 
such a move in their jurisdictions for many reasons. Interviewees 20 and 22 argued that it would 
be costly and difficult for jurisdictions that have national GAAPs to disregard all previously-
issued accounting standards. Interviewee 22 stated that: 
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For those nations who have already an accounting standard setter in place and who 
already are used to using their own accounting standards, it would be a very difficult 
move to throw away the usual accounting standards and adopt IFRS for SMEs all of a 
sudden. 
Also, they questioned the usefulness of the standard’s adoption and characterised many of the 
perceived advantages discussed in Sub-section 6.3.1 as being theoretical and uncertain to 
materialise (Interviewees 7, 8, 12, 14, 15 and 20). Interviewees 7 and 8 suggested that adopting 
IFRS for SMEs would not enhance the comparability of SMEs’ financial statements. They 
argued that, in the case of IFRS, jurisdictions had implemented the standards inconsistently, 
and variations also existed among entities within the same jurisdiction, suggesting that similar 
behaviour would be likely to occur in the case of IFRS for SMEs. According to Interviewee 
14: 
If the general idea is to have a comparable set of standards or comparable financial 
reports by SMEs, I think the practice would have been much different and the financial 
reports might not have been as comparable as one would have hoped for, because it’s 
always a big challenge to have a set of standards applied across the world. 
Participants not only argued that comparability of SMEs’ financial statements would be 
difficult to accomplish, but also that the expected benefits were limited. According to 
Interviewees 7, 8, 12 and 15, SMEs rarely compare their financial statements with one another, 
and seldom engage in international activities or seek international funds, so they have no need 
to harmonise their accounting regulations around the world. The expected benefits to national 
standard setters were also considered to be limited. Interviewee 20 argued that: 
The other advantage would be that standard setting becomes less expensive because 
you delegate the work to somebody else. Again, that would be an advantage, but the 
costs related are not that big, and the other point is it would still not solve the issue 
that we need a national standard setter. Because in the Netherlands, the national 
standard setter also deals with many not-for-profit entities for which also IFRS for 
SMEs is not really tailored, so that economy that we would achieve would be there but 
would be limited. 
Furthermore, adoption of IFRS for SMEs would require SMEs, regardless of size, to prepare 
the entire set of financial statements, including profit and loss accounts, statements of 
comprehensive income, balance sheets, cash flows, notes and statements of changes in equity. 
This contradicted the notion that micro and small SMEs should not be overwhelmed with 
accounting requirements (Devi and Samujh 2015; Ram 2012; Saucke 2015; Interviewees 10, 
14 and 22). A comparison between IFRS and IFRS for SMEs indicated that the latter would be 
less complicated, require less disclosure, and provide limited options for easing its 
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implementation (IASB 2018a; Interviewees 20 and 22). However, compared with national 
GAAPs (e.g. German, Dutch and Italian GAAPs), the standard would be much more 
complicated and untailored to SMEs’ size, and would not satisfy their needs (Interviewees 7, 
14, 20 and 22). According to Interviewee 22, another disadvantage of IFRS for SMEs was that 
it would not reduce small and micro entities’ accounting burden, unlike Dutch GAAP which is 
tailored to all non-listed entities because they are able to apply fiscal valuation principles.8 This 
is a popular facility not permitted under IFRS for SMEs, and it mandates limited disclosure 
requirements compared with the standard: “So all these elements would make IFRS for SMEs 
still, although it is less complex than IFRS, still fairly complex and expensive compared to 
Dutch GAAP” (Interviewee 22). 
With regard to the shared framework between IFRS and IFRS for SMEs, despite being touted 
as an advantage, it was considered a disadvantage for many reasons. First Interviewees 2, 10 
and 14 questioned whether the shared framework had ceased to exist or might soon perish. 
They stated that the IFRS for SMEs framework was neither identical to IFRS nor completely 
different, but something in between (Interviewees 2, 10 and 14). When the IASB issued IFRS 
for SMEs, it used the IFRS conceptual framework, reduced its disclosure requirements and 
redrafted how the standards were written (IASB 2009). This caused IFRS for SMEs to differ 
from IFRS, which led to confusion among its readers, because this paraphrasing caused them 
to question whether they should interpret IFRS for SMEs exactly as they interpreted IFRS, or 
whether the IASB meant to change the standard (Interviewee 14). The IASB did not plan to 
interpret all IFRS amendments for IFRS for SMEs (IASB 2009), indicating that the shared 
conceptual framework might become weaker or perish. According to Interviewee 2: “If the 
IASB don’t change it in the future, so if it’s not a temporary matter, but a permanent matter 
that they don’t change the standard, in fact that means the conceptual framework is going to be 
different”. Interviewees raised concerns that IFRS for SMEs is diverging from IFRS because 
many changes introduced to the latter are not being incorporated into the former, going against 
the IASB’s concept of having a similar conceptual framework for its standards. According to 
the ICAEW (2018b): 
“New IFRS standards and amendments such as IFRS 9 Financial Instruments, IFRS 
15 Revenue from Contracts with Customers, IFRS 16 Leases and IFRS 17 Insurance 
Contracts have not been incorporated into the IFRS for SMEs ... Although the IFRS 
                                                 
8 According to AN Valuations (2015), “Dutch fiscal valuations are based on ‘reele waarde’, meaning fair value. 
This concept is based on the arm’s length principle and a buyer and seller who are both informed and independent. 
This principle has consequences for the valuation cash flows as well as the valuation parameters.” 
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for SMEs includes guidance on fair value measurement, this does not reflect the 
revised definition of fair value in IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement. There are, as a 
result, some significant differences between the IFRS for SMEs and IFRSs. Since the 
IFRS for SMEs is intended to apply to SMEs, these differences are expected to persist 
in the future, although the extent to which new and amended IFRS standards are 
incorporated into the IFRS for SMEs at a later date is uncertain”. 
Another issue is that the conceptual framework of IFRS for SMEs was based on the conceptual 
framework of IFRS, rather than on the needs of SMEs and their users. According to Interviewee 
3, the IASB: 
…started off with this magical IFRS, and we will make it proportional, okay. And I 
think the argument about proportionality is really quite problematic, because it 
assumes a lot about other users. So if you were going to say we will make this 
proportional, how do you do that? It’s very tricky to say what should be amended and 
make it useable for somebody else, instead of saying, “What do you want? What do 
you actually want?” 
According to Interviewees 2, 7, 8, 14, 15, 18 and 19, managers, owners and lenders such as 
banks all have access to tailored financial statements that satisfy their needs, regardless of the 
standard’s adoption. For instance, managers and owners are often involved in the business on 
a daily basis, so they have access to insider information and financial statements tailored to 
their needs, whether prepared under national GAAP or IFRS for SMEs (Interviewees 8 and 
19). 
Similarly, banks and creditors can demand any information they deem necessary because SMEs 
must comply in order to secure loans (Interviewees 7, 14, 15, 18, 19 and 20). According to 
Interviewee 14: 
Banks actually surprised me the most, because their view was, “Yes, everything is very 
interesting, that the IFRS for SMEs suggests.” When we asked all the stakeholders, we 
always asked them about the draft IFRS for SMEs, so we didn’t ask them again on the 
final IFRS for SMEs. But regarding the draft, they would say, “Yes, everything is very 
interesting. Information on deferred tax assets is very interesting and all this 
information that the standard asks for is very interesting. However, to be honest, we 
have our own evaluation systems. We have our black boxes and we won’t tell anyone 
how we go about evaluating a company and coming to our loan decision.” So, they 
said, “We don’t care what kind of standard the companies apply. As long as they 
prepare financial reports, we will ask them additional information as we see fit, and 
we will get the information because the company wants the loan, and therefore we 
don’t actually care whether they apply national GAAP or IFRS for SMEs, even though 
we do see the merits in a lot of information that we get from IFRS for SMEs.” So, they 
surprised me, that they would rather apply their own evaluation system instead of 
having the information available to everyone by IFRS for SMEs financial statements. 
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Interviewee 7 further explained that, financial statements are only a kind of quality control to 
check whether they conform with other information provided by SMEs. This interviewee 
argued that SMEs’ business models and plans for using requested loans are more important 
than financial statements; banks and lenders do not lend just because SMEs provide rigorous 
financial statements, since these statements reflect the past not the future. Financial statements 
may provide information on SMEs’ indebtedness and obligations compared with requested 
loans, but they do not provide any information about the future. 
Similarly to previous studies (e.g. Sian and Roberts 2009; Gassen 2017), the vast majority of 
participants agreed that SMEs’ main use of financial statements is for tax purposes 
(Interviewees 2, 7, 9, 12, 15, 19, 20 and 22). They argued that owing to the direct link between 
accounting regulations and taxable income, in some jurisdictions SMEs would have to prepare 
additional sets of financial statements on top of national GAAP if the standard were adopted. 
Such a move would increase their financial reporting costs and burden, resulting in limited 
benefits (Interviewees 9, 10, 14 and 20). According to Interviewee 14: 
All these huge institutions, they were not in favour of IFRS for SMEs. They said it 
would just be additional work, it would be too complex and too costly, and so in 
Germany there was never a really pro-IFRS for SMEs view in general 
Interviewee 20 further explained that: 
In general, because we have a well-functioning set of standards for non-listed entities, 
there is little appetite or need for an additional set of standards for those entities. So 
we have a well-functioning set of Dutch GAAP accounting standards and there is no 
call for additional standards. Stronger even additional standards would limit 
comparability, and in that sense there is no obvious advantage of going for an 
additional set, whether that is IFRS for SMEs or another set for small – well, for at 
least unlisted entities, let me phrase it like that. 
Unlike many EU countries, in the UK, tax regulations are independent of national GAAP, 
because although financial statement figures form the basis for taxable income, they are 
modified in accordance with complicated and detailed tax legislation (Simon 2016). 
Interviewees 9, 14 and 20 argued that creating two different sets of rules, as in the UK’s 
approach, was not supported in their countries and was considered complicated and 
unjustifiable. According to Interviewee 9, the main disadvantage of IFRS for SMEs is: 
The fact that it’s not necessarily aligned with the tax code, the national tax code, which 
usually is more based on the local national accounting GAAP. So the people were 
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saying “okay, do we still need to do the national GAAP, so you ask me to add an 
additional layer of cost?”, and they were strongly against that. 
The direct link between national GAAPs and taxation is likely to have influenced not only 
SMEs, but also governments. According to Interviewee 20, unlike the UK, many EU 
jurisdictions, including Spain, Italy and Belgium, have strong links between statutory and book 
income and taxable income, and it would be very complex for them to adopt IFRS for SMEs 
because it does not encompass national tax regulations and statutory requirements. EU 
countries’ strong connections between national GAAP and tax regulations meant that 
jurisdictions would have to change their tax regulations fundamentally, and train their staff in 
accordance with IFRS for SMEs if they wished to adopt it (Interviewees 20 and 22). 
Interviewee 22 further stated that “the government again is not very eager to have … an 
additional set of standards”, and explained why adopting IFRS for SMEs would not be 
welcomed in Italy. According to Interviewee 22, when the EC had mandated adoption of IFRS, 
it had been a huge issue in Italy because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) found it very 
difficult to assess banks’, listed companies’ and insurance firms’ taxable income appropriately. 
Even though the IRS had adopted and acquired competence in IFRS, and therefore had a team 
specialising in IFRS, it was still battling with this switch. Clearly, the same training gap and 
difficulty would apply in the case of adopting IFRS for SMEs, because the IRS would not be 
equipped to assess financial statements and income based on financial statements prepared in 
accordance with the standard. In the case of Germany, the Ministry of Justice is responsible for 
preparing national GAAP, which is used as the basis for taxable income. According to 
Interviewee 7, since separate financial statements are heavily tied to the German government, 
adopting IFRS for SMEs would have meant that it would have to surrender its legislative power 
to the IASB, but “I could not see that the German government would ever let go of the separate 
financial statements”. This indicates the existence of factors other than the perceived 
advantages and disadvantages of the standard’s and are discussed in more detail in the rest of 
this chapter. 
6.4 Coercive first dimension of power: Influence of various entities on EU 
NASBs’ decision-making processes 
The remainder of this chapter draws on the skeletal theoretical framework introduced in 
Chapter 4 (Table 4.1), which includes the coercive dimensions of power, mimetic-pragmatic 
moral and cognitive legitimacy, and normative-pragmatic moral and cognitive legitimacy, as 
well as culture, history and authority, to examine how various entities and factors influenced 
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EU NASBs’ decision-making processes. It focuses specifically on the influence of the coercive 
first dimension of power, culture, history and authority, and pragmatic and cognitive legitimacy 
over NASBs, because analysis of the interviews and publicly available documents illustrate 
their importance and relevance, and provide enriched explanations of the data gathered for this 
study. The next sub-sections discuss various actors’ participation in rejection decisions. 
6.4.1 Coercive first dimension of power: German SMEs’ influence on Federal Ministry of 
Justice’s and ASCG’s decision-making processes 
In 2009, the German Federal Ministry of Justice introduced a plan to modernise the German 
commercial code in accordance with international accounting regulations; however, it made no 
direct reference to international rules or regulations (Hellmann et al. 2013; Fülbier et al. 2017; 
Interviewee 12). According to Interviewee 12, during the “overhaul” of the commercial code, 
the Ministry of Justice needed an expert in both accounting and German law, but because it 
was not allowed to hire anyone directly, it asked the ASCG to hire an expert and then second 
the appointee to the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice insisted that the ASCG should 
not engage with or advise the expert at all, but should leave him alone. Once the final draft was 
complete, he was required to explain why he had chosen certain accounting treatments, which 
in some areas was to align the German commercial code with IASs. These areas were fiercely 
debated, and SMEs lobbied the government to prevent or minimise any overspilling of 
international accounting into the German commercial code (Hellmann et al. 2013; Interviewee 
12). Hence, German SMEs were vocal and were able to modify the Ministry of Justice’s 
outcome (Interviewees 7, 12 and 14). According to Interviewee 12, German SMEs were 
opposed to internationalisation: 
Internationalisation, even recently, gets a flavour which isn’t that positive anymore. 
Even some of the ways when they got it closer were not welcomed really… They are 
very vocal, and because they are vocal and very active, they have loads of employees, 
they are a common denominator of the political scene and they can really influence 
the decision making. They can ask for meetings in the Ministry of Justice, and if then 
they claim that god-knows-what will break down if this accounting is promoted, they 
are likely to have an open ear at the Ministry of Justice. 
Interviewee 7 further explained the extent to which German SMEs influenced the ASCG’s 
decision making. He argued that IFRS for SMEs was greeted with much antipathy in Germany 
when it was issued in 2009, and SMEs were quick to lobby the government not to incorporate 
any part of it into German legislation. Thus, the ASCG’s decision-making process with regard 
to IFRS for SMEs ended even before it began. 
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German SMEs are evidently actively involved in and capable of significantly modifying the 
Ministry of Justice’s decision-making process in order to prevent any changes that do not 
satisfy them. This, in turn, indicates that they have considerable influential power over the 
decision-making process, unlike the ASCG, which has weak authoritative power and influence 
over the German government. However, German SMEs are not the only entity influencing the 
Ministry of Justice’s decision-making process. The next sub-section discusses the EC’s 
influence on EU governments and NASBs. 
6.4.2 Coercive first dimension of power: The EC’s influence on EU governments and NASBs 
Since EU jurisdictions must comply entirely with EC directives (EC 2016b), all participants 
from EFRAG, the ASCG, OIC and DASB, without exception, agreed that governments and 
NASBs cannot challenge EC laws, nor adopt any standards that may contradict any EC 
directives (Interviewees 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 21 and 22). They argued that the EC’s 
(2010) rejection of IFRS for SMEs means that the standard does not exist in a legal sense in 
Europe, and that it is not endorsed, so no entity in Europe can claim compliance with the 
standard. Interviewee 14 provided an example of how the EC’s rejection of IFRS for SMEs 
influenced the ASCG and the German government with regard to the standard: 
The EU Commission, especially the European Parliament, decided, “No, we do not 
want an IFRS for SMEs in our European legislation”, and this has actually been the 
point when... this took out all the energy of the project. Because we were working on 
something and trying to improve something that we were sure at that time Europe 
didn’t want any more, and if Europe didn’t want to apply the IFRS for SMEs, then 
most likely Germany or member states wouldn’t have the chance to apply it 
individually. 
Similarly, Interviewees 20 and 22 stated that the decision to adopt IFRS for SMEs was first 
discussed and considered in Brussels rather than within EU jurisdictions, indicating the EC’s 
significant influence on national regulations: 
For Dutch GAAP we followed Dutch law, and that again is based on the European 
directives. So as long as there is no provision in the European directives that would 
either require or at least allow adoption of IFRS for SMEs in European countries, the 
discussion would not come up in the Dutch accounting standard board whether we can 
adopt this standard (Interviewee 20). 
Interviewee 22 provided another explanation for failure to adopt IFRS for SMEs in the EU. He 
argued that the standard was rejected in Italy because of its inconsistencies with EC directives: 
The debate within the board was, for the first time, when we still had the previous 
accounting directives, we were aware that we could not implement IFRS for SMEs 
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because it would clash with the accounting directives which were in force at the time, 
and the transposition in Italian law of the accounting directive (Interviewee 22). 
Interpretations of the incompatibility between IFRS for SMEs and EC directives varied 
significantly across EU countries. The OIC, DASB and ASCG referred to EFRAG’s 
compatibility study, which flagged inconsistencies between the standard and the EC directives. 
The ASCG deemed the flagged issues to be minor and easily overcome, and stated that they 
should not hinder adoption of the standard in the EU (ASCG 2010a, 2010b), whereas the OIC 
and DASB argued that these inconsistencies were roadblocks and were the main reason for the 
standard’s rejection (OIC 2010a, 2010b; DASB 2010b, 2010b; Interviewee 22). 
However, in 2013 the EC updated the Fourth Directive (Directive 2013/34/EU), and required 
all EU jurisdictions to incorporate the amendments (EC 2013). According to the EC (2013), 
the Europe 2020 strategy aimed to enhance SMEs’ business environment, reduce their 
administrative burden and encourage their internationalisation. Although the directive did not 
refer to IFRS, or IFRS for SMEs, it did refer to IASs that would bring it closer to IFRS for 
SMEs. Previous studies of the EC’s 2013/34/EU Directive (e.g. Brouwer and Hoogendoorn 
2017; Di Pietra 2017; Fülbier et al. 2017) have argued that its implementation brought the 
Dutch, Italian and German GAAPs closer to IFRS and IFRS for SMEs. According to Kaufhold 
(2015, p.1950), the EC’s 2013/34/EU Directive eliminated the vast majority of inconsistencies, 
so the only issue remaining was “the treatment of unpaid subscribed capital”, which Kaufhold 
deemed to be irrelevant owing to its infrequent use by SMEs. In other words, the revised 
directive eliminated many existing differences, which would ease adoption of IFRS for SMEs. 
Interviewee 22 stated that: 
With the newest accounting directive, which came out in 2013-2014, those 
incompatibilities were removed because the accounting prescriptions and the 
accounting directives had been modified so that they had been made compatible with 
the IFRS for SMEs … After the second accounting directive was introduced and those 
incompatibilities were removed, we had a freer hand in leading a new set of Italian 
national accounting standards. 
Current inconsistencies between Dutch, Italian and German national GAAPs and the standard 
are not caused by the EC directive (Brouwer and Hoogendoorn 2017; Di Pietra 2017; Fülbier 
et al. 2017). This indicates that in the EU, although the EC is deemed to be very powerful and 
has vast capacity to mandate changes, this was not the main reason for rejecting IFRS for 
SMEs. The next section discusses governments and NASBs authoritative power and its 
influence on the adoption decision. 
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6.5 Authority of EU governments and NASBs and its influence on rejection of 
IFRS for SMEs 
In the EU, NASBs have different levels of authority. In the case of the ASCG, proposed 
standards must be approved by Germany’s Federal Ministry of Justice, and once the 
government has published standards in the Federal Gazette, entities are advised to comply with 
them (Federal Ministry of Justice 2011; Interviewees 7, 12 and 14). This is because compliance 
with published standards means it can be taken for granted that financial statements have been 
prepared in accordance with German GAAP. However, if the Ministry refuses to adopt the 
proposed standards, it either mandates changes or simply rejects their publication, so the 
standards do not become publicly available and compliance with them cannot be deemed to be 
in accordance with German GAAP (Interviewees 7 and 12). Interviewee 7 explained in relation 
to German GAAP: 
Standards have never been compulsory; they have always been voluntary. And the 
assumption that whatever we publish is in conformity with German GAAP is evidenced 
by the government publishing the document in the Federal Gazette. When we have 
finalised our due process and issued our standard, we send it to the Ministry of Justice. 
They consider it, they do the check whether they believe it’s in conformity with the law. 
If they believe it is – and usually they do – then they publish the document, and then 
the document is out there, and the entities are advised to follow it. 
In addition, according to Interviewee 12, the German government’s involvement in the 
ASCG’s decision-making process is limited. It only has observer status, because if it were 
deeply involved, it would be unable to take a totally different approach to the ASCG’s 
recommendations. The German government will appear at the Accounting Regulatory 
Committee in Brussels, and will work in accordance with German entities’ interests, but its 
perspective on and understanding of German interests may differ from the ASCG’s technical 
perception, which may lead to different voices. Therefore, the ASCG has no authoritative 
power over SMEs’ accounting regulations; rather, the Ministry of Justice is the decision maker 
and issuer of German GAAP. 
In the case of the Netherlands, the DASB is responsible for issuing SMEs’ accounting 
regulations, but the issued regulations have no authoritative power equivalent to a legal 
requirement (Brouwer and Hoogendoorn 2017; DASB no date). The DASB board’s members 
include auditors, preparers and users of Dutch companies’ financial statements. The Authority 
of Financial Markets, the Ministry of Security and Justice, and the Ministry of Finance are 
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entitled to attend the board’s meetings as observers, but do not have a right to vote on the 
board’s decisions (DASB no date). 
In Italy, the OIC’s board members include preparers, users, accounting experts, financial 
market experts and auditors. The Italian law published on 11 August 2014, No. 116 of Decree 
Law 91/2014, recognised the OIC as an independent national standard setter with various 
responsibilities, including issuance of national accounting principles inspired by best practice 
and in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code (OIC no date-b). This law also requires 
the OIC to report on its activities annually to the Ministry of Economy and Finance and entitles 
them and Bank of Italy to attend the board’s meetings as observers (OIC no date-a, no date-b). 
The OIC has only recently been recognised as the independent standard setter responsible for 
SMEs’ accounting regulations, which indicates that it has authoritative power to adopt IFRS 
for SMEs as issued by the IASB. According to Interviewee 22: “Theoretically, OIC could draft 
an Italian standard which is word by word exactly just like the IFRS for SMEs. Nothing 
prevents OIC from doing this.” 
Thus, EU NASBs have differing levels of authoritative power and responsibility for accounting 
regulations in their jurisdictions (DASB no date; Federal Ministry of Justice 2011; NAF 2015; 
OIC no date-b). At the time of the EC’s (2010) consultation with regard to the suitability of 
implementing IFRS for SMEs in the EU, the DASB was responsible for issuing national 
accounting regulations applicable to SMEs (DASB 2010a), whereas the OIC and ASCG were 
not recognised by law as having any authoritative power over SMEs’ accounting regulations 
(Federal Ministry of Justice 2011; OIC no date-b). The ASCG still lacks such authoritative 
recognition, whereas in 2014 the OIC acquired this power (OIC no date-b). The DASB strongly 
opposed adoption of IFRS for SMEs and argued that EFRAG’s comparability study did not 
highlight all existing incompatibilities between the EC directive and the standard (DASB 
2010b, 2010b). Its strong opposition may be explained by its fear of losing its authoritative 
power to the IASB, as confirmed by Interviewee 20, who said that adoption of IFRS for SMEs 
would at least cause “the loss of, let’s say, national autonomy in this, because you would also 
be delegating your responsibility to another standard setter”. On the other hand, the ASCG’s 
support for adoption of IFRS for SMEs and its use as an alternative to German GAAP may be 
explained by its lack of authority, which caused it to evaluate adoption of the standard and its 
suitability for German SMEs more neutrally. 
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Although OIC and DASB participants (Interviewees 20 and 22) at first argued that 
inconsistencies between EC directives and IFRS for SMEs prevented the latter’s adoption, 
these differences were greatly minimised when the EC updated the Fourth Directive (Kaufhold 
2015). Nevertheless, Italy and the Netherlands still did not adopt the standard, indicating that 
EFRAG members (Interviewees 2 and 15) statement that the regulators may have used the 
identified incompatibilities as a pretext to protect their authority and legislative power. 
According to Interviewee 2, these incompatibilities gave them “the perfect technical excuse to 
say ‘I’m not interested in this standard”. 
Furthermore, since the vast majority of participants agreed that SMEs’ main use of financial 
statements is for tax purposes (Interviewees 2, 7, 9, 12, 15, 19, 20 and 22), they suggested that 
governments and NASBs were reluctant to relinquish their authoritative power over their tax 
regulations to the IASB. They argued that such delegation would impose additional 
requirements on NASBs, such as actively lobbying on and reviewing the IASB’s processes in 
the case of amendments to IFRS for SMEs, which was considered time-consuming and 
cumbersome. National regulators currently have substantial authority to modify their 
legislation as they see fit, as long as these changes are in accordance with EC directives, which 
is much easier than lobbying the IASB to make such changes to its standards: 
I’d just add I think tax is another major consideration that’s… So it’s not just – well, 
it is political. But again, given the size of SMEs, you know, it’s the largest employer 
across Europe, is a very significant part of the economy. Losing power to set standards 
over those entities also has consequences for a government’s taxation policy, so all 
these things are kind of interrelated as well. You know, it’s not just about whether or 
not rules, you know, match or, you know, whether one rule is better than another rule; 
there are also other consequences to think about (Interviewee 15). 
Although governments and NASBs agreed to surrender legislative power over their listed 
entities to the IASB when the EU adopted IFRS for group financial statements, they refused to 
do so in the case of IFRS for SMEs in order to maintain the remainder of their legislative power. 
According to Interviewees 2, 7, 12, 13, 15, 20 and 22, if EU jurisdictions had adopted the 
standard, they would have delegated SMEs’ regulations to the IASB. Interviewee 7 explained 
that: 
If we stay with the German law, you have full authority over the process; but if we 
adopt it, an international standard, we delegate that authority to a supranational 
authority that’s sitting in London, and we have no control anymore. 
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Similarly, Interviewee 20 deemed such delegation of authority to be a major disadvantage of 
the standard’s adoption in Netherlands. He argued that adoption would cause: 
…first of all the loss of, let’s say, national autonomy in this, because you would also 
be delegating your responsibility to another standard setter. It would be at least 
perceived to make accounting more complex and more costly than the present set-up 
that we have in local GAAP, and so if you say the three disadvantages are loss of 
autonomy, more expensive – those are the two I think major items there. 
Interviewee 22 provided an in-depth explanation of the extent to which adopting IFRS for 
SMEs would impact on NASBs’ and governments’ authority. He stated that: 
Generally speaking, there is a tendency to self-conservation. All structures in human 
nature have a tendency to conserve status quo. It is very unlikely that OIC would come 
forward with the proposal to kill itself! I’m just joking clearly, but there is a tendency 
to keep maintaining the status quo. Also, there is a consideration that the standards 
set by OIC, since they involved a very close consultation process of all stakeholders 
involved, our standards are a better quality, a better fit for Italy than IFRS for SMEs, 
which I believe is true. 
Although Interviewee 22 joked about how the OIC would be sacrificing itself if it proposed 
adopting IFRS for SMEs, his comments, combined with other interviewees’ assumption of the 
impact of adoption on their authority, indicate that this joke made light of the severe 
consequences of an adoption decision. Thus, if EU jurisdictions were to adopt IFRS for SMEs, 
governments and NASBs would lose the reminder of their authority and legislative power, with 
fundamental changes to their roles and responsibilities as national regulators. However, other 
unseen environmental factors including history and culture also played a role in EU 
jurisdictions rejection, as discussed in more detail in the next section. 
6.6 Influence of national accounting history and culture on EU jurisdictions’ 
rejection of IFRS for SMEs 
6.6.1 History and culture of accounting in Germany and their influence on rejection of IFRS 
for SMEs 
Previous studies have argued that accounting tradition plays a role in the acceptance and 
implementation of accounting regulations (e.g. Mir and Rahaman 2005; Albu et al. 2011; 
Ramanna 2013). Germany’s accounting tradition can be traced back to 1329, when a merchant 
called Hermann Wittenborg recorded unsystematic single entries of accounting transactions 
(Courtis 1997). Hoffmann and Detzen (2013) and Richard (2005) reveal that the use of fair-
value accounting in Germany can be traced back to the fifteenth century, and that in 1794, 
Prussia was the second country in Europe to introduce accounting regulations. These included 
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clauses relating to bankruptcy and inventory measurement (Richard 2005). For instance, 
inventory measurement clauses required the use of purchase or saleable price, whichever was 
lower. Until the mid-nineteenth century, valuation of inventory by historical cost dominated 
because regulators saw no need to incorporate fair value into law. 
However, in order to unify German states’ commercial codes and to protect cross-border 
investors, in 1856 Prussia established the first commercial code, which introduced accounting 
regulations for every legal enterprise (Hoffmann and Detzen 2013). According to Hoffmann 
and Detzen (2013), many entities criticised the law for its ignorance of increases in prices, 
which prevented companies from disclosing true values in their financial statements. In 1861, 
German entities were given an option to value all their assets by either historical cost or fair 
value, regardless of whether their values had increased or decreased. Between 1870 and 1873, 
more than 700 companies were founded, and this economic boom led to increased demand, 
which in turn led to increased prices. Companies assumed that prices would increase, and 
therefore overestimated their assets in their financial statements. The 1873 economic boom was 
described as unstable and an artificial bubble. By the end of the year, many companies were 
bankrupt, liquidated or had reduced their share capital. The Supreme Court of Commerce of 
the German Empire determined that the crisis had not been caused by fair value measurements, 
but by deceptive behaviour and misapplication of the law. 
In the late 1920s, Germany experienced another crisis that led to the bankruptcy of major, 
medium-sized and small banks. Creditors withdrew their investments from all entities, and the 
German stock exchange was closed for several months. Creditors lost trust in the financial 
system, which led the German government to update its accounting regulations once again in 
order to regain stakeholders’ trust. These updated regulations prevented revaluation of fixed 
assets, allowed hidden reserves, and permitted only historical cost as a measurement basis, 
because the use of fair value had led to deceitful activities. As a result of these crises, the 
German accounting tradition is embedded with accounting regulations that provide limited 
disclosure, allow hidden reserves and emphasise conservatism (Heidhues and Patel 2011). 
When asked to explain why Germany did not adopt IFRS for SMEs, Interviewee 7 suggested 
that the country’s history of fair value measurement and its accounting culture might explain 
this. According to Interviewee 7: 
People found out how the system could be misused, and it was heavily misused, and 
people lost a lot of money. Equally, we had hyperinflation in the twenties of the last 
century, and also to a certain degree after the Second World War, and people never 
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wanted to experience that again. Therefore, there is a general feeling of being prudent, 
being cautious, so setting aside reserves, building buffers for bad times, because 
people that have undergone these severe circumstances have basically lost all their 
property. So they said, “This should never happen again. I’d rather set aside some 
profit that I made this year and build up reserves for bad times. I save money for bad 
times.” This is very much enshrined in the culture of my country. 
In other words, German SMEs are cagey, conservative and reluctant to disclose details of their 
performance (Heidhues and Patel 2011; Interviewees 3, 7, 12 and 14), so the introduction of 
accounting standards that might reintroduce fair value measurement or contradict historical and 
cultural accounting traditions would be opposed or rejected. Interviewee 12 illustrated this: 
On the German local GAAP committee … we had someone from a relatively small 
family-owned company, and he used to say he would not publish anything, because 
then his teachers’ daughters would question him about his salary, which sounds 
absolutely ridiculous to you and me. However, it’s this being cagey about things which 
small companies still get away with if they don’t have to raise money anywhere. This 
is still seen as a legitimate interest by the German Ministry of Justice, and therefore 
we cannot go all the way for publicity. 
Adoption of IFRS for SMEs would have reintroduced fair value accounting, numerous 
disclosure requirements and unknown accounting options, and would have eliminated 
traditionally embedded accounting treatments, so stakeholders quickly lobbied the government 
to prevent such a move (ASCG 2007b, 2008, 2010c; Interviewees 7, 12 and 14). Interviewee 
12 further explained that it would be difficult for Germany to abandon its history, accounting 
culture and tradition, arguing that the German commercial code: 
…that started in the nineteenth century that’s a lot of luggage we carry around. We 
are still for whatever reason very reluctant to let go of that luggage … It might be 
holding us back, but it’s our roots, and we think we’ve had it for such a long time and 
we are reluctant to let go … It’s history and it’s a bit the devil you know is better than 
the devil you don’t know (Interviewee 12). 
It can be seen that in Germany, adoption of IFRS for SMEs was rejected because its accounting 
requirements contradicted Germany’s historical accounting tradition and culture, and because 
the country would no longer have been able to self-regulate its accounting standards. Adoption 
of the standard would have harmed the German Federal Ministry of Justice’s pragmatic and 
cognitive legitimacy because it would have introduced new accounting regulations that 
opposed stakeholders’ preferences and beliefs, as well as unknown accounting options that 
might contradict its role and responsibility for satisfying its stakeholders demands. 
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6.6.2 History and culture of accounting in Italy and their influence on rejection of IFRS for 
SMEs 
Italy has a similarly long accounting history, culture and tradition that can be traced back to 
Fra’ Luca Pacioli, founder of double-entry bookkeeping in 1494 (Zan 1994; Cinquini and 
Marelli 2007). Over the two centuries following the creation of double-entry book-keeping, the 
Italian literature focused mainly on how to keep accounting records in accordance with it, and 
how to transform these records into financial statements (Zan 1994). According to Zan (1994), 
the era between the seventeenth to the nineteenth century can be described as a crisis, because 
the Italian accounting tradition deteriorated due to increased “foreign theoretical invasion”, 
which included the French De La Porte code. As a result of this “invasion”, the work of French 
accounting authors was taught in Italian high schools until the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Italy’s adoption of IFRS for SMEs was thus perceived as another potential invasion of its 
accounting culture. According to Interviewee 13: 
There was much more reluctance in having, you know, something coming from IASB. 
… Okay, we have IFRS’s, we are happy, thank you very much. Now do you want to 
invade our countries also with IFRS for SMEs? 
Zan (1994) reveals that Italy has its own distinctive accounting history, culture and tradition. 
According to Aben (2011), in 1919, Italy introduced the first compulsory severance pay scheme 
for private employees, which was managed by the National Institute for Social Security; 
however, the scheme was terminated due to inflation and misallocation of the fund’s assets to 
support the government. In 1956, another scheme was introduced for the public sector and was 
extended to industrial employees by the end of the 1960s (Baccaro 2002). During the early 
1970s, the Italian severance pay scheme included minimum pension payments to every Italian 
citizen, as well as pensions based on final salary for public-sector, private-sector and self-
employed citizens (Gallo et al. 2018). This scheme was funded by a pay-as-you-go system, and 
was one of the most expensive and complicated schemes in Europe (Baccaro 2002; Gallo et al. 
2018). As a result, the Italian government intervened and the scheme was reformed many times. 
According to Interviewee 22, one of the main barriers to adoption of IFRS for SMEs was its 
classification of severance payments as pension benefits. Italy’s severance payments are 
enshrined in its labour laws, and every company must set aside a month’s salary for each year 
that an employee is hired, payable when the employee leaves the company. Under Italian 
GAAP, such a pension scheme is not recognised as a pension benefit because it is guaranteed 
by a national fund. However, under IFRS for SMEs, severance payments would qualify as 
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pension benefits, which would make the accounting treatment very complicated for Italian 
companies. According to Interviewee 22: 
…frankly, a long-time tradition. That’s the way it has always been in Italy. It probably 
goes back to the Middle Ages, like most things in Italy! Italy has this speciality of 
having very long traditions. We had a very developed economy here at the time of the 
Renaissance in the 14th century, so many things like banking or banking traditions or 
banking habits, or habits of the economy in general, like paying employees for 
example, they probably originated in that time. Like with accounting, we are home to 
Luca Pacioli, the inventor of double-entry accounting. This is also the reason why we 
always have had accounting standards. Luca Pacioli wrote accounting standards for 
the Republic of Venice in the 16th century, and that’s where our tradition of accounting 
standard setting started. It’s very hard for a country like Italy, which has been setting 
accounting standards for maybe more than 400 years, to give up its accounting 
standard-setting tradition. 
It can be seen that Italy’s rejection of IFRS for SMEs was due to the clash of accounting 
requirements with the country’s long-embedded accounting history, culture and traditions. For 
example, IFRS for SMEs classifies severance payments as pension benefits, whereas such a 
treatment is considered burdensome in Italy because every company, regardless of size, would 
have to recode such transactions. 
6.6.3 History and culture of accounting in the Netherlands and their influence on rejection of 
IFRS for SMEs 
The Netherlands’ accounting history and culture can be traced back to as early as the fourteenth 
century. At that time, the northern and southern Netherlands had different accounting methods, 
which included double-entry book-keeping owing to the influence of German and Italian 
accounting scholars (Funnell and Robertson 2011). In 1602, Vereenigde Ooostindische 
Compagnie was the first public company in the world to publish its financial statements. This 
led to the establishment of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, the oldest stock market on which 
traded stocks are purchased and sold (Camfferman 2010; Zeff et al. 2016). 
In 1809, the Netherlands adopted the Napoleonic Code de Commerce as the basis for its trade 
laws. Shortly thereafter, the Napoleonic Code was used as a basis for the Dutch Commercial 
Code, which took effect in 1838 (Van Oven 1983). According to Van Oven (1983) although 
the Napoleonic Code influenced the development of the Dutch Commercial Code, the latter 
reintroduced Dutch accounting regulations that had been enforced prior to the French 
occupation, including bankruptcy and insurance laws meaning Dutch independent accounting 
regulations had existed even before the French occupation. The Dutch law defined the 
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preparation of financial statements, which included balance sheets and income statements, and 
mandatory publication of accounts was first introduced in 1928 (Van Der Tas 2003). According 
to Van Der Tas (2003), although the accounting profession had existed for many centuries, it 
became organised in 1895 when the Dutch Institute of Accountants was established. By the 
1970s, many accounting institutions had been established, as well as the Tripartite Consultative 
Body, which was the first Dutch national accounting standard setter (Van Der Tas 2003; 
Brouwer and Hoogendoorn 2017). The existence of such a long history of accounting 
regulations indicates their influence on individuals’ and entities’ behaviour. For example, the 
IASB used the IFRS framework to develop IFRS for SMEs, regardless of whether SMEs have 
the same or similar needs and uses for financial statements as public companies (IASB 2009), 
whereas such distinctions are culturally and traditionally embedded in the Netherlands. 
According to Interviewee 20: 
We don’t see a natural move towards IFRS for SMEs for unlisted entities, because we 
consciously make, and that is also our tradition, to have a break between the reporting 
requirements for listed entities and those for unlisted entities. Because for unlisted 
entities, the stakeholders and the users are different than those of the listed entities. 
In the Dutch accounting culture, companies have a long tradition of using the net asset value 
method, which is similar to the equity method. Adopting IFRS for SMEs might have reduced 
equity, which would have led to a reduction in distributable dividends (Brouwer and 
Hoogendoorn 2017). Thus, there were inconsistencies between Dutch GAAP and the standard 
due to traditionally embedded accounting treatments. According to Interviewee 20, many 
differences existed between Dutch GAAP and IFRS for SMEs due to Dutch history and 
accounting traditions, and these prevented the standard’s adoption. He stated that such 
inconsistencies included various minimum capital requirements in Dutch GAAP that are not 
recognised in IFRS for SMEs, such as legal reserve requirements, and thresholds for dividend 
distribution disclosures on liabilities.  
It can be seen that the Netherlands’ long history of setting its own accounting regulations led 
to a national accounting tradition and culture that would have been hindered by adoption of 
IFRS for SMEs. Thus, these unseen environmental factors influenced the final decision. 
6.6.4 Influence of the IASB’s Anglo-Saxon accounting model on EU jurisdictions’ rejection of 
IFRS for SMEs 
According to Nobes and Parker (2012) and Degos et al. (2018), unlike the Anglo-Saxon 
accounting model, which is not connected with taxation but is strongly oriented toward 
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informing investors, the Continental European accounting model is strongly associated with 
taxation and is mainly geared toward informing creditors. 
The IASB’s proximity to the UK and US, as well as its use of IFRS as a basis for issuing IFRS 
for SMEs, mean that the standard is mainly investor-oriented, and hence closer to Anglo-Saxon 
countries than the rest of the world. In the case of the EU, such close proximity was not 
welcomed, except in the UK which adopted IFRS for SMEs with major modification. Other 
EU jurisdictions strongly opposed the standard’s adoption because their national GAAPs are 
strongly connected with taxation (Interviewees 7, 13, 15, 20 and 22), which is deemed to be a 
fundamental characteristic of the Continental European accounting model. Participants also 
argued that national GAAPs are geared toward creditors (Interviewees 11 and 20): 
We have strong requirements also to protect creditors, and even shareholders to some 
extent … There are disclosures on liabilities in Dutch GAAP which again are based 
on the information needs of creditors, which are also not in that sense covered by IFRS 
for SMEs (Interviewee 20). 
Interviewee 9 compared the Anglo-Saxon and Continental European accounting models:  
In some jurisdictions, the most prominent statement is the income statement. For 
example, I’m thinking about the Anglo-Saxon countries and cultures, where we have a 
bit more of short terms possibly, compared to the more Continental European national 
GAAPs, which originally are more set to satisfy the debtors and making sure that 
companies are not going into bankruptcy, or if it was the case, that the money that 
could be recovered would be sufficient. So there, I think, they value the benefits, and 
so, because of those different starting points and those different national GAAPs that 
we have been working on for centuries, or decades at least, they are not viewing the 
role of accounting in the same way. 
IFRS for SMEs’ proximity to the Anglo-Saxon accounting model was considered inappropriate 
and a reason for its rejection in the EU. According to Interviewee 22: 
In the view of Continental Europeans, I think this is quite clear: the IFRS for SMEs 
are very biased towards the Anglo-Saxon accounting tradition and accounting 
standards and culture. That’s one reason why they would not be considered as 
something you would adopt in Italy or France or Germany. They might be good for 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition, but they might not be good for the Continental European 
tradition. 
Thus, the IASB’s proximity to the Anglo-Saxon accounting model was not perceived as a 
positive feature or as a motive for many EU jurisdictions to adopt IFRS for SMEs. Instead, 
such closeness caused a backlash in these countries, which led to the standard’s rejection. Two 
fundamental features of the Continental European accounting model are national GAAPs’ 
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association with taxation, and an emphasis on creditors rather than investors. Such traditions 
were roadblocks to the standard’s adoption in many EU countries owing to inconsistencies 
between the standard and traditionally accepted accounting treatments. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the decision-making processes of EFRAG, the OIC, DASB and 
ASCG with regard to IFRS for SMEs. It has highlighted the perceived advantages and 
disadvantages of the standard, as well as various visible and unseen environmental factors that 
influenced adoption decisions. The evidence presented in this chapter has shown that the 
NASBs had different levels of consideration and participation in the process. Also, different 
visible environmental factors and unseen environmental factors influenced their decisions to 
reject IFRS for SMEs. Therefore, rejection of IFRS for SMEs by the German Federal Ministry 
of Justice, the OIC and DASB did not relate to a single factor domination, nor was it based on 
simple cost–benefit analyses, but was rather a result of multiple interrelated factors influence 
on their decision-making processes.  
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Chapter 7: Development of the skeletal theoretical framework 
7.1 Introduction 
According to Laughlin (1995, 2004, 2007), the MRT approach is a technique to “flesh out” a 
theoretical “skeleton”. The “skeletal” theory may suggest existence of a general pattern; 
however, empirical findings are needed to validate and make such a skeletal theory 
meaningful. In other words, the skeletal theory only provides a language that allows the 
empirical findings to be understood, and the empirical findings enrich and aid the 
development of the skeletal theory. Since this study embraces Laughlin’s (1995) MRT, the 
findings of this study are used to enrich and develop the skeletal theoretical framework 
defined and presented in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1, respectively. They, therefore, reshape the 
skeletal theoretical framework by identifying the relevant parts of it, adding needed meat on 
the bones of the framework, thus making it meaningful and suggesting the need to create a 
version of the developed framework for each jurisdiction, based on salient characteristics and 
unique reasons for the decision. This, in turn, justifies the position of this chapter because it 
draws on the findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 discusses adoption of IFRS 
in the EU through the theoretical framework of this study, Sections 7.3 to 7.6 discuss the 
creation of versions of the theoretical framework for the UK, Germany, Netherlands and 
Italy, respectively, and Section 7.7 concludes this chapter. 
7.2 Explanation of the EU’s adoption of IFRS based on the theoretical framework 
In the case of publicly-listed entities, EU governments and NASBs were forced to accelerate 
their moves toward harmonising accounting standards in order to satisfy the needs of capital 
market investors and issuers, which led the EC to mandate all EU countries to adopt IFRS for 
group financial statements from 2005 (EC 2000, 2002; Chiapello and Medjad 2009). According 
to the EC (2000, p.3), harmonisation of publicly-listed entities’ accounting regulations was 
needed because many inconsistent regulations in the EU were “hampering the development of 
a deep liquid single EU capital market”. This was because capital market issuers and investors 
had to adhere to and comprehend multiple sets of accounting regulations, which was considered 
cumbersome, costly and confusing (EC 2000; De George et al. 2016). 
The existence of many different regulations aimed at publicly-listed companies (EC 2000; De 
George et al. 2016) meant that their accounting standards were influenced by various 
environmental factors, including accounting history and culture. The IASB’s accounting 
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standards included IFRS’s orientation toward an Anglo-Saxon accounting model, which meant 
that they differed from the Continental European accounting model, and adopting these 
standards would therefore cause various entities’ loss of authority and authoritative power over 
publicly-listed companies. Nevertheless, EU capital market issuers’ and investors’ needs for 
unified or globalised accounting regulations were catered for when the EC accelerated EU 
countries’ harmonisation of accounting standards by mandating adoption of IFRS. This 
suggests that the coercive first dimension of power was strong, rather than the influence of 
other environmental factors such as national accounting history, culture or authority, because 
after the EC mandated this move, all EU jurisdictions without exception adopted these 
standards, meaning that no country challenged or disobeyed the EC. 
Since EU governments and NASBs all endorsed EU-adopted IFRS for group financial 
statements, they behaved similarly toward the standards, so their outcomes were isomorphic. 
The EC’s domination over governments and NASBs meant that a single entity caused this 
isomorphic behaviour. Based on the theoretical framework of this study, their isomorphoism 
is explained by the coercive first dimension of power, rather than the influence of any other 
component of the framework. Although the accounting histories and culture of many EU 
countries differ from the IFRS, and adopting these standards would hamper their authority over 
publicly-listed companies’ accounting standards, these obstacles were overcome as a result of 
the EC’s strong influence and exercise of power. However, in the case of IFRS for SMEs, since 
the EC did not exercise its power to mandate the standard’s adoption, its latent power led EU 
jurisdictions’ behaviour to vary. The findings of this study suggest that, although the EC had 
the capacity to exert coercive power, since it did not do so, other visible and unseen 
environmental factors influenced the final outcomes and behaviour of governments and NASBs 
toward IFRS for SMEs. 
The findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 suggest that, in the case of IFRS for SMEs, the 
FRC’s, ASCG’s, DASB’s and OIC’s decision-making processes were not isomorphic but 
dissimilar. Although they were influenced by similar visible environmental factors, including 
the EC directives, national governments, laws and stakeholders, and unseen environmental 
factors such as authority, national accounting history and culture, these factors differed in 
prominence and exerted varying levels of influence, with differing characteristics inhibiting 
isomorphism. This explains the causes of jurisdictions’ varying behaviours toward IFRS for 
SMEs, and the UK’s major modifications prior to the standard’s adoption. It also indicates a 
need to create a version of the developed framework for each jurisdiction to capture its own 
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unique interrelationships. In so doing, it shows the strength of some visible and unseen 
environmental factors and relevant entities with regard to the phenomenon under investigation. 
Since the strength of visible and unseen environmental factors differ in prominence and 
characteristics, they are colour coded according to the extent to which they are consistent with 
or support the entities’ own characteristics relating to IFRS for SMEs adoption decisions. A 
dark green colour suggests that an entity supported adoption of IFRS for SMEs as issued by 
the IASB, or the standard’s adoption did not influence or hinder characteristics such as 
authority. It also suggests that the entity’s national accounting history and culture is consistent 
with IFRS for SMEs. Light green suggests that an entity did not generally prohibit or oppose 
adoption of IFRS for SMEs, but that certain inconsistencies prevented its adoption as issued 
by the IASB. Alternatively, changes and modifications would have been needed prior to 
adopting the standard in order to preserve the entity’s own characteristics, including authority, 
or eliminate contradictions. It also suggests certain inconsistencies between the standard and 
national accounting history and culture. A grey colour suggests that the factor is neutral and 
neither supported, rejected nor was influenced by adoption of IFRS for SMEs. Light red 
suggests that an entity did not generally support rather than oppose adoption of IFRS for SMEs 
because many inconsistencies prevented adoption of the standard as issued by the IASB. 
Alternatively, changes and modifications would have been needed in order to preserve the 
entity’s characteristics or eliminate contradictions, but these changes were deemed 
inappropriate or received little support. It also suggests that the standard and national 
accounting history and culture differ significantly. Dark red suggests that an entity strongly 
opposed adoption of IFRS for SMEs owing to inconsistencies preventing its adoption as issued 
by the IASB. Alternatively, such a move would have hampered or hindered its features, so the 
required modifications were deemed impractical, burdensome and costly and adoption was not 
supported. It also suggests that despite differences between the standard and national 
accounting history and culture, there may also be some similarities. 
Hence, the findings of this study develop the skeletal theoretical framework by showing that 
not all components were relevant or needed to explain the phenomenon under investigation. 
There was little support that the second and third dimensions of power and mimetic and 
normative types of pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy were relevant. Rather, evidence 
suggested that the coercive first dimension of power, authority, history and culture were 
relevant. Furthermore, the findings provide the skeletal theoretical framework with needed 
flesh to make it meaningful and useful for other studies, by explaining how and to what extent 
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the components identified as relevant influenced governments’ and NASBs’ final outcomes. 
The skeletal framework also offers a general language and patterns to allow exploration and 
investigation of the phenomenon under investigation. Figures 7.1–7.4 present developed 
versions of the theoretical framework of this study based on the empirical findings for the UK, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Italy respectively. 
The next section discusses the version of the theoretical framework for the UK based on the 
findings of this study. 
7.3 Version of the theoretical framework for the UK 
In the UK, both visible and unseen environmental factors influenced adoption of IFRS for 
SMEs. Visible factors included the coercive first dimension of power, which captures the 
influence of the EC, the UK government and national stakeholders. These entities provide a 
deeper understanding of the phenomenon under investigation because they had varying levels 
of influence and differing perceptions of the standard. National stakeholders were the entities 
least capable of influencing the UK NASB because they had no direct authority over the 
decision-making process. Rather, they were offered various opportunities throughout the 
decision-making process to indirectly influence or lobby the UK NASB, or as a last resort the 
UK government, in order for their needs to be addressed. Although UK stakeholders generally 
supported the adoption of IFRS for SMEs, they did not support the ASB’s first proposal to 
adopt the standard as issued by the IASB, because it would have been costly and cumbersome 
for many entities, including not-for-profit organisations. As a result, national stakeholders 
demanded certain changes, including the removal of distinction between entities based on 
public accountability. In 2012 the FRC acceded to their suggestions and removed these features 
from FRS 102 prior to its endorsement in 2015. Since national stakeholders did not support 
adoption of the standard as issued by the IASB but were not generally against it, they are 
represented in light green rather than dark green in Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1: developed theoretical framework based on empirical findings for the UK 
Source: Author’s own work 
The UK government was the second most influential entity as a result of its explicit and direct 
influence over the UK NASB because the latter had to adhere to and comply with the UK’s 
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companies acts. However, the UK government was not directly involved in the UK NASB’s 
decision-making process because it had relinquished its authoritative power to the latter; 
instead, it was indirectly involved as a result of its status as an observer. The UK government’s 
indirect involvement meant that its relationship with the UK NASB was flexible because the 
latter was able to request changes or modifications to the UK’s companies acts which it 
believed were needed to allow certain accounting changes, and in some cases the government 
complied. Furthermore, since national stakeholders had to comply with two different sets of 
rules issued by the FRC for financial reporting purposes and HMRC for tax purposes, UK tax 
regulations were weakly linked to national accounting standards. This weak linkage meant that 
adoption of IFRS for SMEs as issued by the IASB was impossible because the FRC would 
have to make certain adjustments, including to derivatives and hedge accounting treatments, in 
order to comply with the UK’s tax system. This suggests that although the UK government 
permitted adoption of IFRS for SMEs, changes were needed to allow such a move because the 
standard was not identical to the UK’s companies acts. The UK government is therefore 
represented in light green rather than dark green in Figure 7.1. 
However, the UK government was not the only authoritative entity with which the UK NASB 
has to comply; it also had to comply with the EC. Since the EC has significant influential power 
over all EU governments, it also has substantial power over NASBs because all EC directives 
must be incorporated into national accounting standards, making it the most influential entity 
over their decision-making processes. Unlike the case of IFRS adoption in the EU, the EC did 
not dominate the UK NASB’s decision-making process in the case of IFRS for SMEs because 
the standard was not endorsed. However, during early stages of the adoption process, in order 
for the FRC to comply with the EC’s Fourth and Seventh Directives, certain changes, including 
to negative goodwill, were needed due to inconsistencies between the directives and the 
standard. However, in 2013 the EC updated the Fourth Directive, eliminating many 
inconsistencies between it and IFRS for SMEs and hence easing adoption of the standard. 
Although a few of the FRC’s modifications were made to comply with the EC directives, 
inconsistencies between the standard and the directives were not considered roadblocks, since 
the UK adopted the standard with modifications and complied with the EC. Nevertheless, since 
a few inconsistencies between the standard and the Fourth Directive remain, adoption of IFRS 
for SMEs as issued by the IASB is impossible in the EU; thus, the EC is represented in light 
green rather than dark green in Figure 7.1. These entities were identified by the theoretical 
framework of this study as relevant and important to understanding the UK NASB’s decision-
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making process, and their level of influence was captured through the framework’s first 
dimension of power. Since no entity dominated the process, other components of the 
framework were also deemed significant to understanding the phenomenon under 
investigation, including accounting history and culture. 
For decades, the UK has been setting its own accounting regulations, which have a long 
tradition of using the “true and fair view”. Since incorporation of this phrase into the UK’s 
1948 Companies Act, it has been widely used in many of the UK NASB’s accounting 
standards, indicating its importance. When the EC mandated adoption of IFRS in 2002, the UK 
NASB suggested that adopting these standards did not hinder the UK’s long history of the “true 
and fair view” because IFRS’s “fair presentation” is equivalent to the UK’s “true and fair 
view”. This suggests that adopting IFRS for SMEs was possible because it did not hinder the 
UK’s long history of the “true and fair view”, as well as because IFRS’s “fair presentation” 
was used and exists in IFRS for SMEs. 
Furthermore, in 1990 the ASC, the UK’s former NASB, was reformed and the ASB was formed 
and modelled based on the US FASB, in order to enhance the board’s independence from the 
accounting profession. This meant that the ASB was proximate to the Anglo-Saxon accounting 
model. The IASB’s Anglo-Saxon accounting model was deemed significant because it caused 
the IASB’s accounting standards to be closer to other countries with an Anglo-Saxon 
accounting model, including the UK. Also, the UK NASB often directly participates in and 
provides support for the IASB’s process of issuing accounting standards, and since the IASB’s 
headquarters is in London, its standards, including IFRS for SMEs, are proximate to the UK’s 
accounting history and culture. Such proximity meant that the standard was similar but not 
identical to previous UK GAAP; for instance, the former prohibited accounting options such 
as revaluation of long-term assets that were deemed historically and culturally acceptable. The 
FRC had to reintroduce these accounting treatments prior to the UK’s endorsement of the 
standard, meaning that the UK’s accounting history and culture were similar but not identical 
to IFRS for SMEs. These factors are therefore represented in light green rather than dark green 
in Figure 7.1. 
In addition to national accounting history and culture and the coercive first dimension of power, 
authority was also deemed to be a relevant component of the theoretical framework, because 
endorsing accounting standards other than those developed or created oneself means that 
another entity dictates national accounting regulations, indicating loss of authoritative power. 
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The UK’s long history of setting its own regulations and rules meant that adopting IFRS for 
SMEs as issued by the IASB would hamper regulators’ authority because they would have to 
give up this task to another entity. Although the UK government relinquished its authority to 
the UK’s NASB, adoption of the standard as issued by the IASB meant that the UK’s NASB 
would lose its role as a regulator and would be reduced to a mere mediator between UK entities 
and the IASB. It would also have meant that the UK government would have to surrender its 
legislative power to the IASB, which would be hard to manage because it is subject to lobbying 
by many entities, rather than an entity that can easily oversee and observe. The UK NASB’s 
authority derives from the government having relinquished this feature, meaning it is not self-
generated. In order to overcome these issues, the FRC followed the EC’s approach and 
protected its authoritative power by adopting the standard with carve-outs, as well as 
introducing many and frequent changes, including renaming it to FRS 102 prior to its 
endorsement in 2015. Based on the theoretical framework of this study, since a single entity or 
factor did not dominate the UK NASB’s decision-making process, the findings suggest that 
visible and unseen environmental factors generally supported its adoption of IFRS for SMEs 
and it is therefore represented in light green. These factors were not identical to the standard 
because there were obstacles and inconsistencies among them, which prevents its 
representation in dark green. This explains the reasons for the major modifications introduced 
prior to the standard’s endorsement, as shown in Figure 7.1. 
The next section discusses the version of the theoretical framework for Germany based on the 
findings of this study. 
7.4 Version of the theoretical framework for Germany 
Despite the influence of similar visible and unseen environmental factors on the UK’s and 
Germany’s behaviour toward IFRS for SMEs, the latter did not adopt the standard as issued by 
the IASB nor with modifications. According to the theoretical framework of this study, visible 
environmental factors included the coercive first dimension of power, which captures relevant 
influential entities such as the EC, the Ministry of Justice, the ASCG and German SMEs. 
Although the ASCG is the German NASB, its role is only advisory to the Ministry of Justice, 
meaning the latter is the final decision maker with regard to national GAAP and tax legislation. 
The Ministry of Justice’s involvement in the ASCG’s decision-making process is limited 
because the former is allowed to take totally different decisions from those proposed or 
suggested by the ASCG. In order for the ASCG’s suggestions or proposals to be considered, 
they must comply with and adhere to German legislation, and once the Ministry of Justice 
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confirms their compliance, it publishes them in the Federal Gazette. Publication of the ASCG’s 
standards does not make them authoritative or compulsory; rather, entities are advised to 
comply with them because doing so means that their financial statements are taken as 
complying with national GAAP. Since the Ministry of Justice is responsible for issuing and 
maintaining national GAAP and tax legislation, SMEs quickly lobbied it and strongly opposed 
consideration or incorporation of IFRS for SMEs when it was issued in 2009. Their demands 
were catered to because the government tends to protect them. One explanation for German 
SMEs’ strong opposition to the standard was their cautiousness. As a result of their disapproval, 
they are represented in dark red in Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2: developed theoretical framework based on empirical findings for Germany 
Source: Author’s own work 
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promote German SMEs’ view in case the EC or the Ministry of Justice endorsed it. This was 
because the ASCG perceived that the standard’s adoption would be useful for German SMEs, 
which led it to call for its endorsement in the EU and to substitute it for German tax legislation 
and national GAAP. The theoretical framework of this study incorporates and highlights the 
relevance of entities’ authority, which offers another explanation for the ASCG’s behaviour. 
Since the ASCG’s role is only as an advisor rather than a decision maker, replacing the national 
GAAP and tax system with IFRS for SMEs would not have reduced its authoritative power 
because it does not have any such power. As a result of its strong support, the ASCG is therefore 
represented in dark green in Figure 7.2. However, in 2010 the EC concluded that IFRS for 
SMEs would not be endorsed in the EU, which caused the ASCG to focus less strongly on it, 
because it would be working on a standard knowing that it would not be mandated. This 
suggests that, owing to the ASCG’s lack of authority, it was hoping that the EC would mandate 
adoption of the standard, because without the latter’s involvement this would be unlikely to 
occur. Thus, the EC did not dominate Germany’s decision with regard to IFRS for SMEs, 
unlike the case of IFRS. 
Contrary to the UK government, which had surrendered its authority over national accounting 
standards to the FRC, the Ministry of Justice was reluctant to do so because this would have 
negative consequences owing to, for instance, the strong link between the German tax system 
and national GAAP. This strong link meant that in order for that the Ministry of Justice to adopt 
IFRS for SMEs, it would have to overhaul its tax system or follow the UK’s approach and 
weaken the link. These options were deemed unsuitable because they were considered costly, 
complicated and unappealing. Weakening the link between taxation and national GAAP would 
mean that German SMEs would have to understand and adhere to two different sets of rules 
for taxation and financial reporting purposes, rather than a single set, which was considered 
costly and unattractive. Adopting IFRS for SMEs for tax purposes would also have been costly 
and complicated for the Ministry of Justice because it would have to retrain its IRS in 
accordance with the standard, and above all it would hamper its authoritative power over tax 
legislation. Consequently, authority and the Ministry of Justice are represented in dark red in 
Figure 7.2. 
Although the coercive first dimension of power and authority influenced Germany’s behaviour 
toward IFRS for SMEs, its accounting history and culture also influenced the final outcome. 
In Germany, during the 1870s and 1920s, two crises occurred that were attributed to use of fair 
value measurements. As a result, use of fair value was prohibited and historical cost accounting 
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was reintroduced, which allowed hidden reserves. However, the IASB’s Anglo-Saxon 
accounting model means that its accounting standards, including IFRS for SMEs, support the 
use of fair value measurement, transparency and detailed disclosure. These features are not 
compatible with Germany’s historically and culturally embedded accounting traditions, 
including the creation of hidden reserves and minimal disclosure. Also, Germany’s Continental 
European accounting model differs from the IASB’s Anglo-Saxon accounting model because 
the former emphasises taxation and creditors while the latter informs and concentrates on 
investors. Therefore, Germany’s behaviour toward IFRS for SMEs was not dominated by a 
single entity or factor, but rather by many interrelated visible and unseen environmental factors 
that were inconsistent with the standard, so the overall colour of the framework is shown in 
dark red in Figure 7.2. 
The next section discusses the Netherland’s version of the theoretical framework based on the 
findings of this study. 
7.5 Version of the theoretical framework for the Netherlands 
In the case of the Netherlands, the Dutch government, the EC and national stakeholders were 
deemed influential entities relevant to understanding the DASB’s behaviour toward IFRS for 
SMEs. Dutch stakeholders were deemed a significant entity because they directly and indirectly 
influenced the DASB’s decision-making process. This is because their representatives are part 
of the board and they are able to submit comment letters during the consultation stage or at any 
time if they wish to raise concerns. The lack of comments submitted to the DASB and the 
findings of this study suggest that national stakeholders had no appetite or support for IFRS for 
SMEs because they were satisfied with their national GAAP, leading to their representation in 
dark red in Figure 7.3. 
Unlike the German Federal Ministry of Justice, the Dutch government is indirectly involved 
with the DASB decision-making process as a result of its status as an observer. However, since 
the Dutch government depends heavily on national GAAP for tax purposes, meaning they are 
strongly linked, for reasons similar to those of the German Federal Ministry of Justice, 
including costliness and authority, adopting IFRS for SMEs was deemed burdensome. For 
instance, the Dutch government would have had to change its tax system and relinquish its 
authoritative power to the IASB. Also, adopting IFRS for SMEs would mean that the Dutch 
government would not be able to observe and oversee the IASB to ensure that the standard was 
in accordance with national legislation. This is because the Dutch government plays no direct 
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role in the IASB’s decision-making process, unlike its explicit and direct authority over the 
DASB because the latter is required to comply with the former’s laws and regulations. The 
Dutch government is thus represented in dark red in Figure 7.3. 
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Figure 7.3: developed theoretical framework based on empirical findings for the Netherlands 
Source: Author’s own work 
Although the ASCG supported adoption of IFRS for SMEs and argued that inconsistencies 
between the standard and the EC directives were minor and should not prevent the standard’s 
adoption, the DASB thought otherwise. Since the DASB had to comply with the EC directives, 
it argued that the inconsistencies highlighted by EFRAG were incomplete and that they were a 
roadblock to endorsement of IFRS for SMEs. Although the EC did not dominate the decision-
making process because the standard was not endorsed in the EU, the directives were used as 
a technical excuse to argue against its adoption. However, in 2013 the EC updated the Fourth 
Directive, which removed some but not all inconsistencies, making adoption of IFRS for SMEs 
easier, yet the DASB did not make such a move. One explanation for the DASB’s reluctance 
to adopt the standard was its fear of losing the remainder of its authoritative power, because 
such a move would have meant it becoming a mediator for the IASB, so adoption would have 
negatively influenced it, unlike the ASCG. As a result of the DASB’s behaviour toward IFRS 
for SMEs, it is represented in dark red in Figure 7.3. Also, the DASB’s and the Dutch 
government’s authority would be negatively affected by the standard’s adoption, so these are 
also represented in dark red in Figure 7.3. 
In addition to the relevance of these factors in the theoretical framework, national history and 
culture are also relevant. The Netherlands has a long history and tradition of setting its own 
laws and regulations, including accounting standards. A particular feature of Dutch accounting 
history and culture is segregation between SMEs and listed entities. Also, since the Dutch tax 
system is strongly linked to national GAAP, the latter is strongly oriented toward the 
Continental European accounting model. These features differ significantly from the IASB’s 
Anglo-Saxon accounting model because, for instance, the IASB only weakly distinguish 
between listed entities and SMEs, since IFRS for SMEs was modelled on the conceptual 
framework and standards of IFRS. In other words, rather than creating a new standard using a 
bottom-up approach, based on and tailored to SMEs’ and their users’ needs, the IASB assumed 
that these entities have similar needs and uses of financial statements to publicly listed 
companies, and instead adopted a top-down approach. These inconsistencies led the standard 
to differ from historically and culturally accepted accounting traditions, so they are represented 
in dark red in Figure 7.3. Thus, unlike the Netherlands’ adoption of IFRS, which was due to 
the influence of the EC and can be explained by the coercive first dimension of power, its 
rejection of IFRS for SMEs was due to the standard’s lack of approval and inconsistencies, 
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with many interrelated visible and unseen environmental factors, as shown in the overall red 
colour of Figure 7.3. 
The next section discusses the version of the theoretical framework for Italy based on the 
findings of this study. 
7.6 Version of the theoretical framework for Italy 
In Italy, unlike the case of IFRS adoption, IFRS for SMEs was not rejected as a result of a 
single factor or entity; rather, multiple interrelated entities and factors caused the outcome. 
Similarly to the Netherlands, Italian stakeholders are able to directly and indirectly influence 
the OIC’s decision-making process because they are offered opportunities to provide comment 
letters and are represented on the board. The lack of publicly available documents to indicate 
that Italian stakeholders demanded or supported adoption of IFRS for SMEs and the findings 
of this study suggest that it was not called for or preferred because they were satisfied with 
national GAAP. As a result, they are represented in dark red in Figure 7.4. One explanation for 
their satisfaction is that national GAAP is strongly linked to the Italian tax system, so they are 
required to comply with a single set of rules for taxation and financial reporting purposes. This 
is because the OIC must adhere to and comply with the Italian government’s laws and 
regulations meaning the latter has explicit and direct authority over the former. In order to 




Figure 7.4: developed theoretical framework based on empirical findings for Italy 
Source: Author’s own work 
Similarly to the Dutch government, the Italian government’s dependence on national GAAP 
for tax purposes provides an explanation for its observer status and annually mandated reports 
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because, for instance, adopting IFRS for SMEs would require tax regulations to be overhauled 
or would weaken reliance on national GAAP. These solutions were considered unsuitable 
because they would be costly and unjustifiable. Also, adopting the standard would mean that 
the Italian government would lose its authority over its tax regulations, meaning that the IASB, 
an overseas entity located in London, would determine and regulate such important legislation. 
The Italian government did not support such an approach, and is therefore represented in dark 
red in Figure 7.4. 
Similarly to the DASB, the OIC perceived inconsistencies between the EC directives and IFRS 
for SMEs as a roadblock and a reason for its rejection in the EU and Italy. The EC directives 
were deemed a technical excuse because the EC had updated the Fourth Directive, eliminating 
many but not all inconsistencies, suggesting that the EC did not dominate Italy’s behaviour 
toward the standard. Despite the updated directive easing adoption of IFRS for SMEs, the OIC 
did not call for its adoption. Based on the theoretical framework of this study, the OIC’s 
authoritative power partially explains its resistance and reluctance to adopt the standard, 
because doing so would cause it to lose its recently acquired authoritative power, dragging it 
backward by turning it into an advisor or intermediary between national entities and the IASB. 
Owing to its behaviour toward the standard, the OIC is represented in dark red in Figure 7.4. 
The theoretical framework also reveals Italian national history and culture to be relevant factors 
that explain Italy’s behaviour toward IFRS for SMEs. Italy is known for its long history of 
writing its own rules and regulations, and a fundamental feature of its historical and cultural 
accounting traditions is its severance payments. These payments are recognised by Italian law, 
meaning that all companies must recognise and record them. Adopting IFRS for SMEs would 
change the accounting recognition of service payments into pension benefits, which would be 
very complicated and costly. In other words, the standard’s adoption would require every 
company, regardless of size, to use this complex accounting treatment, because service 
payments are part of Italian law. Also, since Italy’s strong link between taxation and national 
GAAP suggests that it is oriented toward the Continental European accounting model, the 
IASB’s Anglo-Saxon accounting model was considered a significant disadvantage because the 
former focuses on taxation and is geared toward informing creditors, while the latter focuses 
on providing information for investors. Thus, IFRS for SMEs differed significantly from Italy’s 
national accounting history and culture, so these factors are represented in dark red in Figure 
7.4. Since the standard was neither called for nor similar to the OIC’s visible and unseen 
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environmental factors, its rejection was due to these interrelated factors rather than the 
domination of a single entity or factor, as shown by the overall dark red of Figure 7.4. 
Although the developed theoretical frameworks for the Netherlands and Italy are broadly 
similar, they cannot be combined into a single framework because different visible and unseen 
environmental factors influenced these jurisdictions’ behaviour toward IFRS for SMEs. For 
instance, in the case of the Netherlands, the IASB’s weak distinction between SMEs and public 
entities was deemed culturally and historically significant, whereas in the case of Italy, 
inconsistencies between IFRS for SMEs and service payments were considered significant. 
Furthermore, although the EC was the most influential entity over governments’ and NASBs’ 
decision-making processes, since it did not mandate adoption of IFRS for SMEs, its latent 
power permitted other visible and unseen environmental factors to influence the financial 
decisions. This differs from the case of IFRS, where the EC’s exercise of power is captured by 
the theoretical framework as the dominant reason for adopting these standards in the EU. This 
shows that the theoretical framework is capable of capturing different entities’ latent or actual 
exercise of power, as well as dissimilar environmental factors that may influence similar 
decision-making processes. Thus, the theoretical framework helps explain NASBs’ various 
behaviours toward IFRS for SMEs, and deepens understanding of their decision-making 
processes by showing the strength and influence of differing visible and unseen environmental 
factors that influence final outcomes in different ways. 
7.7 Conclusion 
In summary, governments’ and NASBs’ varying behaviours toward IFRS for SMEs were not 
mainly a result of cost–benefit analyses nor domination of a single entity such as the EC, nor 
can they be explained by a single factor such as the coercive first dimension of power. Unlike 
the EU’s adoption of IFRS, since the EC did not mandate adoption of IFRS for SMEs, its latent 
power allowed many interrelated visible and unseen environmental factors to influence and 
cause such variations. These factors played different roles, and had differing levels of influence 
and varying characteristics in each jurisdiction.  
They are therefore key to gaining a deeper understanding of governments’ and NASBs’ 
behaviours and decision-making processes, yet have been overlooked with regard to the various 
behaviours toward IFRS for SMEs in the EU. However, the interviewees presented their own 
views of their institutions’ decision-making processes as a result of close involvement, so these 
findings cannot be empirically generalised. According to the MRT approach, the findings 
185 
provide valuable flesh for the skeletal theoretical framework, showing that it is capable of 
providing a deeper understanding of NASBs’ decision-making processes, and can be used to 
examine other related accounting phenomena, in that they offer theoretical rather than 
empirical generalisations. The next chapter concludes this thesis by discussing the 
contributions and limitations of this study and making suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study was to investigate NASBs’ decision-making processes with regard to 
IFRS for SMEs. EU jurisdictions’ behaviours toward the standard varied, even though they are 
all obliged to comply with the EC’s accounting directives. This study examined the reasons for 
the diverse behaviours of the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy toward the standard, 
using it as a vehicle to gain a deeper understanding of their processes, and of how and what 
entities and factors influenced the final outcomes. The skeletal theoretical framework, based 
on previous literature, highlighted the existence of general patterns with regard to NASBs’ 
decision-making processes, but did not explain the complexity of interrelated factors 
influencing the adoption or non-adoption of IFRS for SMEs. The findings, on the other hand, 
added needed meat on the bones of the skeletal theoretical framework and explained the 
complexity of these decisions. 
Section 8.2 explains the contributions of this study, and Sections 8.3 to 8.5 discuss its 
limitations, implications, and suggest areas for future research respectively. 
8.2 Contributions 
This study makes both theoretical and practical contributions, as discussed in the next sub-
sections. 
8.2.1 Theoretical contributions 
Laughlin’s (1995, 2004, 2007) MRT approach permits preliminary understanding of 
phenomena based on previous literature. Laughlin describes the MRT approach as a method to 
“flesh out” a theoretical “skeleton”. The “skeletal” theory may indicate the existence of general 
patterns, and empirical evidence is then needed to substantiate and make the theory more 
meaningful. In other words, the skeletal framework offers a language through which to 
understand the empirical findings, and the findings validate and help develop the skeletal 
theory. 
Although institutional theory provides a useful theoretical lens through which to explore and 
understand the phenomenon under investigation, it has been criticised for its oversimplified 
recognition of legitimacy (e.g. Dart 2004; Phillips and Malhotra 2008; Scott 2008) and weak 
consideration of power (e.g. Cloutier and Langley 2013). Dillard et al. (2004) suggest that 
incorporating structuration theory into institutional theory enabled them to mitigate 
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institutional theory’s limitations and led to a better articulation of the phenomenon they 
investigated. In a similar approach, this study incorporates theories of power and legitimacy 
into institutional theory to enable a deeper understanding of NASBs’ decision making 
processes. 
In this study, a power theory, more specifically Lukes’s (1974, 1977, 2005) work on power 
including his three dimensions of power, is used to articulate how coercive pressure has various 
dimensions depending on the implicit or explicit power an individual, entity or group of entities 
has over agenda items and decision-making processes. The use of such power may, for 
instance, permit or prohibit different actors’ participation in NASBs’ decision-making 
processes. Legitimacy theory, more specifically Suchman’s (1995) different types of 
legitimacy, is used to articulate how different types of legitimacy may influence an NASB’s 
tolerance of or compliance with various environmental factors. Moreover, an NASB’s 
perception of their authority and national accounting history and culture form an important part 
of the skeletal theoretical framework of this study because these factors help further explain 
and understand NASBs’ decision-making processes and their behaviour. Thus, the theoretical 
framework of this study proposes a social-theory-based framework for expanding institutional 
theory to better articulate institutionalisation processes. 
The findings of this study enriched its skeletal theoretical framework with empirical evidence 
that explains how and to what extent the identified relevant parts of the framework influenced 
EU NASBs’ decision-making processes and behaviours toward IFRS for SMEs. The findings 
of this study strongly suggest the importance and relevance of coercive first dimension of 
power to understand the phenomenon under investigation. This is owing to NASBs decision-
making processes cannot be classified as a “mixed power system” as they must comply with 
EC directives, national governments, and national stakeholders, respectively. That is, NASBs 
tolerance and compliance with these actors differed depending on their acquisition level and 
exercise of power. The coercive second dimension of power was only relevant in the case of 
the UK because the perception of the UK NASB’s chair influenced, and to some extent 
dominated, some stages of the decision-making process. Moreover, the findings suggest that 
NASBs’ perceptions of their authority influenced their decision-making processes and 
behaviour toward IFRS for SMEs. Because they often only regulate national accounting 
standards, they thought to protect the reminder of their authority by rejecting the standard or 
modifying it prior to its adoption. In other words, adopting IFRS for SMEs, as issued by the 
IASB, would reduce them to mere mediators between their national stakeholders and the IASB. 
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Since EU jurisdictions’ national accounting history and culture differ significantly, the findings 
of this study also suggest that such differences further explain governments’ and NASBs’ 
varying behaviours toward IFRS for SMEs. Because these historically and culturally accepted 
accounting treatments indirectly mandated certain changes or led to rejection of the standard. 
Even though the findings of this study suggest the relevance and importance of coercive first 
dimension of power, authority, accounting history and culture, and the second dimension of 
power in the case of the UK, they provided little support for the relevance of the third dimension 
of power, mimetic and normative dimensions of pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy, 
because they did not help explain the data gathered. However, despite these parts of the 
theoretical framework being deemed less important in this study, they should not be excluded 
from the framework. Rather, they indicate that the framework has the capacity to explain more 
complicated issues which have not been discussed in this study. Thus, the expansion of 
institutional theory based on the findings and theoretical framework of this study enables it to 
better articulate political and socio-economic contexts and further addresses the dynamics of 
enacting, embedding and changing organisational processes. 
8.2.2 Practical contributions 
This study makes several practical contributions in addition to the theoretical contributions 
discussed above. Kaya and Koch (2015) and Saucke (2015) have argued that jurisdictions’ 
behaviour toward IFRS for SMEs was based on cost–benefit analysis because they focused 
mainly on these issues, meaning their results were influenced mainly by perceived costs and 
benefits. Also, they have argued that EU countries were unlikely to adopt the standard, or at 
most would adopt but greatly modify it, because the EC opposed it owing to its inconsistencies 
with its directives. However, the findings suggest that, although the EC exerted a significant 
influence on EU jurisdictions, it was not the main reason for their differing responses to IFRS 
for SMEs, because the updated version of the Fourth Directive 2013/34/EU eliminated the vast 
majority of incompatibilities between the standard and the directive. Governments and NASBs 
had varying perceptions, and although they were influenced by similar environmental factors, 
these factors varied in nature. Interviewees and publicly available documents revealed the 
complexity of adoption and non-adoption decisions, because many entities and factors 
influenced the final outcomes. This indicates that the decisions were not based solely on cost–
benefit analyses, but rather on various interrelated visible and unseen environmental factors. 
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The IASB argued that a key advantage of adopting IFRS for SMEs was harmonisation of 
SMEs’ accounting standards. Scholars (Aboagye‐Otchere and Agbeibor 2012; Bartůňková 
2013; Hoxha 2014; Buculescu and Dutescu 2018; Sellami and Gafsi 2018) have argued that, 
in developing countries, harmonisation of SMEs’ accounting regulations is not seen as a benefit 
because SMEs generally do not seek international investors or foreign markets. Similarly, this 
study has revealed similar perceptions by NASBs, further extending the current literature by 
illustrating that NASBs in developed countries, including Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, 
believe that their national SMEs would not benefit from harmonising accounting regulations 
because the standard would only benefit medium-sized entities. Thus, developed countries also 
do not see significant benefits from harmonising some SMEs’ accounting regulations or 
adopting IFRS for SMEs. 
The UK and Ireland are the only EU jurisdictions that have adopted IFRS for SMEs with major 
modifications. The findings of this study extend previous literature by explaining what caused 
these major modifications. Some of the early modifications were due partly to the EC, but were 
also influenced by the ASB’s environment. However, later modifications of the standard were 
introduced to preserve the UK’s historical and cultural accounting traditions, including the 
introduction of revaluation of long-term assets. The findings show that even if jurisdictions 
adopt IFRS for SMEs, SMEs’ financial statements may differ nationally and internationally. 
The UK modified the standard prior to its adoption in order to make it fit with its environment. 
If other jurisdictions also do so, this will lead to different versions of IFRS for SMEs. Thus, it 
is difficult to harmonise SMEs’ financial statements, and the process is theoretical rather than 
empirical, as was the case for IFRS. 
Many advantages of the standard’s adoption were attributed to its shared conceptual framework 
with IFRS, including ease of SMEs’ transition to public companies. This finding suggests that 
many advantages of IFRS for SMEs were not based on features of the standard per se, but 
rather on its closeness to IFRS, so if a jurisdiction has not adopted IFRS, it is unlikely to adopt 
IFRS for SMEs. Therefore, if governments and NASBs have not evaluated their national 
accounting regulations and the standard prior to their decisions, they should do so in order to 
better assess the standard’s usefulness in their jurisdictions. 
8.3 Limitations 
This study was conducted using a qualitative approach due to its appropriateness for examining 
social phenomena. NASBs are similar to other entities, in that their decision-making processes 
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are social phenomena. Despite a well-designed research plan based on previous literature, this 
study unavoidably has several limitations. 
The first limitation is generalisability. A qualitative approach was adopted because it is a 
preferred method when investigating questions relating to how social experience is created 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2000), whereas quantitative studies are seldom able to capture 
participants’ perceptions because they tend to rely on remote, inferential empirical methods 
rather than engaging closely with participants (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). However, semi-
structured interviews capture only interviewees’ personal perceptions, limiting their 
generalisation because these perceptions may not be representative of their organisations. Thus, 
interviewees’ responses in this study represented their own views of their organisations’ 
decision-making processes as a result of their close involvement with their organisations and 
their external environment. Nevertheless, this rich data, including interviews with former and 
current board members and analysis of publicly available documents, provides internal validity 
for the findings on NASBs’ decision-making processes. 
The second limitation of this study relates to the use of IFRS for SMEs as a case study to 
investigate EU NASBs’ decision-making processes. Scholars have criticised case studies for 
their lack of empirical generalisability. Since this research used a case study approach, it cannot 
claim generalisability of the results to other NASBs not discussed in this study, because they 
may have been influenced by other factors not deemed relevant to this study, such as 
involvement by the World Bank. Yet despite the potentially limited empirical generalisability 
of the findings, the study’s contribution to understanding NASBs’ decision-making processes 
should not be ignored since it has theoretical generalisability (see Sub-section 8.2.1) and makes 
empirical contributions (see Sub-section 8.2.2). The value of IFRS for SMEs as a case study 
lies in its consideration to change national accounting regulations. This indicates the standard’s 
importance and suggests that its adoption or non-adoption was influenced by visible and unseen 
environmental factors relating to governments and NASBs. Investigation of EU jurisdictions’ 
behaviour toward the standard offers an illustrative example of the influence of these factors 
and various entities on the decision-making process, showing the complexity of both this 
process and the issuance of accounting regulations. 
The third limitation of this study is that it was sometimes difficult to obtain secondary data to 
validate interviewees’ responses because data were not publicly available or had never been 
produced. In the case of Germany, the ASCG had received many comment letters, but these 
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were not publicly available. After requesting these letters, it turned out that they had been lost 
owing to changes to the ASCG’s website. In Italy and the Netherlands, the NASBs never 
requested any comment letters from their external stakeholders, so publicly available 
documents were limited. However, this study referred to previous literature to minimise this 
issue. 
The fourth limitation relates to time issues. Limited time was a major obstacle because field 
work requires a vast amount of time and preparation. NASBs rarely agreed to participate, and 
often did not have time for follow-up interviews. However, this study had to be conducted 
within a specific time frame, and the interviews were conducted within six months to provide 
sufficient time to properly analyse the data. Another issue relating to time was that this study 
investigated IFRS for SMEs nine years after its publication and discussion in the EU. Thus, 
interviewees may have forgotten some issues or may have lacked interest in discussing this 
topic, since it was no longer being discussed within the EU. However, the EC is slowly 
amending the Fourth Directive and bringing it closer to IFRS for SMEs. Many incompatibilities 
have been removed, suggesting that this issue may resurface in the near future as a result of the 
EC’s 2020 Vision of harmonising EU SMEs’ accounting regulations. 
The final limitation of this study relates to the nature of interviews. In some cases, the interview 
sessions were short due to interviewees’ busy schedules, so not all interviewees were asked 
every prepared question. In addition, the nature of semi-structured interviews means that the 
flow of each interview and the issues discussed may differ based on interviewees’ perceptions 
and positions in their organisations; thus, they may not have had an answer for each question 
asked. The quality of digital records also varied significantly. For example, one interview was 
conducted in a restaurant, with background noise on the recording that caused some difficulty 
in the later transcription. In the case of telephone calls, interviewees sometimes had a bad signal 
that caused the line to drop for a few seconds or made their voices unclear. To minimise this 
issue, detailed notes were taken along with the audio-recordings, and clarifications were 
requested in cases of loss of signal or unclear voices. Interview transcripts were also sent to the 
interviewees to minimise transcription errors and offer them a chance to provide any further 
feedback. 
8.4 Implications of the study 
The findings of this study have several important implications for NASBs. Investigations of 
IFRS adoption or non-adoption indicate that many entities influenced the final outcome, 
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including the EC (Burlaud and Colasse 2011) and various other factors, such as authority (e.g. 
Hail et al. 2010; Zeff 2010; Cox 2014; Krishnan 2016; Van Mourik and Walton 2018), history 
and culture (e.g. Mir and Rahaman 2005; Ramanna 2013; Degos et al. 2018). This examination 
of the adoption or non-adoption of IFRS for SMEs in the EU indicates the existence of similar 
factors. 
Investigating the UK’s adoption of IFRS for SMEs with major modifications, and rejection of 
the standard by Germany, the Netherlands and Italy has also shed light on the influence of their 
external environments on their final decisions. Each jurisdiction has its own national 
stakeholders with various levels of influence, and governments with different levels of 
dependence on national GAAP for tax purposes. Understanding these national differences 
would be beneficial for many entities including the IASB. 
The IASB would benefit from this study by understanding how NASBs perceived its IFRS for 
SMEs standard, since this study has investigated the advantages and disadvantages of the 
standard’s adoption. It might consider these issues in its triennial revision in order to make 
adoption more appealing to EU jurisdictions. It should reconsider its assumptions that adoption 
of IFRS for SMEs will lead to harmonisation of SMEs’ financial reporting and that their needs 
are similar to those of public companies. It should also minimise the standard’s extensive 
disclosure requirements and burdensome complexity. In doing so, it might use the EC’s 2020 
Vision to harmonise SMEs’ accounting regulations and lobby it to mandate the standard’s 
adoption in the EU. 
Of relevance to jurisdictions considering adoption of the standard, such as Norway, this study 
shows the influence on adoption decisions of visible factors such as national stakeholders and 
governments, and unseen factors such as authority, history and culture environmental factors. 
These environmental factors should be considered prior to taking the final decision, because 
failure to do so may have negative consequences, including national stakeholders’ non-
compliance with adopted standards, and NASBs’ loss of legitimacy or even dissolution. 
Finally, stakeholders might use this study to understand how their participation influences 
NASBs’ decision-making processes. Their comments and feedback might be relevant and 
might bring to light issues not considered by national boards or their technical teams, which 
might influence final decisions. National stakeholders often participate only if they have 
negative feedback, whereas the interviewees were also keen to encourage participation by those 
offering positive feedback, which would provide support for proposed accounting standards 
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and help issue well-balanced accounting regulations. However, many interviewees agreed that 
national stakeholders may not have the necessary resources or technical experience to provide 
persuasive feedback, and urged NASBs to be proactive in seeking such stakeholders’ opinions 
and simplifying discussions of issues to better assess their needs for and uses of financial 
statements. 
8.5 Suggestions for future research 
This study explored EU jurisdictions’ various behaviours toward IFRS for SMEs. It 
investigated the influence of governments’ and NASBs’ external environment on adoption or 
non-adoption of the standard. The study’s exploratory nature, fleshed out theoretical 
framework and investigation of the influence of visible and unseen environmental factors on 
the overall decision-making process provide a number of opportunities for further research. 
Future research might use this study’s theoretical framework to deepen understanding of 
decision-making by accounting regulators at various stages of their processes. This is because 
various visible and unseen environmental factors may influence regulators throughout their 
decisions to issue, adopt or not adopt accounting standards. In doing so, scholars might extend 
and provide further validation of the theoretical framework and gain a deeper understanding of 
these entities. In the case of IFRS for SMEs, future research might examine the theoretical 
framework in jurisdictions other than those studied here. In particular, an exploration of 
decisions relating to IFRS for SMEs in developing countries might produce a rich source of 
further evidence. 
Finally, many advantages of IFRS for SMEs were deemed by interviewees to be theoretical, 
and thus require further empirical investigation. Future researchers might investigate the 
standard’s advantages in greater depth in order to better inform decisions on adoption or 
rejection. NASBs argued that one of the main reasons for rejecting IFRS for SMEs was national 
SMEs’ lack of appetite. This study focused only on NASBs, so future research might 
investigate national SMEs’ perceptions of the standard in order to verify this claim. 
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Appendix A: Protocol for EFRAG Interviews 
1- Please describe your role and responsibilities during the planning stage and discussion 
period for IFRS for SMEs. 
2- Please describe the process by which the decision with regard to IFRS for SMEs was made. 
Prompt: 
o To what extent was the government involved in the adoption decision? 
o For example, the European Commission? 
3- How would you describe EFRAG advise with regard to IFRS for SMEs? 
4- From your perspective as a member of the EFRAG, what do you see as the three main 
advantages and disadvantages of implementing IFRS for SMEs? 
Prompt: 
o Why do you believe these advantages and disadvantages are significant? 
o What about the common framework for IFRS and IFRS for SMEs? 
5- From your perspective, which three key stakeholders were most important in this decision? 
Prompt: 
o Why do you believe these stakeholders were important? 
6- During the IFRS for SMEs consultation, what views were expressed by key stakeholders? 
Prompt: 
o What were the key stakeholders’ main concerns? 
o Were there any similarities between the views of key stakeholders? 
o How might the key stakeholders’ concerns have been overcome or how were they 
overcome? 
o How did the EFRAG manage any differences between key stakeholders? 
7- How did you interact with the IASB and the EC? 
Prompt: 
o Why do you believe EFRAG dissolved its SME working group? 
o What about the European Parliament specific request that EFRAG should not deal 
with SMEs accounting issues? 
8- Please describe how key stakeholders influenced your organisation’s decision. 




o Why do you believe the UK and Ireland adopted IFRS for SMEs with major 
modifications? 
o Why do you believe the FRC made frequent amendments on FRS 102 since its 
issuance? 
o Why do you believe other EU jurisdictions have not adopted IFRS for SMEs? 
10- Please explain the extent to which the decision regarding IFRS for SMEs aligned with your 
jurisdiction’s financial reporting culture. 
Prompt: 
o Culture is defined as a set of shared beliefs and preferences across entities 
(norms). 
o What about investors’ protection and conservatism? 
11- Were there any political factors that influenced the decision regarding IFRS for SMEs? 
Prompt: 
o Politics is the outcome of interested stakeholders’ influence on other organisations 
and how these stakeholders reach their desired outcomes. 
o What about the influence of the EC and the IASB? 
o Does the FRC decision with regards to IFRS for SMEs have any implications on 
its role or position as the UK national accounting standard setter?  
12- Are there any other important issues you wish to raise? 
13- Can you name anyone else whom it would be useful for me to interview? 
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Appendix B: Protocol for NASBs Interviews 
1- Please describe your role and responsibilities during the planning stage and discussion 
period for IFRS for SMEs. 
2- Please describe the process by which the decision with regard to IFRS for SMEs was made. 
Prompt: 
o To what extent was the government involved in the adoption decision? 
3- How would you describe the decision made in your jurisdiction with regard to IFRS for 
SMEs? 
Prompt: 
o Why do you believe the IASB’s website included the UK and Ireland as IFRS for 
SMEs adopters? 
4- From your perspective as a member of the [Name of NASB], what do you see as the three 
main advantages and disadvantages of implementing IFRS for SMEs? 
Prompt: 
o Why do you believe these advantages and disadvantages are significant? 
o What about the common framework for IFRS and IFRS for SMEs? 
5- From your perspective, which three key stakeholders were most important in this decision? 
Prompt: 
o Why do you believe these stakeholders were important? 
6- During the IFRS for SMEs consultation, what views were expressed by key stakeholders? 
Prompt: 
o What were the key stakeholders’ main concerns? 
o Were there any similarities between the views of key stakeholders? 
o How might the key stakeholders’ concerns have been overcome or how were they 
overcome? 
o How did the [Name of NASB] manage any differences between key stakeholders? 
7- How did you interact with the IASB and the EC? 
8- Please describe how key stakeholders influenced your organisation’s decision. 
9- Are there any decisions on this matter made by other NASBs that strike you as interesting 
or surprising? 
Prompt: 
o Why do you believe the UK and Ireland adopted IFRS for SMEs with major 
modifications? 
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o Why do you believe the FRC made frequent amendments on FRS 102 since its 
issuance? 
o Why do you believe other EU jurisdictions have not adopted IFRS for SMEs? 
10- Please explain the extent to which the decision regarding IFRS for SMEs aligned with your 
jurisdiction’s financial reporting culture. 
Prompt: 
o Culture is defined as a set of shared beliefs and preferences across entities 
(norms). 
o What about investors’ protection and conservatism? 
11- Were there any political factors that influenced the decision regarding IFRS for SMEs? 
Prompt: 
o Politics is the outcome of interested stakeholders’ influence on other organisations 
and how these stakeholders reach their desired outcomes. 
o What about the influence of the EC and the IASB? 
o Does the FRC decision with regards to IFRS for SMEs have any implications on 
its role or position as the UK national accounting standard setter?  
12- Are there any other important issues you wish to raise? 
13- Can you name anyone else whom it would be useful for me to interview? 
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Appendix C: Consent Form 
CONSENT FORM 
 
An exploratory study of accounting standard setters’ decision-making processes: The case 






















Participation   
I have been given information explaining about the study.      
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study.    
I have been given satisfactory answers to all my questions.   
I agree to take part in the study. Taking part in the research involves being interviewed.   
I agree for the interview to be recorded (audio). However, if you wish the interview not to be 
recorded, detailed notes will be taken instead. 
  
I agree for the interview to be transcribed   
I understand that my participation is voluntary; I can withdraw from the study at any time 
and I do not have to give any reasons for why I no longer want to take part. 
  
Would you like to receive a copy of the interview transcript?   
Department of Accounting and Finance                              
Mr. Mohammad Wazzan 
E-mail: m.wazzan@bristol.ac.uk 
 
Brief Project Outline: 
This study aims to develop a better understanding of the decision-making process of national accounting 
standards boards (NASBs) by examining international variation in the adoption of IFRS for SMEs in 
the European Union (EU). The study explores factors that influence FRC’s decision with regard to IFRS 
for SMEs. 
At all times, the University of Bristol’s research ethics policies and processes will be applied. This 
ensures confidentiality and anonymity for all participants. Each interview is scheduled to last between 
30-60 minutes. All participation is voluntary and should you wish to withdraw at any time from the 
study then you are free to do so without reason or explanation, and your responses will be permanently 
erased. The data collected from participants will be anonymized, kept secure under password protection. 





Use of the information I provide for this study only 
  
I understand my personal details such as phone number and address will not be revealed to 
people outside the study. 
  
I understand that my words may be quoted in publications, reports, web pages, and other 
research outputs. However, any identifying information such as personal details will not be 
used in any quoted materials 
  
 
The researcher can use the information you provide legally 
  
I agree to assign the copyright I hold in any materials related to the study entitled: “An 
exploratory study of accounting standard setters’ decision-making processes: The case 





________________________ ______________________       _________________ 
Name of participant [printed]  Signature                  Date 
 
        Mohammad Wazzan                                   16 July 2019 
Name of researcher [printed]  Signature                        Date 
 
If you have any ethical concerns related to your participation in this study please direct them 
to the Joint Chairs of the School of Economics, Finance and Management’s Research Ethics 
Committee: Dr. Chinyere Uche (chinyere.uche@bristol.ac.uk) or Dr. Stephan Heblich 
(stephan.heblich@bristol.ac.uk). 
226 







16 July 2019 
  
Dear [Participant’s Name], 
 
An exploratory study of accounting standard setters’ decision-making processes: The 
case of adoption of IFRS for SMEs in the EU 
[Introduce Participant’s relevant experience and reasons for invitation]. I would like to invite 
you to participate in a study I am conducting as part of my PhD research in the Department of 
Accounting and Finance at the University of Bristol. My research aims to develop a deeper 
understanding of the decision-making process of national accounting standards boards by 
examining international variation in the adoption of IFRS for SMEs in the European Union 
taking account of the IAS Regulation which does not foresee endorsement of the IASB 
pronouncement. In this respect, I should conduct 40 interviews, thus your help is much 
appreciated. 
 
The interview lasts 30-60 minutes and it covers four main areas as follows: 
• Your role and responsibilities during the discussion with regard to IFRS for SMEs. 
• The nature of the decision-making process regarding IFRS for SMEs. 
• A discussion of IFRS for SMEs attributes. 
• Any knowledge you have on decision-making by other NASBs. 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary, does not require any preparation and 
withdrawal from the project is available at any stage. With your permission, the interview 
will be recorded and transcribed to facilitate the data analysis process. Should you wish, I 
will send you a copy of the interview transcript to allow you to confirm its accuracy. 
  
Although I do not anticipate any sensitive information to be covered during the interview, I 
will ensure that your responses and any other material provided will be anonymised, stored 
and protected in line with the University of Bristol’s research ethics guidelines. If you have 
any questions regarding this study or would like additional information to assist you in 
reaching a decision about participation, please contact me by e-mail or my supervisor 
Professor Stuart Cooper (s.m.cooper@bristol.ac.uk). 
 
If you wish to discuss any aspects of the research ethics with an independent member of the 
faculty at the University of Bristol, then please contact the Joint Chairs of the School of 
Economics, Finance and Management’s Research Ethics Committee: Dr. Chinyere Uche 
(chinyere.uche@bristol.ac.uk) or Dr. Stephan Heblich (stephan.heblich@bristol.ac.uk). 
 
If you are willing and able to participate in the research, please email me at the address above 
with some suggested dates and times, or please provide a telephone contact to enable us to 
arrange a mutually convenient time. 
 
Mohammad Wazzan 
School of Economics, Finance and Management 
12 Priory Road 
Clifton 
Bristol, BS8 1TN 




I am very grateful to you for considering this invitation and look forward to hearing from 
you. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Mohammad Wazzan 
